CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Darrell Michael Bolefahr asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Yvette Rodriquez has asked us to review her case for arguable error. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Seeing no error that would result in a more favorable disposition for defendant, we shall affirm the judgment. We order correction of the abstract of judgment to address misplaced and omitted fines.

Defendant William Lee Ashley appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 (unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code) petition to reduce his felony conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) to a misdemeanor. He contends the trial court erred in finding his conviction ineligible for section 1170.18 relief.
We previously affirmed the denial of the resentencing petition. (People v. Ashley (Sept. 20, 2016, C080297) [nonpub. opn.].) In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition providing evidence of eligibility.

Defendant Kevin Lloyd Hubert appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 (unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code) petition for resentencing on his conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). He contends that the crime of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle comes within the resentencing provisions of section 1170.18 because it is a theft statute subject to section 490.2.
We previously affirmed the denial of the resentencing petition. (People v. Hubert (Sept. 2, 2016, C080123) [nonpub. opn.].) In this opinion, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition providing evidence of eligibility.

Respondent Rivergate of Santa Maria, LLC (Rivergate) notified visitors at its Santa Maria Pines Campground that the park was sold and slated for closure. The resident manager and two park visitors, appellants here, sued Rivergate. They alleged that Rivergate’s notice violated unlawful detainer procedure, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the Recreational Vehicle Park Occupancy Law (RVPOL).
Rivergate cross-complained against appellants, who moved to strike the cross-complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court granted the motion in part.
We conclude that the anti-SLAPP law does not apply to the causes of action at issue here, which are compulsory cross-claims related to the subject matter being litigated in the complaint. (§ 426.30.) Rivergate’s claims arose from appellants’ prelitigation conduct. The claims had to be asserted by cross-complaint or be forfeited. We affirm.

Respondent Robert B. Locke served appellants Dana and Patricia Berry with three-day notices to pay rent and quit their space at Rivergate RV Park in Santa Maria. Rivergate is a client of Locke and his law firm. Appellants filed this putative class action against Locke, alleging that the notices violated the federal and California Fair Debt Collection Practices (FDCP) Acts and the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).
Locke moved to strike appellants’ lawsuit as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The anti-SLAPP law directs courts to strike causes of action arising from a defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights to petition or to free speech, unless the plaintiff shows a likelihood of prevailing on the claim. (Id., subd. (b)(1); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.) The trial court granted Locke’s motion.

Robert Norrie (plaintiff) sued Capital One, N.A. (Capital One) and others, challenging their 2012 foreclosure and sale of his Manhattan Beach property. The trial court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. He appeals. Because plaintiff’s pending bankruptcy deprives him of standing to prosecute his claims, we affirm.

M.S. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a delinquency petition alleging that appellant committed vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). Appellant was declared a ward of the court and placed home on probation for six months. She contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that she acted with gross negligence. We affirm.

Plaintiff Anthony Udom appeals from a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiff alleged defendant the Board of Trustees of California State University committed fraud and infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.

An LLC sued one of its members to reform its operating agreement due to an “inadvertent error” made by the attorney who drafted the agreement. The LLC and the member stipulated to a judgment reforming the agreement. Both before and after judgment was entered, however, the attorney moved to intervene, claiming that his reputation was being sullied and that the stipulated judgment reflected collusion. The trial court denied both motions. Because the judgment made no express or implicit findings regarding the attorney’s competence and for the additional reasons set forth below, the trial court’s rulings were correct, and we affirm.

After a jury awarded the plaintiff $1,002 in damages in a dispute over a residential co-op board’s election, a court awarded the plaintiff’s attorneys more than 130 times that amount in attorney’s fees. After the co-op paid $124,701.22 and later sent a check for an additional $45,291.23, plaintiff’s attorneys rejected the check because it was $887.10 short in postjudgment interest and because they wanted to apply for another $4,480 in attorney’s fees. The attorneys then sought discovery and, when it went unanswered, moved to compel a response. The co-op responded that the motion to compel was moot because the plaintiff’s daughter (who was substituted in for the plaintiff after he died) had accepted the $45,291.23 check and signed an acknowledgment of the satisfaction of the judgment. The trial court ruled that the satisfaction of judgment was invalid, and granted the motion to compel. The co-op appeals.

Appellant Fredrick Berry challenges the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126 (Proposition 36). He argues the court abused its discretion when it found that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted Marcus Freeman (defendant) of pimping (Pen. Code., § 266h, subd. (a)) —that is, of knowingly deriving support and maintenance form a person he knows to be a prostitute. When the victim-prostitute could not be located in the months leading up to trial, the court admitted her preliminary hearing testimony in lieu of her live testimony at trial. Defendant asserts this violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses. We reject this assertion, and affirm.

This case is before us a second time. Appellant Ted Maslo sustained injuries following a 2008 traffic accident involving an uninsured motorist. Appellant sought payment from his insurer, respondent IDS Casualty Property Insurance Company (IDS), for the full $250,000 policy limit, which IDS refused. The parties arbitrated the uninsured motorist claim in 2011, and appellant was awarded $164,120.91. Subsequently, appellant filed a complaint against IDS, alleging that IDS had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by unreasonably delaying payment and forcing appellant to arbitrate his claim. After the trial court sustained IDS’s demurrer to the complaint, appellant appealed. We concluded that allegations pleaded in the complaint set forth a cause of action for insurer bad faith, and reversed. (See Maslo v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins. Co. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 626.)