CA Unpub Decisions

In January 2015, defendant Pharaoh Haywood filed a petition in propria persona pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18 to redesignate as a misdemeanor his 1996 felony conviction for the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). He waived personal appearance if the matter was not contested.

Angelique R. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s dispositional order bypassing family reunification services for her minor children A.R. and J.R. and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13), 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452, 8.456.) Mother contends the court violated her due process rights by conducting the hearing in her absence and by denying her request for a continuance. We deny the petition.

D.B. appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) for second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The trial court declared the offenses felonies, placed appellant at home on probation, and ordered appellant to pay a restitution fine. Appellant contends the evidence does not support the finding that he aided and abetted the robbery. We affirm.

In 164 page “briefs” accompanied by over 450 footnotes G.V. (mother) seeks review of claims that she received ineffective assistance from her trial counsel whom the juvenile court declined to remove, that the court abused its discretion in denying her request for a contested hearing on a proposed permanent plan and bypassing family reunification services, and that substantial evidence does not support the termination of her parental rights. We decline to revisit her claim that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and the court’s refusal to grant her “Marsden Motion.” We previously rejected these claims in a prior opinion in G.V. v. Superior Court (In re J.C.) (Jul. 10, 2017, B281501) [nonpub. opn.]. She has had her day in court and she lost.
Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to eight-year old J.C. and one-year old A.M. (Welf. & Inst. Code §366.26.) Mother has a history of substance abuse and involvement with the dependency syste

Nathaniel Cyprian appeals from a judgment and sentence following his convictions for two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant contends the prosecutor committed Batson/Wheeler error. He further contends the trial court erred in imposing and staying sentence enhancements based on two prior prison terms, as no evidence was submitted to prove the prior convictions. Finally, appellant contends that the matter should be remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 620) whether to strike two firearm enhancements imposed. Respondent concedes the sentence was unauthorized, and requests this court remand the matter for a new trial on the prior conviction allegations and for resentencing. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the sentence was unauthorized and that remand is the appropriate remedy. Accordingly, we affirm .

Intermedix Corporation (Intermedix), a medical billing services provider, appeals from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration with its customer, Premier Health Partners, Inc. (Premier). A written agreement between the parties, which named specific hospital locations, contained an arbitration provision. The instant dispute involves a hospital location not named in that written agreement. Appellant argues the trial court erred in determining that no applicable arbitration provision exists in the instant dispute. We disagree and affirm.

Crowell & Moring, Mark D. Plevin and Brendan V. Mullan, for Defendant and Respondent.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, concluding the insurer owed no duty to defend plaintiff Michael Sullivan, as trustee of two family trusts, in an action for soil and groundwater contamination to real property adjacent to property owned by the trusts. We agree there was no potential for coverage on behalf of plaintiff under the commercial general liability policy (CGL policy) and accordingly affirm.

Jose Cortez appeals after a jury convicted him of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, former subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that appellant had prior serious felony and strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(2) & (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subds. (a)(2) & (c)(2)(C)) and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison. He contends (1) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the expert testimony regarding his gang tattoos; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s true finding on the prior strike allegations. We affirm.

Jennifer Kwiatkowski appeals a judgment following the denial of her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) seized as a result of a traffic stop. After the denial of her motion, Kwiatkowski pled guilty to transportation for sale of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a).) We conclude, among other things, that the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop her car based on the way she was driving and that the trial court properly denied her suppression motion.
The trial court imposed an aggregate six-year split sentence with three years in county jail and three years on mandatory supervision. In reaching this sentence, the court imposed a consecutive three-year enhancement for a prior felony drug offense conviction under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c). The passage of Senate Bill 180 abolishes that enhancement (Stats. 2017, ch. 677, § 1), and this change in the law is retroactive.
We affirm.

Henry Edward Diaz II appeals from the 16-year sentence he received following his conviction for voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), with the finding that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Diaz contends the trial court erred by imposing the high term on the firearm allegation, and asks that the matter be remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement pursuant to the recent amendment to section 12022.5, subdivision (c).
We affirm.

Michael Romell Cropper appeals his conviction, by jury, of one count of indecent exposure. (Penal Code, § 314, subd. (1).) The trial court sentenced appellant to a total of four years in state prison. He contends there is no substantial evidence that he exposed himself “willfully and lewdly[,]” (§ 314, subd. (1)), and that the trial court erred when admitted evidence of his prior conviction for the same offense. He further contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance so that trial counsel could obtain a transcript of the trial on his prior offense and when it declined to instruct the jury that the prosecution failed to provide the transcript to appellant. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Nations Title Company of California, Inc. (Nations) appeals an order on remand that awarded expert witness fees in the amount of $244,376.75 to defendants and respondents Security Union Title Insurance Company dba Pacific Coast Title (Pacific), Michael Lowther, Wayne Diaz, Tony Becker and Phil Jauregui (collectively, Defendants).
Our prior decision (Nations Title Company of California v. Security Union Title Insurance Company, et al. (Jan. 25, 2016, B250490, B253840) [nonpub. opn.] (Nations I)) concluded the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for expert witness fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine which expert witness fees were reasonably necessary to Defendants’ trial preparation.
On remand, the trial court found Defendants were entitled to expert fees in the amount of $244,376.75. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination on remand and af

Defendant and appellant Jose Lewis Avila was charged with nine counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)), one count of assault with a deadly weapon, one count of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and one count of child abuse. A jury found him guilty as charged and found true the allegations, as to all counts, that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, and that, as to count 10, defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court found true the allegation that defendant suffered two prior strike convictions and a prior serious felony. Defendant was sentenced to 12 consecutive terms of 25 years to life, plus 74 years based on the enhancements. Defendant appealed his conviction. On March 7, 2016, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction in part, but concluded that the trial court misunderstood its authority in imposing, as mandatory, consecutive sentences. (People v. Avila (Mar. 7, 2016, B260179) [nonpub. opn.], at p. 16 (Avila I).)

Appellants Decision Diagnostics Corporation, Keith Berman (its president), and Pharmatech Solutions, Inc. (a subsidiary) filed a complaint for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against respondents Matthew D. Girardi, his law firm (The Girardi Law Firm, LLP), Emily Corporation and Joseph DiFabio (Emily’s president). Respondents filed a cross-complaint alleging, among other claims, that appellants had defamed Girardi by posting libelous statements on a public website. Appellants filed a special motion to strike the defamation claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court initially granted the anti-SLAPP motion, but after further consideration, denied the motion. Appellants contend the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the defamation claim did not arise out of activities protected under section 425.16. Accordingly, we affirm .