CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Marques Adrian Gaines of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found that, in the commission of both the murder and attempted murder, defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that in the commission of the attempted murder, defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The jury further found that appellant had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and had two prior “strike” convictions (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)). The trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 176 years to life.

This case is before this court for a second time, after the California Supreme Court granted review, deferred briefing, and then transferred it back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). At issue is whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant Sean Patrick Allison’s petition to redesignate his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) as a misdemeanor. We affirm the order.

Defendant Shawncey Blake appeals from an order denying his petition to have his Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction resentenced as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47.
In 2014, voters approved Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1179 (Page).) Proposition 47 “reduced the punishment for certain theft- and drug-related offenses, making them punishable as misdemeanors rather than felonies.” (Page, at p. 1179.) Proposition 47 added Penal Code section 490.2, which provides that “obtaining any property by theft,” where the value of the property taken is $950 or less, is petty theft and shall generally be punished as a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 490.2, subd. (a).) Thus, a Vehicle Code section 10851 conviction may be resentenced to a misdemeanor “if the vehicle was worth $950 or less and the sentence was imposed for theft of the vehicle.” (Page, at p. 1187.) In addition, Proposition 47 added Penal Code sec

The present case is before this court for a second time, after the California Supreme Court granted review, deferred briefing, and then transferred it back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). At issue is whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant Freddy Casias’s petition to reduce his conviction for vehicle theft with a prior conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5) to a misdemeanor and be resentenced accordingly. We affirm the order because defendant failed to show that the value of the vehicle did not exceed $950.

E.F. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 364, subdivision (c) (all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code), continuing jurisdiction over his four-year-old son, R.F. Finding no error, we affirm.

In a prior opinion, People v. Thompson (March 14, 2017, G051654) (nonpub. opn.), a panel of this court remanded with directions to the trial court to conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) into allegations made by defendant Tony Lee Thompson (Thompson) of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court conducted a Marsden hearing, denied Thompson’s Marsden motion, and reinstated the judgment.

Eldon E. Blasco filed a lawsuit against Bahram Dadvar and Quicken Mortgage Corporation (Quicken) that asserted, among other things, a cause of action for breach of a fixed fee agreement and a separate cause of action for breach of a variable fee agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a lengthy statement of decision in which the court found that Blasco had met his burden of proving breach of the fixed fee agreement and awarded him $100,000. The court found that Blasco had not met his burden of proving breach of the variable fee agreement and awarded him nothing on that cause of action.
Dadvar and Quicken appealed from the judgment. They contend the trial court erred by awarding Blasco $100,000 because he had engaged in conduct for which a real estate broker’s or salesperson’s license was required. As Blasco was not duly licensed, Dadvar and Quicken argue he engaged in unlawful activity for which he could not recover.

On August 9, 2005, a jury convicted Cook of second degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (b)) and, in a separate proceeding, the court found true allegations that Cook had four prior convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On September 7, 2005, the court sentenced Cook to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life.
On November 6, 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform Act which made prisoners serving a third strike sentence eligible for resentencing if none of his or her prior strike convictions was for one of several enumerated felonies that included assault with the intent to commit rape that was committed by force, violence, duress, menace, etc. (§§ 1170.126, 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv), Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b).)

Appellant Brittany Leann Perez stands convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)/count 1), driving under the influence and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)/count 2), and failure of a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to stop at the scene of an accident (§ 20001, subd. (a)/count 4). It was also found true appellant fled the scene after committing a violation of Penal Code section 191.5 within the meaning of section 20001, subdivision (c).

Appellant Brittany Leann Perez stands convicted of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)/count 1), driving under the influence and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)/count 2), and failure of a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to stop at the scene of an accident (§ 20001, subd. (a)/count 4). It was also found true appellant fled the scene after committing a violation of Penal Code section 191.5 within the meaning of section 20001, subdivision (c).

Karen and David McBrien were married in 1991. Their daughter was born in 1993. In December 2004, after 13 years of marriage, Karen filed for dissolution of the marriage. During the proceeding, David was ordered to pay spousal support. The amount of spousal support has been the subject of many motions over the past 12 years. An August 10, 2006, minute order stated that, pending further order of the court, a Gavron warning was given to Karen. A May 14, 2012, minute order stated (1) the 13-year marriage was a long-term marriage, (2) David had shown no changes to warrant modification of spousal support, and (3) a Gavron warning was issued to Karen that she must take the steps necessary to become self-supporting.

Appellant/defendant Jorge Luis Aceves-Cortez (defendant) was convicted of murdering his wife, Maria, and sentenced to 15 years to life. Defendant had a history of committing prior acts of domestic violence against her, including prior beatings to her head in the year before her death.
It was undisputed that Maria died from subarachnoid hemorrhaging in her brain. Her children, the only witnesses to the incident, testified defendant either slapped or punched her in the face immediately before she collapsed.
Defendant’s trial involved a clash of opinions between the prosecution and defense experts about why the brain hemorrhaging occurred – whether the massive bleeding was the result of defendant’s infliction of blunt force trauma to her head, or she died as the result of an unrelated and coincidental rupture of a previously undiagnosed brain aneurysm.

A jury convicted defendant Deontray Robinson of the first degree murder of Jerry Mitchell, Jr., with the special circumstances that defendant committed the murder to silence a witness and while actively participating in a criminal street gang. The jury also convicted defendant of robbery, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and actively participating in a criminal street gang, and found true various firearm and gang enhancement allegations. Defendant admitted to having suffered a prior serious and violent felony conviction. The trial court declared a mistrial during the penalty phase when the jury deadlocked on whether to impose a sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to LWOP, plus 55 years to life.

William (Bill) Dickerson, his wife Heidi Dickerson, and Paradiso in Terra LLC (Paradiso, and collectively, Plaintiffs) sued general contractor Perry & Papenhausen, Inc. (P&P), its principals, and Papenhausen Construction (Defendants), as well as their subcontractors, based on the allegedly defective construction of Plaintiffs' home. Defendants cross-complained for, among other things, breach of contract. Dickerson recovered damages, and the other parties recovered nothing. Paradiso appeals from an award of costs to Defendants. We conclude the appeal is moot, in light of our partial reversal and remand for further proceedings in the nonpublished opinion Dickerson v. Perry & Papenhausen, Inc. et al. (Apr. 30, 2018, D069248) (Dickerson), and the appeal is dismissed.