CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Cesar Gordon took Joseph Franco’s bike from a Costa Mesa Taco Bell. But Franco saw what was going on and chased Gordon down, grabbed his backpack, and threw him off the bicycle. Gordon attempted to retain the bike, and a scuffle ensued, during which Gordon landed at least one punch. Franco would later testify Gordon hit him twice in the face, and there is no issue concerning whether Gordon used force in his effort to keep Franco’s bike. Gordon was convicted of attempted robbery and petty theft and sentenced to nine years in prison.

A postal worker sued homeowners and a housesitter after he broke his wrist trying to distance himself from the housesitter’s dog. The trial court granted the homeowners’ summary judgment motion on the grounds the housesitter was not acting as their agent. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant/defendant Manuel Garcia pleaded no contest to battery with serious body injury and was sentenced to the second strike term of six years pursuant to a plea agreement. On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief that summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We affirm.

Appellant Vernon Leroy Kolb, Jr., appeals from an order for extended commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (c). Appellant contends his hearing was fundamentally unfair due to the improper admission of substantial amounts of case-specific hearsay through an expert witness. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Appellant F.C. (father) appeals from a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to his children, A.C., K.C., and A.L.C. (the children). He claims that the court erred in not applying the beneficial parental relationship exception. (Welf. & Inst. Code , § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

Appellant C.F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to her daughter, A.F. (the child). She contends that the order should be reversed because: (1) she failed to received notice of an ex parte hearing and the order from that hearing; and (2) the court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception. (Welf. & Inst. Code , § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

L.C. is the mother (Mother) of M.R. (the child), who was age 14 on the date of the challenged orders. Mother appeals from the court’s orders at the six-month review hearing: (1) denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 asking for placement or reunification services; and (2) placing the child with his father (Father) over the child’s objection. We affirm.

The trial court granted defendant and respondent, Christa Holland’s, motion in support of dismissal of the complaint. The court ruled that plaintiff and appellant, The People, were collaterally estopped from proceeding on the felony complaint due to the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) ruling in favor of defendant in an action by the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (County) to recover an alleged overissuance in CalFresh benefits received by defendant. On appeal, the People contend the court erred in applying collateral estoppel to bar prosecution of defendant because the ALJ did not decide the same issues raised by the People’s complaint. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Kevin Joseph Bartolucci pled guilty to possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (Pen. Code , § 30305, subd. (a), count 1), unlawful purchase and receipt of a firearm while subject to a restraining order (§ 29825, count 2), and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b), count 3). Defendant admitted that he committed these offenses while he was out on bail in another case. (§ 12022.1.) The court denied probation and sentenced him to a total term of five years four months in state prison. The court also ordered defendant’s guns and ammunition that were seized from his property to be destroyed.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to afford him the opportunity to transfer his firearms and ammunition to a third party before ordering their destruction.

In 2008, defendant and appellant Jessica Kelly Bock pled guilty to receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), count 1) and possession of a forged check (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d), count 4), pursuant to a plea agreement. In exchange, a trial court dismissed another count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), count 3), burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 2), and being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a), count 5), and it placed defendant on probation for a period of 36 months. Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which, among other things, established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) Defendant filed a petition for resentencing, pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18.

Defendant and appellant, Matthew Chris Richards, pleaded no contest to one count of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Subsequently, California voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which, among other things, established a procedure for specified classes of offenders to have their felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors and be resentenced accordingly. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.)
In a previous nonpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. (People v. Richards (Feb. 28, 2017, E065398) [nonpub. opn.].) In the instant case, at the direction of the California Supreme Court, we reconsider the matter in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition without prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition provid

Appellant J.B. and respondent A.L. have one minor child together. From their child custody judgment, J.B. appeals an order modifying his child support obligation, which added an imputed monthly income amount to his previously ordered support payment. (Fam. Code, § 4058, subd. (b) [in making child support ruling, court has discretion to consider earning capacity of parent in lieu of income].) J.B. receives monthly pension payments as a retired member of the military, and contends that the family court abused its discretion or otherwise acted unlawfully in imposing such an imputed amount for calculation of his child support obligation, over his retirement income. We affirm.

Rebecca M. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) petition and order terminating parental rights to her daughter, Brooklyn W. Mother contends she sufficiently established changed circumstances regarding her substance abuse problem, and that it was in Brooklyn’s best interests to be placed in the family home on a family maintenance plan. According to mother, because the juvenile court erred in denying her section 388 petition, termination of parental rights was improper as well.
Jeremy W. (father) also appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. In his separate appeal, he joins in and adopts the arguments made by mother.
We reject mother’s contentions and father’s joinder, and affirm the juvenile court’s orders denying mother’s section 388 petition and terminating parental right

S.M. (mother) and R.R. (father), parents of the minors, appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26 & 395; unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are to this code.)
The parents collectively contend (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that M.M. would likely be adopted; (2) the court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply; (3) the court erred in finding the sibling bond exception to adoption did not apply; (4) the court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash subpoenas for two of the minors, M.M. and A.M.; and (5) the court erred in denying mother’s request for a bonding study. Mother further asserts that if this court finds her request for a bonding study was untimely, then we should find her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.