CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court granted defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions after plaintiff refused to cooperate with opposing counsel or to comply with multiple court orders to attend his deposition. Plaintiff appeals the ensuing judgment. We affirm.

Jerry Jamgotchian appeals from the trial court’s grant of a motion to compel arbitration in Ronald S. Caswell’s lawsuit against him, and the court’s award of attorney fees to Caswell. We affirm.

Jessica A. Stepp alleged that she was terminated by Fidelity National Title Group, Inc. and related entities (collectively Fidelity) on the basis of her gender and pregnancies and in retaliation for her opposition to Fidelity’s discriminatory practices, asserting claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stepp dismissed her sexual harassment cause of action during trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fidelity on her discrimination and retaliation causes of action, finding that neither discrimination nor retaliation was a “substantial motivating reason” for her termination. However, the jury found Fidelity liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and awarded Stepp a total of $1,173,849 in economic and noneconomic damages. Fidelity appeals from the judgment and from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office charged Scott Alan Lyles (appellant) with the shooting murder of Ruben Castaneda (Castaneda). (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The information alleged that appellant personally and intentionally discharged a handgun causing great bodily injury or death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d).) It was also alleged that appellant had five prior “strike” convictions and/or sustained juvenile petitions under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12), three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A jury convicted appellant of second degree murder, and found the firearm allegations to be true. Subsequently, appellant admitted the priors.

Defendant and appellant Robert Genel appeals his convictions for misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer and two counts of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. Genel contends the trial court erred by denying his Batson/Wheeler motion, and Penal Code section 21310, as applied to him, infringes his federal Second Amendment right to arm himself in his home. We affirm.

Steven Jackson appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant, in the commission of which he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a broom, and dissuading a witness from testifying. Jackson admitted a prior serious felony conviction, constituting a strike within the meaning of the three strikes law. On appeal, Jackson contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation by revoking his pro. per. status without adequate cause. Jackson also challenges the sentence enhancement for use of a deadly or dangerous weapon on the basis that the four-foot hollow plastic broom he used was not a deadly or dangerous weapon. He also contends that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on late discovery provided by the prosecution and that denial of his Pitchess motion was in error.

16-year-old D.P. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s order adjudging him a ward of the court and placing him on probation in the custody of his parents for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and shall affirm the judgment.

A.R. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward of the court and placing him on probation after he pleaded no contest to a charge of felony sexual battery. His sole contention on appeal is that a probation condition prohibiting him from viewing, possessing, or distributing any sexually explicit or pornographic images is unconstitutionally vague. The People concede the matter must be remanded for the juvenile court to modify the challenged condition. We agree that remand is appropriate to permit the juvenile court to define the material prohibited by the pornography condition with greater precision.

This is the fourth in a series of recent appeals by David DiMarino. In each instance he was found to be in violation of parole by having contact with his girlfriend, M.F., after he had been forbidden to contact her as a condition of his parole. This time it was also alleged he violated a condition of parole by deleting the phone log history on his cell phone. He admitted both parole violations and was sentenced to 150 days in jail. He appealed under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441–442. We shall affirm.

Appellant Arthur Johnson was terminated from the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) based on his sexual harassment of a coworker. He appeals from a superior court judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandate against the Regents of the University of California (University), by which he challenged his termination. Appellant contends the evidence at the administrative level was insufficient to support a finding he committed sexual harassment in violation of the University’s policy. He additionally argues the University abused its discretion by dismissing him rather than employing progressive discipline procedures. We affirm.

Defendant Eric A. Klein appeals from a judgment for plaintiffs Karen W. Diggs and Cultured Gourmet LLC (LLC, collectively plaintiffs) following a bench trial. Klein claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the LLC or, in the alternative, to disqualify plaintiffs’ attorneys.
We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Akaran Alemdii Alishlah of a felony, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, and he was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison. On appeal, Alishlah contends that the trial court erred by not sua sponte giving a jury instruction on unanimity because the offense can be based on either taking or driving a vehicle. We conclude there was no error because in closing argument the prosecutor elected Alishlah’s driving, not taking, of the vehicle as the basis of the charge. We also conclude that even if there was an error, it was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.

A jury found defendant Raymond Haamea Mataele guilty of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant or parent of his child with a prior conviction for domestic violence, felony child endangerment, and violation of a protective order. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for felony child endangerment and, alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term for the offense. He also challenges the imposition of certain fees. The Attorney General concedes the domestic violence fee should be stricken.
We will strike the domestic violence fee, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant James Colyar seeks review of an order extending his civil commitment to Napa State Hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5. Appellant contends that the order was based on expert testimony derived from case-specific hearsay, which was inadmissible under judicial authority decided after the order was filed. We conclude that the admission of the challenged evidence was not prejudicial. We will therefore affirm the order extending appellant’s commitment.