CA Unpub Decisions

Derek Ryan Roden appeals a judgment following his conviction for first degree residential burglary of an occupied residence (Pen. Code, § 459), a felony, (count 1), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a), misdemeanors (counts 2 and 3). The trial court found that he suffered a prior strike serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1170.12 (b).) The court imposed an aggregate prison term of 17 years on count 1. We conclude, among other things, 1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identification, 2) Roden has not shown that his counsel provided ineffective assistance, and 3) the court did not impose an unauthorized sentence. We affirm.

Defendant Aharon Eleazar Moallem appeals his sentence for criminal threats with the use of a knife and assault with a deadly weapon. Moallem contends the trial court should have stayed his sentence on one of those two counts under Penal Code section 654. We agree. We therefore remand the case for the correction of Moallem’s sentence.

In 2007, Gail and Stanley Hollander (collectively, the Hollanders ) sued the insurer of certain artwork they owned, XL Specialty Insurance Company (XL Specialty), and various other defendants, including entities related to XL Specialty. Among those related entity defendants are the following: XL Capital Ltd. (XL Capital); XL America, Inc. (XL America); and NAC Re Corporation (NAC Re) (collectively, defendants).
In 2016, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the Hollanders had not raised a triable issue of material fact with respect to either their alter ego/single enterprise or agency theories of liability. The Hollanders appealed, arguing that they had submitted sufficient admissible evidence to proceed to trial against defendants on those theories. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Jabari Haleem Muied of first degree residential burglary. On appeal, Muied contends the trial court violated his rights by accepting his admission of a prison prior under Penal Code section 667.5(b) without advising him of his rights. We agree. We therefore reverse the one-year enhancement to Muied’s sentence and remand the case for the People to decide if they wish to try the enhancement allegation.

On appeal, it is undisputed that defendant Gustavo Armando Luna, Jr. shot and killed a rival gang member, Christopher Hernandez. Hernandez’s family saw the shooting, which occurred just after Hernandez’s sister’s middle school graduation. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder.
Defendant argues that the following error requires automatic reversal of his conviction: (1) the trial court’s comments on reasonable doubt during jury selection, which defendant contends lowered the burden of proof; and (2) the trial court’s denial of defendant’s peremptory challenge when the trial court granted the prosecution’s Batson/Wheeler motion. We conclude there was no structural error. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court’s comments could not reasonably have been understood to lower the prosecution’s burden of proof. Second, although the trial court failed to set forth explicitly his reasoning for denying the peremptory challenge, as a matter gov

G.D. (Mother) and J.D. (Father; together, Parents), parents of seven-year-old B.D., brought separate writ petitions to try to avert a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 that had been set for March 21, 2018. B.D. was taken from them in January 2016, at age five, because their home was dirty and unsanitary. Father contends the court’s findings were unsupported by substantial evidence, and by conflating a supplemental petition with an 18-month review, the court failed to make a jurisdictional finding on the supplemental petition, improperly proceeded to disposition on the supplemental petition, failed to give required notice of the disposition hearing, and failed to make necessary findings on disposition of the supplemental petition. Mother, too, contends necessary findings for the section 387 petition were omitted, the evidence was insufficient to support implied findings, and the court erred in combining an unnoticed disposition hearing with the jurisdicti

This appeal is from a judgment following a court trial, which holds Darwyn Fair (Mr. Fair) liable to Verde Peninsula Fund II, LLC (VPF) for damages in the amount of $184,000. Mr. Fair, a Michigan attorney who has represented himself throughout these proceedings, contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court made several errors of fact and law. We affirm.

This is the second appeal before this court arising out of defendant Thelmeas Walker’s conviction on one count of forcible rape during a residential burglary, enhanced for personal use of a firearm. Defendant received a prison term of 25 years to life for the forcible rape count, with a consecutive 10-year term for the firearm enhancement. On October 30, 2014, this court affirmed the judgment in a nonpublished decision, and the California Supreme Court thereafter denied his request for review. (People v. Walker (Oct. 30, 2014, A134924) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Jan. 14, 2015, S222982.)
On March 30, 2017, defendant, representing himself, filed a motion based on a newly enacted voter initiative to “Set Aside Juvenile Offender’s Conviction and Remand All Further Proceedings to Juvenile Court Unless People Motions to Transfer Case to Adult Court, and Juvenile Court Orders Such Transfer [Pub. Saf. Rehab. Act of 2016; Cal. Const., Art. I, Sec. 32.].” The trial court thereafte

Sean Moore was charged with felonious assaults on two San Francisco police officers. At the preliminary hearing on these and other charges, the defense argued the arresting officers were not acting “in the performance of [their lawful] duties”—a required element for several charges. The preliminary hearing magistrate ruled that factual disputes about whether Moore assaulted the officers and whether the officers used reasonable force to arrest him for the assaults should be submitted to a jury. Moore was held to answer on most of the charges, and he renewed his arguments before the superior court in a Penal Code section 995 motion. The superior court found insufficient evidence that the officers were lawfully performing their duties when Moore committed the alleged crimes and set aside eight counts. The People appeal. On the factual record before us, we affirm.

Appellant Lefty, LLC (Lefty) appeals from an adverse judgment against it following a bench trial, asserting the trial court erred in enforcing what it contends is an invalid liquidated damages clause. Lefty advances two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court improperly evaluated the reasonableness of the liquidated damages amount by looking in hindsight to the actual damages suffered, not to the anticipated damages at the time the clause was agreed to, and (2) even if the trial court correctly looked to anticipated damages, it improperly evaluated the reasonableness of liquidated damages by including certain costs that were not eligible for inclusion in its calculation of anticipated damages. We see no merit to either argument and therefore affirm.

This case arises from the City of Santa Rosa’s (City) decision to turn a 69-bed defunct hospital into a facility called the Dream Center (sometimes “Project”), which would house 63 young adults, ages 18 to 24, and would provide individual and family counseling, education and job training, a health and wellness center serving the community for ages 5 through 24, and activities for residents, including a pottery throwing area, a half-court basketball area, and a garden to be tended by the residents. The Dream Center was sponsored and largely funded by real party in interest, Social Advocates for Youth (SAY). Two neighbors, Charles T. Jensen and Robert Turley (appellants), challenged the Project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) on the grounds that, among other things, noise impacts from the Project required preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). The City instead issued a negative declaration signifying it

Defendant Timothy Benjamin Gleason was convicted after jury trial of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and attempted first degree burglary (§ 664). The jury found true the allegation that defendant used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the first degree burglary (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true the allegations that a person was present in the residence at the time of the commission of each offense (see § 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The trial court placed defendant on probation with various terms and conditions, including that he have no contact with the victims.

This case concerns defendant Manuel Antonio Mendoza’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, which was added in 2014 by Proposition 47 (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2014) text of Prop. 47, § 14, pp. 73-74, eff. Nov. 5, 2014; see Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a)), also known as “the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act.” (Voter Information Guide, supra, text of Prop. 47, § 1, p. 70). Proposition 47 “reduced the punishment for certain theft- and drug related offenses, making them punishable as misdemeanors rather than felonies.” (People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1179 (Page).) “To that end, Proposition 47 amended or added several statutory provisions, including new Penal Code section 490.2, which provides that ‘obtaining any property by theft’ is petty theft and is to be punished as a misdemeanor if the value of the property taken is $950 or less. [Citation.] A separate provision of Proposition 47, codified in Pe

Claude Knafo appeals from an order awarding $66,103 in attorney fees to Collectors Universe, Inc., a company that grades the quality of sports trading cards. Knafo’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by awarding Collectors the attorney fees it incurred in defense of Knafo’s complaint, rather than confining its award to the fees incurred in connection with Collectors’ cross-complaint. According to Knafo, because his complaint contained no reference to any contractual attorney fee claim, it could not give rise to such a claim on behalf of his opponent.