CA Unpub Decisions

Greg E. Poole (father) appeals from a postjudgment order denying his requests to modify a permanent custody order and grant him a new trial, and ordering him to pay Julie E. Dembrek’s (mother’s) attorney fees as sanctions. Father asks this court to reverse the trial court’s decision. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
The postjudgment order from which father appeals, issued following a contested hearing in the trial court. The appellate record, however, does not include a reporter’s transcript from that hearing, and no reporter is noted in the minute order. Therefore, we treat this as an appeal on the judgment roll. (Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082-1083 (Allen); Krueger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.)
The limited record we have establishes that the parties were married in October 2006 and their marriage was dissolved in May 2014. Together, they have one child, born in April 2007.

Appointed counsel for defendant Denisho Demmetrius Collins filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant later filed a supplemental brief arguing that the trial court constitutionally erred by reducing his first degree murder conviction to second degree murder.
After briefing was complete, defendant’s counsel filed a supplemental opening brief arguing that we must remand the matter so that the trial court may exercise its discretion on whether to strike defendant’s firearm enhancement under legislation that became effective January 1, 2018. We conclude the trial court properly reduced defendant’s conviction to second degree murder. We agree, however, that remand is necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the recent amendment t

After a jury found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), defendant Joseph Ferriero admitted to suffering four prior drug convictions (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)). On appeal he contends: (1) the trial court erred in failing to advise him of his Boykin-Tahl rights as well as the penal consequences of an admission before taking his admission to the prior convictions; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to an officer’s testimony revealing defendant was an informant; and (3) his trial counsel also rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the officer’s testimony because it pertained to bona fide negotiations. Finally, in a supplemental brief, defendant contends reversal is required in light of the Legislature’s partial repeal of section 11370.2. Defendant’s final contention has merit, and we will remand for resentencing.

The subjects of this appeal are R.B., Jr. (born January 2015) and S.R. (born December 2016). Appellant R.B. (Father) is the children’s presumed father; the children’s mother, C.R. (the mother), is not a party to this appeal. The juvenile court sustained allegations that Father and the mother engaged in domestic violence in R.B., Jr.’s presence, and declared both children dependents pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) , and (b)(1). Father does not challenge the court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), that he was negligent in not protecting his children, but does challenge the finding under section 300, subdivision (a), that he intentionally harmed them. Father contends “[w]hat the evidence does not show, and something the juvenile court did not find to be true, was that either [R.B.] or [S.R.] [was] physically harmed during any domestic violence incident.”

R.F. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her son A.K. (born in October 2010) arguing that the dependency court erred in finding the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply to the relationship between her and her son. We affirm.

Appellant B.T. (Mother) appeals from juvenile court orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights under section 366.26 with respect to her son, N.T. (born November 2014). Mother maintains that she satisfied her burden under section 388 to establish changed circumstances and best interests to warrant either resumption of reunification services or return of N.T. to her custody, and that the juvenile court therefore erred in denying her petition. She further contends that in the event we reverse the order denying her petition, we must also reverse the order terminating her parental rights. We conclude that Mother has not demonstrated error and therefore affirm both orders.

In an unpublished opinion, we reversed the first degree murder conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) of defendant and appellant Jonathan Duke. (People v. Duke (Jan. 17, 2017, B264579).) We offered the prosecution the option either to retry Duke for first degree murder, or to accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction for second degree murder. (See People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 647 [“ ‘ “An appellate court is not restricted to the remedies of affirming or reversing a judgment. Where the prejudicial error goes only to the degree of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, the appellate court may reduce the conviction to a lesser degree and affirm the judgment as modified, thereby obviating the necessity for a retrial.” ’ ”].) The prosecution chose the latter option, and the trial court resentenced Duke to 15-years-to-life in prison.

Keith Ervin Brown (appellant) was convicted of two counts of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. He admitted that he had prior convictions for three counts of robbery. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in state prison, calculated as follows: 25 years to life for each count, plus five years for each count pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
On appeal, appellant argues: (1) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on juror misconduct and newly discovered evidence; and (2) the trial court should have granted appellant’s motion to strike some or all of his prior strikes. We find no error and affirm.

Appellant Saul Terrell appeals from the judgment of his multiple convictions of assault with a firearm and kidnapping. Specifically, appellant argues that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s true findings on firearm enhancement allegations and one of the assault convictions. As we shall explain, we disagree but remand this matter for resentencing in light of the Legislature’s recent amendment to the law regarding the imposition of firearm enhancements. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, 12022.53.)

A jury found Hector Luna guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possession of methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)), and possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true an allegation that Luna was personally armed with a firearm when he possessed methamphetamine for sale (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c)). Luna admitted allegations that he suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction and served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to eight years in state prison.

Appellants HiteJinro Co., Ltd. (HiteJinro), and its Chairman Mon Deuk Park (Park) filed a motion under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) to strike causes of action alleged in the fifth amended cross-complaint filed by respondents Hite USA (HUSA) and Deuk Lee (Lee). The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the challenged causes of action did not arise from conduct protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. We agree with the trial court and affirm the order.

Plaintiffs Coalition Against Distracted Driving (CADD) and Stephen Joseph (Joseph) (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the third amended complaint, which alleges public nuisance and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on defendants’ failure “to adequately warn their customers about the potential safety risks and dangers of using smartphones and smartwatches while driving.” We affirm.

Father appeals in propria persona two orders relating to child support. One order dismissed his motion accusing mother of fraud. The other order modified child support. We affirm both.
FACTS
Charles and Shanna Hamm were married for 10 years before separating in 2008. There are three minor children of the marriage. The parties share legal and physical custody. Currently one child resides with each parent with only the youngest child dividing his time between both parents.

Da’ad Makhlouf (Makhlouf) appeals a judgment confirming an arbitration award obtained by Ghada Young (Young), following the denial of Makhlouf’s motion to vacate the award.
The essential issues presented are whether the award should have been vacated on the grounds that (1) the arbitrator, Judge Kennedy (Ret.), failed to disclose he had previously acted as a mediator in this matter; (2) Makhlouf did not personally sign a stipulation form for Judge Kennedy to act both as mediator and as arbitrator, in a process known as Med-Arb; and (3) the arbitrator should have disqualified himself.