CA Unpub Decisions

Muye Liu and Trigmax Solutions LLC (collectively, defendants) appeal from the trial court’s partial denial of their anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dongxiao Yue has degrees in physics and computer science; his papers have been cited in “prestigious research journals.” From 2002 to 2008, Yue assisted a family in a “well publicized” custody dispute in Tennessee. In 2012, Yue established a “Chinese language . . . community Web site” called Zhen Zhu Bay (ZZB).

Plaintiff Junho Hyon, acting in propria persona (pro. per.) sued the governor and the State of California for constructive fraud. On appeal, Hyon challenges an order declaring him a vexatious litigant as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b), requiring him to obtain a prefiling order before filing any new litigation in propria persona in state courts (§ 391.7), and directing him to post security to pursue his lawsuit (§ 391.3). He also challenges an order dismissing his complaint after he failed to post the required security. We shall affirm the challenged orders.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree burglary, misdemeanor theft, and misdemeanor trespass. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 376, “Possession of Recently Stolen Property as Evidence of a Crime.” We reject defendant’s claim and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Michelle S. of two counts of sexual intercourse with a child age 10 or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)) and, during a subsequent time period, continuous sexual abuse of a child age 14 or younger (§ 288.5). Defendant is serving concurrent prison terms of 25 years to life on the first two counts, consecutive to a term of 16 years on the third count. Defendant contends that with respect to the first two counts, the evidence required the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of statutory rape, defined as unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than the perpetrator. (§ 261.5, subd. (c).) The lesser offense carries a maximum penalty of three years (§§ 261.5, subd. (c), 1170, subd. (h)(1)) rather than the life sentence imposed for sexual intercourse with a minor age 10 or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)). We agree the pleadings and state of the evidence required instruction on the lesser

While being pursued by the police, defendant Alexander D. Yohn, who was highly intoxicated, ran a red light and struck and killed motorcyclist Andrew Silva. As a result, a jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a) and 191.5, subd. (a).) Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries over defendant’s Evidence Code section 352 objections, and that the error had the effect of violating his right to due process of law. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence and affirm the judgment.

Joseph A. Jolson and Kathleen Rohan Jolson as trustees of The Jolson 1996 Trust (the Jolsons) filed a lawsuit against Mark B. Pasternak and Myriam Kaplan Pasternak, individually and as trustees of The Mark B. Pasternak and Myriam Kaplan Pasternak 2005 Trust (the Pasternaks) challenging the scope of the Pasternaks’ use of an easement. The court determined the Pasternaks have a right to utilize their easement over the Road to Ranches (Road) for all current uses except the Outstanding in the Field events or third party events. The court also required the Pasternaks to maintain the Road “in the condition which it has been maintained heretofore.”

S.J. (the minor) was placed in protective custody on May 10, 2017, when she was approximately 11 months old. The Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services, real party in interest (Department), filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the failure of the mother, M.R. (Mother, or Petitioner) and the father, J.J. (Father) to protect and provide support for their child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The Department alleged that Mother, who was homeless, had criminal, mental health, and substance abuse histories that significantly impaired her ability to care for the minor, and that the minor had been exposed to instances of domestic violence involving Mother and Father. The court sustained the allegations of the petition in July 2017 and granted the parents family reunification services. In February 2018, after a six-month review hearing, the court terminated Mother’s and Father’s family reunification services and scheduled

A.L. (then two) and S.L. (then three; collectively, the minors) were placed in protective custody on May 9, 2017. The Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed juvenile dependency petitions on behalf of the minors alleging, inter alia, the failure of the mother, A.L., (Mother) and the father, S.L., (Father) to protect and provide support for their child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The Department alleged that Mother abused controlled substances (including methamphetamine) while acting as the primary caregiver, thereby placing the minors at substantial risk. It alleged further that Father was unable or unwilling to protect the minors from Mother’s behavior. The court sustained the allegations of the petition in July 2017, granted Father family reunification services, and denied services to Mother. On January 31, 2018, after a six-month review hearing, the court terminated Father’s family reunification servic

R.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order in the juvenile dependency petition filed on behalf of seven-year-old M.G. (daughter). In that order, the juvenile court placed daughter with father, granted him sole legal and physical custody, authorized father to relocate to New Jersey, and terminated its jurisdiction over daughter.
We find no error and will affirm the order.

Defendant Han Quoc Hoang was convicted by jury trial of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), by personally discharging a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). On appeal, he contends that the court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury, in accordance with CALCRIM No. 505, that to justify his killing of the victim on a theory of self-defense, defendant had to have acted “only because of” the reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. We find no instructional error and therefore must uphold his conviction.

Defendant Fernando Alonzo was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes for shooting at a rival gang member. On appeal, he does not dispute he carried out the shooting. Instead, he challenges the jury’s finding he committed it to benefit a criminal street gang in which he was an active participant. In defendant’s view, the gang charges were not proven by admissible evidence, they lack substantial evidentiary support, and the jury was misinstructed on their elements. We disagree with these contentions. As the People concede, however, the case must be remanded to allow defendant to make a record relevant to his future parole hearing, and to permit the trial court to decide whether to dismiss certain sentencing enhancements. Thus, while we affirm the judgment, we remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs and appellants Tom Beyl and Cindy Beyl (collectively, Beyls) sued defendant and respondent City of Yorba Linda (City) to challenge the validity of special assessments the City levied under the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 22500 et seq.; Act). The Beyls seek a judicial declaration the City violated Proposition 218 and the Act in levying the assessments for fiscal year 2015/2016, and a writ of mandate compelling the City to comply with Proposition 218 and the Act. The Beyls also allege the City violated the constitutional prohibition against gifts of public funds by using public funds to improve private property, and they seek an injunction to prevent the City from doing so in the future.

A wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) filed February 15, 2017, alleged that on November 5, 2016, minor M.G. criminally threatened his grandmother, Margaret B. (count 1 - Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)); unlawfully, maliciously, and intentionally killed an animal (count 2 - Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (a)); committed elder abuse (count 3 - Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)); and assaulted Margaret B. with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 4 - Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) The petition was later orally amended to add count 5 for “violating probation.” (§ 777, subd. (a).)
M.G. admitted counts 2 and 4, and the court found count 5 true. The court dismissed counts 1 and 3. The court committed M.G. to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF).

Following a trial by jury, defendant Joel Vargas was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)) (count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3)) (count 3), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 4). The jury also found true the gang enhancement allegation attached to count 1 (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); that defendant used a firearm within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii), as to count 2; and the enhancement allegations for personal use of a firearm attached to counts 1 and 4 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).