CA Unpub Decisions

Robert Grandville Kelso (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of attempted contact with a minor with intent to commit a sex crime (Pen. Code, § 288.3, subd. (a) ), attempted distribution of harmful matter to a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (b)), and arranging or attempting to arrange a sexual meeting with a minor (§ 288.4, subd. (b)). He contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process by admitting into evidence text messages taken from his cell phone and a forensic report relating to images and videos taken from his computers. We reject the contention and affirm the judgment

Defendant Standard Drywall, Inc. (SDI) appeals an order denying its petition to compel arbitration against plaintiff Servando Perez (Perez). SDI contends the trial court erred in denying the petition because: (1) Perez’s opposition to the petition was untimely, and therefore the allegations of the petition should have been deemed admitted; (2) Perez’s statutory claims under the Labor Code were encompassed within the arbitration provisions of SDI’s three collective bargaining agreements (CBA’s), but the trial court erroneously limited its analysis to only one of the CBA’s; and (3) the arbitration provisions do not violate the ruling in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 (Iskanian) because Perez may still bring his claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) in arbitration.

The relationship between judge and jury is never more fraught than during the jury deliberation process, particularly when, as in this case, the jury has reached an impasse. On the one hand the judge must afford the jury sufficient autonomy to conscientiously reach no verdict; on the other hand it must urge the jury without improper pressure to reach a fair and impartial verdict. Because the judge exercises unusually strong influence over a deadlocked jury, he or she must deal with the tension between these functions with the greatest of care. Unfortunately, that was not done in this case.
Appellant Iskender Cingoz, a 67-year-old citizen who came to the United States from Turkey when he was 26, and has no prior criminal record, was found guilty by a jury of one count of committing sexual acts with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)), and five counts of committing lewd acts upon a child under age 14. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a).)

Bobby Burke appeals a four-year split sentence imposed after he pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, subd. (a)) valued over $65,000 (Former Pen. Code, § 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of taking or driving a vehicle without permission (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) with a prior conviction for the same crime (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)). Upon defendant’s timely appeal, we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appellate counsel filed a brief stating the case and facts but raising no issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant did not file written argument.
We have reviewed the entire record to determine if there are any arguable appellate issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 440–441.) We include here a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case as well as the conviction and punishment imposed.

This case is before us for a second time, after the California Supreme Court transferred it back to this court with directions to reconsider in light of the recent opinion in People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page).
In September 2014, defendant Cesar Marcos Rios pleaded no contest to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (hereafter Vehicle Code section 10851(a)), and admitted that he had suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years eight months in prison.
In March 2016, the trial court denied defendant’s petition under section 1170.18, which was enacted as part of Proposition 47, to have his Vehicle Code section 10851(a) conviction resentenced to a misdemeanor. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying the petition.

In this juvenile dependency proceeding, three children were removed from their mother’s custody and placed with their father in India. The mother appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over the children. She also challenges the juvenile court’s order appointing a guardian ad litem for her before the dispositional phase, and asserts that the guardian ad litem improperly waived her right to a contested disposition hearing. We will affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Clifford Chaun Loyer of one count of domestic battery with corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count one), two counts of resisting and deterring an executive officer (§ 69; counts two and five), one count of battery on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b); count six), and one count of misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a) &(b)(2)(A); count eight). Subsequently, the trial court found true allegations defendant had two prior serious felony convictions and a prison prior. The court sentenced defendant to eight years and eight months in state prison.
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that his two section 69 convictions for resisting and deterring an executive officer should be consolidated into a single conviction because resisting multiple police officers during a single incident constitutes a single violation of the statute. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Ramon Padilla, an inmate at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison at Corcoran (CSAT), filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order directing CSAT personnel to process his inmate appeal. The trial court summarily denied the petition. The court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the petition because appellant had not exhausted his administrative remedies.
The trial court did have jurisdiction over the claims stated in appellant’s petition. Accordingly, the order denying the petition is reversed.

Appellant, Ramon Padilla, an inmate at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison at Corcoran (CSAT), filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order directing CSAT personnel to process his inmate appeal. The trial court summarily denied the petition. The court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the petition because appellant had not exhausted his administrative remedies.
The trial court did have jurisdiction over the claims stated in appellant’s petition. Accordingly, the order denying the petition is reversed.

Defendant Michael Ray Fowler was convicted at the conclusion of a jury trial on July 22, 2015, of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count II and false imprisonment (id., § 236; count III). The jury acquitted defendant of domestic violence (id., § 273.5, subd. (a)(1); count I). In a bifurcated proceeding on September 8, 2015, the trial court found true the enhancements alleged in the second amended information that defendant had prior serious felony convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in 2001 and residential burglary in 1986. These enhancements were alleged pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) and the three strikes law (id., § 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The trial court also found true three prior prison term enhancements (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)). On January 26, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count II, plus two 5-year terms for the prior serious felony enhancements.

Plaintiff and respondent Marlies Erickson owned a mobile home and leased a space from defendants and appellants Sierra Corporate Management, Inc. et al., Hollydale Lowertier Partner, LP and Hollydale Uppertier/Operating, LP (the Sierra Defendants) at a mobile home park located in Brea (the Park). She signed a written lease agreement for the space (the Lease). Erickson defaulted on her rent and the parties entered into another agreement, a forbearance agreement (the Forbearance Agreement), to allow her to stay in the Park. Both agreements contained arbitration clauses. Erickson attempted to sell her mobile home, but the Sierra Defendants refused to approve the potential buyers.
Erickson filed a complaint against the Sierra Defendants in superior court and the Sierra Defendants filed their petition to compel arbitration (the Petition) pursuant to the two agreements.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Michael Alan Woolever of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and further found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant was granted five years’ probation with one of the terms requiring him to serve 365 days in county jail for which he was given credit for time served. (§ 1203, subds. (e)(2), (f).) Defendant appeals, contending the record lacks substantial evidence supporting either conviction because the prosecution failed to prove he was not acting in lawful self-defense. Specifically, defendant contends the record lacks substantial evidence that the force used by him was excessive in relation to the threatened harm.

Mary Anne H. and Jarred W. seek review of juvenile court orders setting hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanency plan for their children. They assert that Mary Anne did not receive reasonable family reunification services. Mary Anne contends that the court erroneously excluded the attachments to her declaration and improperly admitted the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's (Agency) report in evidence. She asks this court to reverse the orders setting section 366.26 hearings and to reinstate her reunification services. Jarred argues that the court erred in denying Mary Anne's requests for continuances and granting the Agency's request for a continuance, by disregarding and not ruling on his objections, and by admitting the social study report in evidence.

A jury convicted Justin C. Smith of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The jury also found true that Smith personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning of sections 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). The court sentenced Smith to prison for a determinative term of one year for the use of a deadly weapon and an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second degree murder.
Smith appeals, contending the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in making certain arguments to the jury warranting reversal. We affirm.