CA Unpub Decisions

J.W. (Minor) appeals from an order denying his request for a restraining order. (Welfare and Institutions Code, § 213.5.) Minor contends there was “overwhelming evidence” the order was necessary for his safety. Minor also argues the juvenile court “denied him a fair hearing on his request for a restraining order.” We disagree and affirm.

Steven DeCaprio appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus against the Alameda County Board of Supervisors and the Alameda County Tax Collector (collectively, the County). We affirm.

This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant Phoenix Campbell-Loya of assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. Defendant challenges this judgment on the grounds that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury in connection with his primary theory of self-defense, and that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance in violation of his constitutional right to counsel by failing to request an instruction permitting the jury to consider a third party’s prior assault or threats reasonably associated with the victim when evaluating defendant’s use of force against the victim. We affirm.

After a jury found him guilty of numerous terror-related crimes on school property, including attempted murder, defendant Alexander Youshock entered into a negotiated plea agreement that included a stipulation that he was legally insane when he committed count three, exploding a destructive device with intent to commit murder (Former Pen. Code, § 12308 ). The trial court thereafter imposed, and then stayed, a total prison term of 24 years 8 months, after which defendant was committed to Napa State Hospital for an indeterminate term.
Several years later, the parties stipulated that defendant’s sanity had been restored, with the result that the stay of his determinate term of 24 years 8 months was lifted, and he was sent to prison.

Antonio Santiago was sentenced to eight years in state prison for four counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14, and he challenges that sentence in two respects. First, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in choosing the aggravated term for his crimes. Second, he argues that the attorney who represented him at sentencing was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the sentence and for failing to urge leniency on the basis of Santiago’s limited cognitive abilities. We will affirm, as we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentencing decision and no prejudice from the complained-of inadequacies in defense counsel’s representation.

Defendant Decoy Alcoy Hazle appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of three counts of committing sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child of 10 years of age or less (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)) (counts 1, 4, and 5), two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child of 10 years of age or less (Pen. Code, § 288.7, sub. (b)) (counts 2 and 7), two counts of lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) (counts 3 and 8), and one count of attempted sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child of 10 years of age or less (Pen. Code, §§ 288.7, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)) (count 6). Hazle contends that his conviction on one of the counts must be reversed because two pages were missing from the third amended information. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings. Finally, he contends that his convictions were not supported by substantial evidence. We reject Hazle’s arguments and affirm

Defendant Luis Alberto Abonce Munoz pleaded no contest to felony unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle without the owner’s consent in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and a one-year jail sentence to be served on the electronic monitoring program with probation terminated on release. His plea agreement included a Cruz waiver. Defendant failed to appear for sentencing. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ formal probation subject to various conditions, including that he serve one year in county jail.

Ten years ago the trial court ruled that Akram and Fatma Quadri, not Ahmad Alkayali, owned all the stock in NeoCell corporation. This court affirmed that decision in an unpublished decision. (See Quadri v. Alkayali (Mar. 9, 2011, G042758) [nonpub. opn.] (Quadri-1).) In 2016, however, plaintiff Alkayali requested the trial court set aside the verdict on the grounds of extrinsic fraud. Alkayali’s theory was that he had found new evidence showing he was the controlling shareholder of NeoCell – three previously uncalled witnesses and the supposed malingering of a fourth, who did not testify because of ill health. The trial court denied the request and we now affirm. What was conspicuously missing from the moving papers in the set aside motion, and indeed in the briefing on this appeal, is a demonstration of how the Quadris prevented Alkayali from calling any of the three new witnesses the first time. Moreover, the Quadris submitted evidence the fourth witness was genuinely ill.

The California Supreme Court, in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 (Baral), held a special motion to strike under the California anti SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16), may be directed to specific allegations of protected activity constituting a claim for relief within a pleaded count that also includes allegations of unprotected activity. Based on Baral, defendants and appellants Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (Cerullo), Plaza del Sol Real Estate Trust (Plaza del Sol) and Roger Artz (collectively Defendants) assert the trial court erred in denying their anti SLAPP motion.

Appellant Thomas Austin Farmer, Jr., was convicted of multiple counts of child sexual abuse. His sole contention on appeal is that his pretrial statements to the police should have been excluded from his trial because they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Although appellant’s statements were elicited at a police station, he arrived there on his own and was repeatedly informed he was not under arrest and free to leave at any time. Under these circumstances, we conclude appellant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he was interviewed. Therefore, his statements were properly admitted into evidence, and we affirm the judgment against him.

Defendant Ricardo Perez was found guilty by a jury of one count of carjacking and three counts of second degree robbery. The jury also found true the sentencing enhancement allegations, pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b), that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the carjacking offense and in two of the second degree robbery offenses. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant admitted prior conviction and prior prison term sentencing enhancement allegations.

Israel Franco and Simon Gonzalez were jointly tried and convicted of aggravated assault and active participation in a criminal street gang. Gang enhancement allegations were found to be true, and Franco was additionally found to have inflicted great bodily injury upon two victims. On appeal, both men challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the gang charges and related enhancements. Gonzalez, who was found liable as an aider and abettor on certain counts, also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions. Lastly, error is alleged with regard to the use of hearsay during testimony by the People’s gang expert.
We reject the claims of insufficient evidence. The jury was improperly exposed to hearsay, but the error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm the judgments.

J.E. (father), the father of A.E., H.E. and O.E., appealed from a judgment terminating his parental rights as to the children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Father filed an opening brief contending that the juvenile court failed to adequately comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480 et seq.) On March 21, 2018, the parties filed a joint application and stipulation for reversal of judgment and remand. After our own careful review of the entire record, we conclude that the juvenile court did fail to adequately comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of ICWA, and we reverse with the requested directions.

Plaintiff and his family lived in a mobile home located on Gaston Road in Perris (the Property). A search warrant was served on the Property by the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department. During execution of the search warrant, one of the sheriff’s deputies called in Defendant to inspect the mobile home, which was in considerable disrepair. Defendant issued a code violation on behalf of the County of Riverside (the County) and ordered that electricity to the mobile home be shut off.