CA Unpub Decisions

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant City of Compton (City) in plaintiff Kareemah Mateen-Bradford’s (plaintiff) action for gender discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff challenges the pretrial denial of her motion to enforce a settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, claims instructional error and defects in the special verdict form compel reversal, and complains of the award of attorney fees (§ 1038) and costs to the City. We affirm the denial of the section 664.6 motion. Although we agree there was instructional error, that error alone did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The defect in the special verdict form, however, did result in a miscarriage of justice compelling reversal. Consequently, we also reverse the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs.

Defendant and respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) employs classroom teachers and home school teachers. Home school teachers provide one-on-one instruction to students who cannot physically attend their local schools, and the teachers are designated part-time or full-time depending on the number of students assigned to them. Education Code section 45025 mandates that pay for part-time teachers “bear[ ] the same ratio to the amount provided full-time employees as the time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time actually served by full-time employees of the same grade or assignment.” We consider whether LAUSD is misapplying the statute by including a “conference/preparation” period that a collective bargaining agreement allocates to full-time home school teachers when deciding on the ratio by which part-time teachers (who are not allocated such a preparation period) should be paid.

Defendant and appellant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Financial Casualty) challenges a summary judgment entered in favor of the People of the State of California following the forfeiture of a bail bond. Financial Casualty argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment because the misdemeanor defendant had not been ordered to appear at the pretrial hearing. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment.

Jean Marc Van den Heuvel appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend Raymond Charles Van den Heuvel’s demurrer to Jean Marc’s third amended complaint on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Aramis Arango Gomez (defendant) was convicted by a jury of nine crimes: carjacking, robbery, attempted robbery, and six counts of false imprisonment committed in the course of the attempted robbery. The crimes that formed the basis of the charges occurred on three separate dates over a two-week period in the neighborhood where defendant lived. Defendant does not challenge his carjacking conviction, so we consider only whether the other convictions should be reversed because they are supported by insufficient evidence, were influenced by improper lay opinion identification testimony, or were the product of a prejudicial joinder of charges.

The jury convicted defendant and appellant Rakeem J. Williams in count 1 of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and in counts 2 and 3 of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). As to all three counts, the jury found true gang enhancement allegations pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). It also found true personal use firearm allegations pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d), in count 1, and use of a firearm by a principal pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c), in counts 2 and 3.
Defendant was sentenced to 85 years to life in prison.

Petitioner David Brandon (David) petitioned to annul his marriage to Respondent Sarah Brandon (Sarah) based on his claim the marriage had been a product of fraud. David’s theory, as articulated to the family law court and here again on appeal, is that he is a victim of “immigration marriage fraud” because Sarah violated federal immigration laws when she came to the United States and married him only for immigration purposes. The family law court denied David’s request to nullify the marriage and dissolved it instead. We consider David’s legal and evidentiary challenges to the family law court’s decision, as well as his contention that the court was biased against him.

Defendant Jeffrey Minifie appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury found Minifie guilty of second degree murder, kidnapping, and evading an officer and causing injury. Minifie admitted he had suffered three prior felony convictions for which he had served separate prison terms.
On appeal Minifie contends the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s statements of fear to her daughter under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Minifie also claims instructional error. Finally, he contends the trial court erred in imposing sentence enhancements on both the indeterminate and determinate sentences for having served three prior prison terms. We affirm.

The trial court denied appellant’s petition pursuant to Proposition 47 to have his felony conviction redesignated as a misdemeanor. He contended the value of the property in his receiving stolen property conviction was under $950. The trial court rejected his claim and this appeal followed. We affirm the trial court ruling.

Defendant Linton McNeal appeals an order remanding him into custody to begin serving a 180-day county jail term previously imposed as a condition of probation. His attorney has submitted a brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and has advised defendant of his right to submit a supplemental brief, which he has not done. Based on our independent review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there is no arguable issue warranting further briefing.

The Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) appeals from a juvenile court order directing the Agency to arrange and pay for a bonding study of the minor M.C. (minor) and his father, A.C. (Father). The Agency contends the court abused its discretion in ordering the study, and further argues that requiring the Agency to pay for the study was an unlawful gift of public funds, a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and in excess of the court’s jurisdiction. We will reverse the order to the extent it required the Agency to pay for the bonding study, and affirm the order in all other respects.

In this dependency appeal, J.J. (mother) challenges dispositional orders made pursuant to subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5, denying her the chance to reunify with her infant son, Joshua (born June 2016). Specifically, mother asserts that the juvenile court failed to state the factual basis for its bypass finding and that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination that it would not benefit Joshua to pursue reunification services with her. Mother additionally challenges the juvenile court’s failure to consider placing Joshua with the maternal grandparents at disposition. Concluding that ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s bypass order, we affirm.

Defendant Vincent James Descano appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Health and Safety Code section 11361.8 (Proposition 64),
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, which was enacted as part of Proposition 64. Appellate counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. We directed the parties to file supplemental briefing concerning whether the trial court erred in considering the facts of defendant’s counts that had been dismissed pursuant to a Harvey waiver.

Plaintiffs Fletcher Tyler, Nancy Tyler, and Kalyani Patel (collectively plaintiffs) filed suit against defendant James T. Haro, a real estate agent and mortgage loan broker, and Alamo Mortgage Corporation (Alamo), alleging Haro fraudulently induced plaintiffs to loan him and Alamo substantial sums of money as “bridge loans,” when in fact Haro used the funds to invest in a risky real estate venture. The loans were never repaid. After a bench trial, the trial court found in plaintiffs’ favor on causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, and concealment.
Haro contends the trial court erred in applying the wrong legal standard to resolve plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, and alternatively, the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding Haro owed plaintiffs a fiduciary duty.