CA Unpub Decisions

The notices of appeal filed by appellant Pavel Parchin (Parchin), as further limited by the issues properly raised in his appellate briefing, define the scope of our review in this case. Parchin appeals from (1) a January 24, 2017, order that required him to pay $30,000 in sanctions to respondent Anastasiya Volovik’s (Volovik’s) attorneys and denied his motion to compel Volovik to pay him spousal support (the First Order); and (2) a March 28, 2017, order denying Volovik’s motion to enter a default judgment nunc pro tunc (the Second Order). Parchin presents no cognizable argument challenging the Second Order, so we consider only his arguments concerning the First, i.e., whether the record shows the family law court’s attorney fees and costs sanction was an abuse of its discretion and whether the court properly denied Parchin’s spousal support request.

A Welfare & Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of Kristin W. (born Sept. 1999); Harmony W. (born Aug. 2001); T.W. (born Jan. 2004); and S.W. (born Jun. 2009) in September 2013.
On March 9, 2015, Sh.W., mother of the four children (mother) filed a notice of appeal from termination of her family reunification services as to S.W. Mother argued that the order must be reversed due to the juvenile court’s failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). On January 27, 2016, this court filed a nonpublished opinion holding that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s determination that ICWA was inapplicable and no error occurred. (In re S.W. (Jan. 27, 2016, B263250) (the January 2016 case).)

Plaintiff employees were successful in a wage and hour class action against defendant and appellant Epsilon Plastics. Specifically, at four different times, Epsilon employees worked on a 12-hour/day schedule, under which they were paid for 10 hours at the regular rate of pay and 2 hours of overtime. This Alternative Workweek Schedule (AWS) would have been permissible if it had been adopted in accordance with the rules set forth in the applicable wage order. However, the trial court concluded, after a bench trial, that the AWS had not been properly adopted. The court further concluded that Epsilon’s failure to pay overtime for the ninth and tenth hours of work, in reliance on the improperly adopted AWS, was not in good faith. As a result of the improperly adopted AWS, plaintiffs obtained judgment for unpaid overtime, interest, waiting time penalties (Lab. Code, § 203), inaccurate wage statement penalties (Lab. Code, § 226), and attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff and appellant Andrew Egbe brought an action against defendants and respondents U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) (collectively, Defendants) asserting claims related to Defendants’ alleged failures to account for loan payments and abide by the terms of a loan modification agreement. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Russell Philmlee (defendant) appeals from his assault convictions, contending that substantial evidence did not support the judgment, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions of rape and forcible oral copulation, and that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to impeach his credibility with his two prior convictions of failing to register as a sex offender. Finding defendant’s contentions to be without merit or that any error was harmless, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joan Klass Levin appeals after the trial court granted the motion of plaintiff Bart Willoughby to enforce a settlement agreement between the parties pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing a settlement with different and more expansive terms than she agreed to on the record at a mandatory settlement conference. We agree, in part, and modify the court’s order by striking two of its provisions. As modified, the order and judgment are affirmed.

Defendant Stephen Arthur Brown failed to disclose, on an insurance application submitted to plaintiff Monterey Insurance Company, information about an apartment building’s prior claims history. After defending several claims brought by some of the building’s tenants, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Brown and others for various causes of action, including fraud, based on Brown’s misrepresentations. Plaintiff now appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Brown. The trial court granted summary judgment after concluding plaintiff had waived its right to recover because it took no action when it received documentation of the property’s loss history after the insurance application was submitted. We agree with plaintiff that there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether it waived its right to sue for the misrepresentations that Brown made in procuring the insurance policy. Accordingly, we reverse.

The sole question presented is whether defendant Brian Anthony Patterson was given a sentence in excess of his plea bargain. The salient circumstances are these:
Defendant was charged in case No. 15-9108 with committing the felony of second degree burglary on February 16, 2014, and committing the misdemeanors of possessing drug paraphernalia, shoplifting, and petty theft in January and February 2015. He and the prosecution reached a negotiated disposition of that action as follows: defendant would plead guilty to the burglary; the misdemeanor charges would be dismissed; defendant would serve 180 in the county jail; and he would be on probation for three years. In May 2015, the trial court accepted the plea, suspended imposition of sentence, and admitted defendant to probation for three years upon specified conditions, one of which was that he serve 180 days in the county jail. The maximum punishment to which defendant could be subjected was three years, but the court left the se

John Muir Health and the Board of Directors of John Muir Health (collectively John Muir) operate the John Muir Medical Center (hospital). John Muir appeals a writ of administrative mandamus compelling it to conduct, under the hospital’s medical staff bylaws (bylaws), formal peer review proceedings of disciplinary actions imposed on plaintiff Jatinder Dhillon by the hospital’s medical executive committees. We agree with John Muir that the bylaws do not provide for formal peer review of the discipline imposed in this instance. Accordingly, we shall reverse the order and remand for entry of an order denying Dhillon’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus.

In 1988, defendant Billy Allen Washington pleaded guilty to felony receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, former § 496) among other counts. The record reflects that the property at issue was a motor scooter. Defendant was placed on probation with the term to run coterminous with a six-month jail sentence.

Father (A.M.) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders removing daughter (J.R., born 2006) from her caregiver’s care. In its orders, the juvenile court made two findings that father now contests on appeal: (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that placing daughter with father would be to her detriment and (2) the notices sent by the Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) were adequate. Father argues the juvenile court’s finding regarding daughter’s placement with him was superfluous and erroneous, because daughter was not in his care at the time the dependency proceedings were initiated and he did not request placement. He also claims the notices sent by the Department pursuant to ICWA were deficient. As we explain below, father forfeited his arguments about the juvenile court’s detriment finding for failing to object below. Additional

Defendant Andrew Daniel Rodriguez shot and killed Pedro Hernandez after Hernandez used his pickup truck to hit defendant’s parked car. A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and found true an allegation that he had personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to a total term in prison of 40 years to life. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for acquittal because insufficient evidence supports his conviction, (2) the trial court erred when it admitted excessive and unnecessary gang evidence, (3) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the defense of self or another, and (4) cumulative errors denied him due process of law. For the reasons set forth below, we reject defendant’s claims of error.

Defendant Roy Lomas pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, § 311.11, subd. (a)) and was placed on three years of probation in March 2015. The trial court imposed the probation condition mandated by section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(4), which requires the probationer to waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, in response to defendant’s objections, it declined to impose the probation condition mandated by section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3), which requires the probationer to waive the privilege against self-incrimination in connection with the sex offender management program. The trial court overruled the prosecution’s objection to the court’s omission of the section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) condition.

Christina S. (mother) and D.N. (father) seek extraordinary writ relief (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450 & 8.452) from the juvenile court’s December 2017 orders terminating reunification services concerning their child Darius S. (born September 2012) at the 18-month permanency hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.22; all statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted), and scheduling a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for April 18, 2018. Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding Darius would be at risk if returned to her care, and both parents contend reasonable services were not provided or offered. Our review discloses no basis to overturn the court’s orders and therefore we deny the requested relief.