CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant alleges that he was sodomized by his roommate, K.W., while a patient in the adolescent psychiatric unit of respondent Good Samaritan Hospital Southwest (Hospital). He brought this action alleging that Hospital was negligent in placing K.W. in a room together with appellant, and limiting its efforts to supervise these patients to observation of each of them at 15-minute intervals, including not ordering one-on-one supervision. K.W.’s intake papers indicated that his hospitalization was involuntary, he recently had assaulted and injured his stepfather, and his younger siblings had to be protected from K.W. as a precaution.
Hospital brought a summary judgment motion, supported by a psychiatric nurse’s expert declaration, on grounds that it did not breach its duty of professional care in any respect or contribute to appellant’s injury in any way.

In May 2013, appellant Joseph Cuellar entered a negotiated change of plea to resolve this criminal matter. He pleaded no contest to three charges: (1) felony improper handling of hazardous waste (Health & Saf. Code, § 25189.6, subd. (a); count 3); (2) felony diversion of construction funds (Pen. Code, § 484b; count 42); and (3) felony willful failure to file payroll taxes (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 2117.5; count 49). He received an aggregate prison term of three years eight months, which was to run concurrently to a related federal prison sentence.
After entering his negotiated plea agreement in this matter, appellant hired new counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court denied that motion. Appellant’s only claim on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion. He contends his pleas were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. We discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Defendant Kylin Dion Smith was convicted by jury of the first degree murder of Felipe Atilano, the attempted second degree robbery of Atilano, and the attempted second degree robbery of Isidro Madera. As to count 1, the jury found true an aggravating circumstance alleging the murder was committed in the commission of a robbery, and a circumstance alleging defendant was 17 years old at the time of the murder. As to all counts, the jury found defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true an allegation that defendant had committed all counts for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). Defendant received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on count 1, with a term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement.

At the hearing on the first and final report of administrator of the estate of Edward Taggart (decedent), objector and appellant Timothy L. Taggart (Timothy ) interposed multiple objections to the accounting and requested an evidentiary hearing. The probate court denied the request, overruled his objections, approved the first and final account, and granted the fee requests and distributions as prayed. Timothy appeals, contending: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing; (2) a reference to his disciplinary record with the State Bar during the proceedings prejudiced the court such that the matter should be assigned to a different judge; and (3) multiple fixed filing fee charges are unconstitutional. We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Gabriel Ambrosio Zuniga guilty of willfully inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5; count 1), a felony, and violating a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count 2), a misdemeanor. Zuniga admitted to five alleged prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and allegations that two of those five prior offenses were serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), and 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(a)). The trial court sentenced Zuniga to 10 years in prison.
In this appeal, Zuniga contends that the erroneous admission of evidence of a previous act of domestic violence requires the reversal of his conviction. We find no error, and affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Alysia Webb (Webb) filed a verified petition for writ of mandate in superior court alleging the City of Riverside (Riverside) violated Propositions 26 and 218 when it began transferring additional revenue from electric utility reserve fund accounts into the general fund without approval by the electorate. Webb contends the court improperly dismissed her case without leave to amend on a demurrer because the 120-day statute of limitations arising under Public Utilities Code section 10004.5 does not apply to her challenge of Riverside's change in calculation of its electric general fund transfer. She further contends the fund transfers constitute a tax increase because they alter the methodology used to calculate the amount of money Riverside transfers from the electric utility reserve to the general fund. We disagree and affirm.

Mark Darulis, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a postjudgment order denying his second amended writ petition against Fire Preventive Service, Inc. (FPS) and San Miguel Consolidated Fire Protection District (the District). We affirm the order.

Mark Darulis, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a postjudgment order denying his second amended writ petition against Fire Preventive Service, Inc. (FPS) and San Miguel Consolidated Fire Protection District (the District). We affirm the order.

A jury convicted Michael Martin Garrett of residential burglary of the inhabited portion of a building (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 1), evading an officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 2), unlawfully taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3), resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 5), and hit and run driving (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 6). The trial court sentenced Garrett to a determinate sentence of four years eight months that consisted of the following individual sentences: four years on count 1; eight months on count 2, to run consecutively with count 1; three years on count 3, to run concurrently with count 1; and 180 days each for counts 5 and 6, both to run concurrently with count 1.

Sheila Halousek filed an administrative complaint with the State Personnel Board (SPB) against her employer, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), alleging discrimination based on a perceived mental disability, failure to reasonably accommodate, and failure to engage in an interactive process. After the SPB ruled against her, Halousek brought suit in the Sacramento County Superior Court on the same facts and legal theories rather than filing a petition for writ of administrative mandamus seeking to overturn the SPB’s adverse decision. The trial court sustained a CalPERS demurrer without leave to amend, ruling, among other things, that Halousek’s lawsuit is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Representing herself, Halousek now contends CalPERS took illegal action against her resulting in the constructive termination of her employment.

G.R. (Mother) challenges a juvenile court jurisdictional order finding her children to be persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Mother contends there was insufficient evidence that her children were at substantial risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Timothy Cook (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of importing a controlled substance. Defendant challenges only his sentence, seeking retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 180, to vacate the sentence enhancement imposed under the recently amended Health and Safety Code section 11370.2. Respondent does not oppose striking the enhancements. We affirm the judgment, but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Whitney Royal (defendant) appeals from the order for restitution made as part of her probationary sentence. She contends that restitution was improperly awarded to the victim of a crime for which defendant was not convicted, and that the award was not reasonably related to her offense or to deterrence of future criminality. Finding no merit to defendant’s contentions, we affirm the order.

Twenty-two months after her home was made uninhabitable by fire damage, octogenarian Margarita Rodriguez (plaintiff) sued her lender, defendant Banco Popular North America (BPNA, the bank), on a variety of legal theories stemming from BPNA’s failure to disburse any of the insurance proceeds covering the fire loss. Defendant filed a demurrer based on federal preemption and the sufficiency of the allegations. It also filed a verified cross-complaint in interpleader, depositing with the court the insurance proceeds it had been holding, minus the amount it retained to retire the mortgage. Plaintiff in turn demurred to the interpleader cross-complaint, contending interpleader was not appropriate because BPNA was independently liable to her for damages based in part on the delay in disbursing the insurance proceeds.