CA Unpub Decisions

After granting K.V. and D.V.'s (the V.s) application to become de facto parents of L.H., the trial court, sua sponte, ordered that the V.s receive confidential reports pertaining to L.H.'s dependency. L.H.'s father, R.D., objected to the release of the reports, but the trial court overruled R.D.'s objection. Two days later, R.D. filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's sua sponte ruling ordering the disclosure of confidential reports and sought a stay of the court's order. R.D. attached a copy of this court's decision in B.F., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 811 to his motion. In B.F., this court stated, "De facto parents do not have an automatic right to receive the Agency's reports and other documents filed with the court." (Id. at p. 817.) Instead, we explained, "[De facto parents] have standing to petition the juvenile court for the right to inspect or copy the case file." (Id. at p. 818.)

Public Resources Code section 21167.4, subdivision (a), a provision of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), provides: "In any action or proceeding alleging noncompliance with [CEQA], the petitioner shall request a hearing within 90 days from the date of filing the petition or shall be subject to dismissal on the court's own motion or on the motion of any party interested in the action or proceeding." (§ 21167.4, subd. (a).) The primary purpose of section 21167.4 is to expedite CEQA litigation. Several appellate decisions have construed section 21167.4, subdivision (a) as requiring a written request for a hearing to serve the purposes of the statute. (See, e.g., Torrey Hills Community Coalition v. City of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 429, 439-442 (Torrey Hills); County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 943, 948-952 (County of Sacramento).)

Nehemiah L. McIntosh appeals a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of one count of residential burglary and one count of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 496, subd. (a).) McIntosh admitted a prior conviction for robbery. (§ 211.) The trial court sentenced McIntosh to eight years for the burglary conviction, and stayed a sentence of four years for receiving stolen property. Based on the prior robbery conviction, the court imposed both a five-year serious felony prior enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a one-year prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court stayed the one-year enhancement. On appeal, McIntosh contends the court should have stricken, rather than stayed, the one-year enhancement. The People concede the issue. We agree and remand the matter with directions to strike the one-year prior prison term enhancement and will order the abstract of judgment amended accordingly. We affirm the judgment in all other resp

Defendant, Adam Teifer Jacob, appeals from a final judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are found in the Penal Code) with a knife enhancement alleged under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 25 years plus one year for the use of a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).

Defendant, Adam Teifer Jacob, appeals from a final judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are found in the Penal Code) with a knife enhancement alleged under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 25 years plus one year for the use of a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).

Defendant and appellant Lela R. Dennis pleaded no contest to a charge of exhibiting a deadly weapon to a police officer in violation of Penal Code section 417.8. The trial court sentenced defendant to three years in state prison.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment after a guilty plea and checked the box on the appeal form indicating the appeal was based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea. We appointed counsel for defendant on appeal. On March 21, 2018, counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no issues but asking this court to independently review the record for error.

Cruzito Herrera Cruz appeals from the judgment entered after he pled no contest to felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)) and interference with a wireless device (§ 591.5). Pursuant to the negotiated plea, the trial court dismissed three counts for dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (c)) and battery (§ 242), and granted probation subject to the condition that appellant pay a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $30-a-month probation supervision fee, a $80 court security fee (§ 1465.8), and a $60 criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373). A $300 probation revocation fine was imposed and stayed. (§ 1202.44.)

M.M. (Mother) appeals from the August 9, 2017 order terminating her parental rights. She argues the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). She contends the juvenile court did not determine the home state, which was Missouri, and never conferred with Missouri as to whether it wished to exercise jurisdiction over the dependency case. Although the trial court failed to comply with the UCCJEA, we affirm because the court’s assumption of emergency jurisdiction was proper. We remand to the juvenile court to allow it to contact and provide notice to the Missouri court.

The juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over two young boys. The mother of both boys, and the father of one of them, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and the father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the removal of his son from his custody. We conclude substantial evidence supports at least one basis for dependency jurisdiction as to each child, as well as the court’s removal order. We accordingly affirm.

James Daniel Elliott appeals an order denying his petition to reclassify his 2012 conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, “the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subds. (f) & (g).) We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a new order designating the conviction as a misdemeanor. (Ibid.)

Alejandro Salas appeals a sentence the trial court imposed after it revoked his parole for a parole supervision violation. (Pen. Code, § 3000.08.) The court imposed a 120-day period of confinement in the county jail for Salas’s violation and ruled that period would run “consecutively to any time he is serving otherwise.” (Italics added.) We conclude, among other things, that the trial court lacked authority to run a period of confinement for a parole violation consecutively to a sentence on another criminal case. The portion of the judgment imposing a consecutive sentence is stricken; as so modified, we affirm.

S.M., a mentally disordered offender (MDO; Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.), appeals an order authorizing the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to treat his severe mental disorder. (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1.) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to represent himself and the evidence does not support the finding that he lacks the capacity to refuse treatment. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Darin McLemore brought an action for dental malpractice against several defendants, including respondents Alejandro Hurtado, D.D.S., and Jung Joo Park, D.D.S. Respondents filed separate motions for summary judgment, arguing that McLemore’s action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The trial court ruled that the limitations period commenced when McLemore sent a March 27, 2014 email (the March 27 email), in which McLemore explained the injuries he had suffered as a result of respondents’ treatment and discussed the possibility of litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that McLemore’s notice of intent to sue, and his complaint, were filed after the expiration of the one-year limitations period. We affirm.

In a negotiated disposition, V.H. admitted he had assaulted a fellow high school student and was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court and ordered into the camp community placement program. V.H. admitted multiple probation violations shortly thereafter. Ultimately, the juvenile court committed him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) following a contested disposition hearing. On appeal, V.H. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJF rather than a less restrictive setting. Having considered the record as a whole, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the dispositional order.