CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Abraham Castro Gonzalez pled no contest to attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187/count 3), domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)/count 5), and making criminal threats (§ 422/count 6). On appeal, Gonzalez contends the court erred by its failure to issue an amended abstract of judgment after it amended the judgment. We find merit to this contention and will direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.

Appellant Alexander Ramirez appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transporting or selling a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379). Appellant’s plea included admissions to four special allegations that appellant violated section 11370.2 based on prior convictions under sections 11378, 11379, and 11379.5. It further included a plea to one misdemeanor count of fleeing a pursuing peace officer. (Veh. Code, § 2800.1.) Appellant contends that the trial court failed to abide by the terms of his plea agreement when it sentenced him to a six-year term of incarceration. Appellant further argues both that the People did not prove he willfully failed to participate in a residential treatment program and that his sentence violates principles of equal protection. In supplemental briefing, appellant argues that Senate Bill 180, which modifies the scope of section 11370.2 is retroactive, such that his special allegation admissions are no longer valid.

Appellant Ellis Grey appeals following his convictions on one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 664) and one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). Included in appellant’s sentence are enhancements under both counts for use of a firearm (§ 12022.5) and infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7), as well as two enhancements related to prior felony convictions (§ 667.5). In his initial briefing, appellant asserts the prosecution improperly dismissed potential jurors based on their race. In supplemental briefing, appellant contends remand is required so the trial court can consider whether to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse appellant’s convictions and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant Aaron Paul Elwell was charged with attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 212.5, subd. (c), 664 [count 1]) and brandishing a deadly weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1) [count 2]). In connection with count 1, the information alleged he personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); was previously convicted of first degree burglary, a qualifying “strike” offense under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a) (e)) and serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)); and previously served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged and found true the special allegation he used a deadly weapon. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the remaining special allegations. Defendant was sentenced to six years, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction and one year for using a deadly weapon, on count 1. He also received a concurrent 90-day jail term on count 2.

§ 245, subd. (d)(1)), with firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (c), § 12022.5, subd. (a)); and one count of drawing or exhibiting a semiautomatic rifle with the intent to resist or prevent arrest by a peace officer (§ 417.8). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years eight months in prison.
The convictions were based on an incident which began when defendant communicated what appeared to be a suicide threat to a close friend who was also a Ridgecrest police officer. His friend requested that other officers perform a welfare check at the trailer park where defendant lived. When officers tried to contact him at his trailer, defendant shouted profanities, refused to walk out, and fired multiple rounds through the trailer’s walls. The officers evacuated the trailer park and called for backup assistance. The Kern County Sheriff’s Department Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team responded and surrounded the trailer. Defendant remained in the trailer for nearly si

A jury found defendants Katila Ann Jean Nash and David Deshawn Moses guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed while defendants were engaged in the commission or attempted commission of burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)). At the time of the offense, Nash was 15 years old and Moses was 17 years old, and they were tried as adults. Nash was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison, and Moses was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
This matter is presently before us for consideration for a fourth time. As set forth in our first opinion, before the joint trial on guilt, there was a jury trial on Nash’s competence and she was found competent to stand trial. Nash was 17 years old at the time of her competency trial and she raised two claims on appeal regarding the competency determination, both claims based on her age.

This case comes before us a second time. An information filed in the Merced County Superior Court charged Ryan Osmen Suarez with the murder of John Cordero. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The information further alleged Suarez (1) personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); (2) personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5) within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(2)(B); and (3) committed the offense for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). Although Suarez committed the offense when he was 15 years old, he was tried as an adult in criminal court. The victim was 15 years old as well.
A jury convicted Suarez of first degree murder and found the enhancement allegations true. The court sentenced Suarez to an aggregate, unstayed term of 50 years to life in state prison.

Defendant and appellant, Vincent Deleon, stabbed and robbed K.H. while she was standing with her child by her car in a grocery store parking lot. When a bystander pursued defendant, who fled with K.H.’s purse, defendant stabbed the good Samaritan to death.
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following jury convictions for murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder (§§ 187, 664; count 2). As to count 1, the jury also found true a special-circumstance allegation. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) As to counts 1 and 2, the jury further found true the allegation defendant used a deadly and dangerous weapon. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Also as to count 2, the jury found true the allegation that defendant inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The court sentenced defendant to life in prison without parole, plus 12 consecutive years in prison.

Defendant Charles Lewis States pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a)and Penal Code section 664, subdivision (a). Thereafter, Proposition 47 went into effect. Proposition 47 allows certain defendants convicted of specified theft or drug-related felonies to petition to have those convictions treated as misdemeanors. The trial court denied defendant’s petition under Proposition 47, on the ground that Proposition 47 does not apply to a conviction for unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle.
Defendant appeals. He contends that Proposition 47 must be construed as applying to a conviction for attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. Alternatively, he contends that, if Proposition 47 does not apply to a conviction for attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, it violates equal protection.

In case No. CM044114 (case 14), defendant Brandon Michael Wayne Almodova entered a negotiated no contest plea to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 and a stipulated sentence of the upper term of four years in county prison. Under the plea agreement defendant was to be allowed to argue for mandatory supervision.
On March 23, 2016, in case 14, the court sentenced defendant under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)(5), imposing the upper term of four years, ordering defendant to serve 365 days in local custody, and suspending execution of the remaining time, 1096 days, to be served under mandatory supervision.
A petition filed in case 14 on March 6, 2017, alleged that defendant failed to refrain from the possession of controlled substances and failed to obey all laws.

Defendant Marco Calderon appeals from the judgment following his contested probation violation hearing. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, identifying no issues and requesting that this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issue exists on appeal. We have done so and we affirm.

On August 20, 2015, Jose Francisco Orozco stole a car and was caught by police less than a mile away. About a week later, while released on bail, he carjacked the vehicle of a defense attorney in the underground parking structure of the Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles. That evening, he attempted to carjack another car but was thwarted after beating the driver.
After proceedings to determine whether Orozco was competent to stand trial, and several delays due to his serial illnesses and refusal to attend trial, a jury convicted him of felony car theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), carjacking and attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664/215, subd. (a)), and two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).

A jury convicted defendant Miguel Ernesto Alvarez of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c).) The jury also found true a criminal street gang enhancement allegation. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years in state prison—two years for the robbery plus 10 years for the gang enhancement.
We agree with defendant’s sole contention on appeal—that there was insufficient evidence to establish the two predicate offenses required to support the gang enhancement. (§ 186.22, subd. (e).) There was substantial evidence of only one predicate offense. Because there was insufficient evidence of two predicate offenses, we direct the trial court to strike the gang enhancement. We also remand this matter for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Gordon Clark appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent Joe Lewis, and from the trial court’s order denying Clark’s motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. In August of 2011, Lewis filed suit against Clark alleging he fraudulently induced him to invest approximately $500,000 in a movie finance company that turned out be an investment scam. Clark contends the trial court improperly based its rulings on inadvertent statements he made in open court admitting to personal liability for the debt owed to Lewis. We affirm.