CA Unpub Decisions

Respondent Matthew Wejbe was charged with multiple crimes after he was found in possession of stolen property during a police encounter. There is no dispute he was unlawfully detained at the outset of the encounter. The only question is whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule requires suppression of the stolen property on that basis. Answering that question in the affirmative, the trial court dismissed the charges against Wejbe. On appeal, the People contend the attenuation and inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply so as to salvage the case. We agree that intervening circumstances attenuated the taint of Wejbe’s unlawful detention. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Claude Knafo appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Collectors Universe, Inc., a company which grades the quality of certain sports collectibles, including trading cards. Knafo submitted a 1972 Julius Erving trading card to Collectors for grading, and Collectors returned the card to him in a tamper-proof case bearing a label that incorrectly described the card as being in perfect “Gem Mint 10” condition. Collectors quickly realized its error and requested Knafo return the card to it for correction of the mistaken description.

This case is a perfect reminder of the critical role a complete record plays in an appeal. After being bitten by a dog owned by defendant Lisa Mukai, and under the control of her son, defendant Brian Lenorud (defendant), plaintiff Howard Gensler filed suit alleging claims of battery, negligence and statutory strict liability, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. A jury found in plaintiff’s favor on the negligence and strict liability causes of action, awarding him approximately $7,500 in compensatory damages. The battery cause of action and the issue of punitive damages never reached the jury because the trial court granted nonsuit as to both.

A jury convicted Michael Brian Milutinovich of attempted lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 288, subd. (a); count 1), and arriving at an arranged meeting place for the purpose of lewd activity with a minor (§§ 288.4, subd. (b); count 2). The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years on count 2, and imposed a consecutive one-year term on count 1.
Defendant argues the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior uncharged sexual offenses, and the court violated section 654’s prohibition against double punishment by imposing a consecutive one-year term on count 1.
We conclude the court properly admitted three instances of prior uncharged sexual offenses. The Attorney General concedes the court’s sentence violates section 654, and we accept the Attorney General’s concession. We modify the judgment to impose a section 654 stay on count 1. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiffs Mark R. Estacion (Mark), Richard A. Estacion (Richard), and Scott A. Estacion (Scott; collectively plaintiffs) appeal from an order denying their motion to disqualify Charles K. Mills (Mills) from acting as attorney for defendant Sharon Morgan (defendant). They claim uncontroverted evidence supported a finding of disqualification, the court relied on an incorrect legal standard in denying the motion, and the court failed to weigh the interests of maintaining ethical standards of professional responsibility against a party’s right to counsel of her choice. In the disqualification motion plaintiffs also asserted defendant and Mills had stolen documents and on appeal they maintain the court erred in failing to require their return and prohibiting defendant from using them in the case.
The court ruled there was insufficient evidence to support the motion, much of which was based on speculation. We agree and affirm.

Bank of New York Mellon (Mellon) appeals from an order denying its anti-SLAPP motion to strike the first amended cross-complaint of First Foundation Bank (First Foundation). First Foundation sued Mellon after Mellon failed to transfer bonds it was holding as security for a line of credit for San Miguel Equities, LLC (San Miguel.) First Foundation allegedly wired Mellon $5.5 million to pay off the line of credit. Mellon took the $5.5 million, but did not transfer the bonds. It subsequently interpleaded them.
The trial court denied Mellon’s anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that, first, Mellon had not shown that First Foundation’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity and, second, even if the activity was protected, First Foundation had established likelihood of succeeding on the merits. In denying Mellon’s request for discharge under the interpleader statute, the court had already ruled that Mellon was not a mere disinterested stakeholder.

This is appellant Zaman Kabir’s fourth trip to the Court of Appeal in the same case. It is at least one trip too many. All the issues raised in this appeal have been adversely decided as to Kabir in at least one of two previous appeals. In deciding the last of these, we carefully explained why he could not repeatedly raise the same issues in serial appeals. This explanation fell on deaf ears. We now affirm the order denying Kabir’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered against him in 2010.
Respondent Behnaz Shahbazi has moved for sanctions for a frivolous appeal, and we grant the motion. We impose sanctions payable to Shahbazi in the amount of $5,000 and payable to the Court of Appeal in the amount of $2,500.

In 2012 ADX Components (ADX) was operating out of two units in a condominium industrial park in Santa Ana. It was the tenant of JEDA Investments, which in turn was part of the park’s owner’s association.
The owner’s association wanted to sell two other units in the condominium, and thought a new roof was needed, so they hired roofing contractor SBR Construction (SBR) to do the work. The 10-day weather forecast looked dry, giving SBR adequate time to complete the roof. But when a Santa Ana inspector canceled an inspection, SBX could not complete the roof on time.
By now, a storm was brewing. SBX constructed a temporary roof (mostly plastic) to ride out the storm, but when it hit with unexpected ferocity, water got into ADX’s units. SBX covered ADX’s boxes of inventory, but the units were still exposed to moisture. ADX sued SBR, claiming it did not receive adequate shelter from the storm, and as a result lost the value of much of its inventory – so much so it even

Marshall S. Sanders and Lydia O. Sanders appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants PNC Bank, N.A., doing business as PNC Mortgage (PNC), and Bank of America, N.A. However, Marshall Sanders’s opening brief, which is a virtual clone of an earlier opening brief we ordered stricken, is devoid of any statement of facts, cogent legal argument, or citations to the lengthy appellate record. The brief does contain an impressive table of contents, but unfortunately that table bears no relationship to the content of the brief itself.
Sanders’s opening brief fails even to acknowledge that the judgment he challenges was the product of a motion for summary judgment, let alone provide any analysis of why the trial court might have erred in granting that motion. Accordingly, Sanders has failed to meet his appellate burden, and we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Nicosia Contracting International LLC sued a former employee, Harrison Rees, for defamation and interference with contractual relationship. The basis of the lawsuit was Rees’ report to the Anaheim Fire Department that Nicosia had installed substandard parts in a building it had constructed in Anaheim.
Rees responded with an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion and denied Nicosia’s subsequent motion for new trial. Nicosia has appealed from the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion.

In a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602), the People alleged minor Joshua R., committed one count of misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594).
At the jurisdictional hearing on July 27, 2017, the court found the misdemeanor vandalism count true. At the dispositional hearing on August 18, 2017, the court adjudged Joshua R. a ward of the court, granted probation, and released him to his father. One of the conditions of Joshua R.’s probation was that he could not leave Kern County without first obtaining consent of his probation officer.

Defendant Manuel Mendez contends on appeal he is entitled to an additional day of actual custody credit and two additional days of conduct credit. We modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Shabreena Khan pled no contest to one felony count of violating Welfare and Institutions Code section 10980, subdivision (c)(2). She was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. Khan appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Dartagnan Tadaryl Hutcherson (appellant) contends his drug and firearm possession conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) after appellant filed a presentence motion, listing a desire for a Marsden hearing, as a basis to withdraw his plea. Because the motion was, in substance, a challenge to the validity of the plea itself, we dismiss the appeal for failing to obtain a certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.)