CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Sharon Williams appeals from a civil harassment restraining order entered against her pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, after a hearing, in a proceeding brought by plaintiff and respondent Erika Rios. The restraining order expired by its own terms on January 15, 2017. Because the order has been extinguished, no appellate relief can be granted. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.

The trial court dismissed without prejudice the action brought by plaintiff and appellant Azita Zendel against the Hertz Corporation. Zendel, who represents herself, repeatedly failed to follow rules of procedure, culminating with her failure to file and serve a second amended complaint (SAC) as directed within 20 days after an order sustaining Hertz’s demurrer with leave to amend. Zendel’s adherence to the rules on appeal fares no better, as she has filed an appellant’s appendix and brief that do not comply with the rules of court, and Zendel has not included in the record on appeal reporter’s transcripts or suitable substitutes of hearings at which arguments were considered, conflicting evidence was weighed, and discretionary rulings were made. We modify the judgment to reflect that the dismissal is with prejudice, but otherwise affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Emanuel Lewis Boone of assault with a deadly weapon, with a great bodily injury enhancement. Boone appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying his self-representation request and failing to sua sponte instruct the jury regarding expert witness testimony. Discerning no prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Emanuel Lewis Boone of assault with a deadly weapon, with a great bodily injury enhancement. Boone appeals, contending the trial court erred by denying his self-representation request and failing to sua sponte instruct the jury regarding expert witness testimony. Discerning no prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Michael Deuschel (plaintiff), representing himself, sued USC Faculty Dental Practice and USC Ostrow School of Dentistry (defendants) for dental malpractice and breach of contract. During the litigation, he requested multiple stays and continuances due to medical issues. The court denied certain of plaintiff’s requested stays and continuances and ultimately granted defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals the court’s denial of his requests, which he claims should have been analyzed as requests for accommodation under Rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court (Rule 1.100). We are asked to decide whether plaintiff has affirmatively shown the trial court erred on the record presented, which includes no reporter’s transcripts of the hearings during which the court considered plaintiff’s requests and which, so far as we can discern, reveals plaintiff did not present the legal theory on which he now seeks reversal.

Defendant and appellant Anthony Wells appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent Jose Dumas in this action arising from a failed real estate transaction and business loan. Wells contends the judgment must be reversed because (1) there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of promissory fraud or fraud under Civil Code section 1572, subdivision 5; (2) there is no substantial evidence of a civil conspiracy to commit fraud; and (3) Dumas acted with unclean hands and an illegality of purpose. We modify the judgment to reduce the amount in damages awarded to Dumas, and affirm the judgment as modified.

Defendant Dwayne Leon Ellis, currently serving a third strike sentence, appeals from the denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1170.126 to recall his sentence. We find no error, and affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute about coverage under an accountant’s professional liability insurance policy. Plaintiff and appellant Martin Leffler (Leffler), an accountant, was insured by defendant and respondent Camico Insurance Company, Inc. (Camico) when Leffler asked Camico to defend him in a third-party action. Camico reviewed the claim and ultimately informed Leffler it had no duty to defend him in the lawsuit. After the third-party lawsuit concluded, Leffler sued Camico for breach of the insurance contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted summary judgment for Camico, finding Leffler’s claim was excluded under the policy because the third-party lawsuit pertained to actions taken by Leffler when he was “managing, controlling or operating” an entity other than his accounting firm named in the policy.

Appellant Ronny Salazar appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him on one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187; count 1) and two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187; counts 2 & 3) with, as to each offense, personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing death or great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and a finding he committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
Salazar claims the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting at trial (1) evidence referencing the Mexican Mafia; (2) Salazar’s recorded jailhouse conversation with another inmate in which he made self-incriminating statements; and (3) an out-of-court statement that a gang member told the police Salazar had confessed to being the shooter.

Defendant Julius Darnell Harris appeals his conviction for first degree murder and true findings regarding firearm and gang allegations; defendant Michael Dunn appeals his conviction for second degree murder and true findings regarding firearm and gang allegations.
Harris contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense and heat-of-passion. Harris also contends his lawyer was ineffective by failing to request that the jury be instructed on provocation to reduce the degree of murder. Dunn contends the trial court improperly imposed two prison priors based on the same conviction, and he is entitled to an additional day of credit. He also contends the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury on the right of a home occupant to use deadly force, and there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement. Harris joins in Dunn’s arguments.

The Contractors’ State License Board (the Board) seeks a writ of mandate and a stay to prevent the “apex deposition” of David R. Fogt. Fogt is the Board’s Registrar of Contractors, a position which makes him the Board’s secretary and chief executive officer. After real party in interest, Black Diamond Electric, Inc. (BDE), noticed Fogt’s deposition in a declaratory judgment action BDE had brought against the Board, Fogt sought a protective order to prevent the deposition. Respondent court denied the motion for a protective order, and the Board now seeks writ review.
We conclude that under well-established California law, the head of a government agency, such as Fogt, generally is not subject to deposition. “An exception to the rule exists only when the official has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action and the deposing party shows the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.”

D.B. (Minor), who had been the subject of four previous sustained wardship petitions filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, admitted allegations in a later petition that he committed grand theft of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2).) He appeals from two provisions of the juvenile court’s disposition orders. He argues that the court abused its discretion by committing him to the Challenge Academy at juvenile hall. He also argues that the court violated his due process rights by stating that he is prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm until the age of 30, because the prohibition is not authorized for the offense of grand theft of a firearm. We find no abuse of discretion, and, because the firearm prohibition had been properly imposed in the disposition of an earlier offense, we find no violation of due process. Therefore, we shall affirm.

Appellant B.M. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and the termination of her parental rights under section 366.26. Respondent concedes the juvenile court applied the incorrect evidentiary standard to the section 388 petition at the combined section 388 and section 366.26 hearing. (See In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194.) Respondent further concedes that upon this record the error cannot be deemed harmless and the matter must be remanded to the juvenile court. We agree.

After the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board (rent board) denied their petitions, certain tenants of the Midtown Park Apartments petitioned for writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) in San Francisco Superior Court, alleging their tenancies are subject to San Francisco’s Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance (rent ordinance). The superior court sustained the City of San Francisco’s (City) demurrer to the operative first amended writ petition and entered judgment for the City.
Tenants appeal. They claim their tenancies are protected by the rent ordinance because their rents were not “controlled or regulated by any government unit, agency or authority” between February and May 2014. (S.F. Admin. Code, ch. 37, § 37.2, subd. (r)(4).) We disagree and affirm.