CA Unpub Decisions

In 2008, Edwin Cruz was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a crime he committed when he was 17 years old. In 2015, Cruz was granted a resentencing hearing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), when he was again sentenced to LWOP. Cruz appealed and challenged the LWOP sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds. During the pendency of this appeal, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 394 (SB 394) and Senate Bill No. 620 (SB 620). SB 394 provides all youth offenders serving LWOP sentences in California a parole suitability hearing after 25 years of incarceration. We find SB 394 renders Cruz’s Miller challenge to his LWOP sentence moot. However, we reverse this case, again, to correct certain sentencing errors. We also remand for correction of the abstract of judgment and to allow the trial court the opportunity to exercise its newly granted discretion under SB 620 to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancements.

Satish Shetty, representing himself, appeals the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend demurrers to his first amended complaint. Shetty contends the court erred in ruling he did not have standing to bring a quiet title action regarding property he had acquired from a junior lienholder or to challenge an assignment of the first deed of trust (the senior lien) between Bank of America, N.A. and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. He also contends he was not afforded a fair or meaningful hearing. Because Shetty has adequately pleaded a quiet title action against HSBC, we reverse the judgment as to it and otherwise affirm.

Jessica A. Stepp alleged that she was terminated by Fidelity National Title Group, Inc. and related entities (collectively Fidelity) on the basis of her gender and pregnancies and in retaliation for her opposition to Fidelity’s discriminatory practices, asserting claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Stepp dismissed her sexual harassment cause of action during trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fidelity on her discrimination and retaliation causes of action, finding that neither discrimination nor retaliation was a “substantial motivating reason” for her termination. However, the jury found Fidelity liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and awarded Stepp a total of $1,173,849 in economic and noneconomic damages. Fidelity appeals from the judgment and from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Spouses Meir Westreich and Maria Ruiz (plaintiffs) brought two actions against their next-door neighbors, Randall and Janice Higa (defendants). The first action concerned a boundary line dispute and ownership of the fence that separated their properties. Defendants prevailed.
While the first action was pending, plaintiffs filed a new action for breach of privacy, retaliation for the exercise of their rights to free speech and to petition, intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress, and trespass. The trial court struck this complaint on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and awarded defendants $41,207.76 in attorney fees and costs.
Plaintiffs filed separate appeals from the judgment in the first action and the anti-SLAPP order in the second. We consolidated the appeals and now affirm the judgment in the first action and dismiss the appeal in the second.

We affirm appellant’s conviction of three felony charges: first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1), making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2), and attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 4). We find that the trial court did not prejudicially err in admitting and excluding portions of telephone calls appellant made while incarcerated. We also find that appellant’s right to a public trial was not violated by the trial court’s limited exclusion of a small child during the playing of a portion of a jailhouse telephone call. We further find the trial court was correct in admitting “other acts” evidence pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 1109, that there was no prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, that a witness did not render an improper opinion, and that there was no instructional error.
We do, however, reverse appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

In the underlying proceeding, the trial court granted Newhall School District’s (Newhall) writ petition, in part, by vacating Acton-Agua Dulce Unified School District’s (Acton) approval under the Charter Schools Act of 1992 (Ed. Code, § 47600 et seq. (the Charter Schools Act)) of a charter school to be located in Newhall’s jurisdiction, but denying Newhall’s request to void the charter ab initio. The court remanded the matter to Acton to hold a new hearing to make the pertinent findings under Education Code section 47605, on the record, without improperly considering financial gain as a factor. Acton held a new hearing and approved a new charter school, again to be located in Newhall.
Newhall appeals from the denial of its motion for an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

N.O. (Mother) and R.N. (Father) are the parents of K.N., a one-and-a-half-year-old dependent of the juvenile court. Mother and Father each filed a petition seeking review by extraordinary writ of the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. We deny their petitions and requests for a stay of the section 366.26 hearing.

Plaintiff Alvin Cox, as trustee of the Westlake Trust, in an unopposed appeal challenges the denial of his application to quiet title to a parcel of improved real property in Oakland. Plaintiff purchased the property from the person who several years before had acquired it from a decedent whose estate had not been probated. Although no objection was raised by any party with a conceivable interest in the property, the trial court refused to quiet title apparently on the grounds that title should have been transferred in probate proceedings and that the county would be unable to enforce an anticipated supplemental assessment against the property if title were quieted in plaintiff. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s action, and that plaintiff is entitled to relief confirming the trust’s title to the property subject to payment of the supplemental assessment.

Oliver A. sought the sealing of juvenile wardship petitions and related records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, which governs dismissal upon “satisfactory completion” of probation. The juvenile court granted Oliver’s motion only as to his most recent wardship petition. Oliver appeals, arguing he met the requirements of section 786 with regard to another wardship petition and related probation violations and sealing was required. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Christopher Baker and Caroline Baker sued their home loan servicer, Citi Mortgage, Inc. (Citi), the trustee of the securitized trust holding their loan, U.S. Bank N.A., and the successor trustee under their deed of trust, Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), in an attempt to prevent sale of their home through nonjudicial foreclosure. (Civ. Code, § 2924.) The trial court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment. The Bakers argue a declaration submitted in support of respondents’ motion did not lay a proper foundation to show that documents establishing the chain of title qualified for the business records exception to the hearsay rule. They also challenge the trial court’s conclusion they did not establish triable issues of material fact regarding whether foreclosure was initiated by an unauthorized party. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the Bakers’ evidentiary objections and they did not establish a triable

Maurillo Garcia died in August 2011 after receiving multiple stab wounds. Defendants Marcos Mendoza, David Martell, and Juan Javier Ramirez (collectively, defendants) appeal their convictions, following a joint trial, for second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) with gang enhancements (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)) for killing Garcia. (Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.) We previously filed a partially published opinion finding no prejudicial error and affirming defendants’ judgments with modifications. The Supreme Court directed us to vacate our decision and reconsider the appeal in light of People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara). We re-file our original analysis regarding all issues except for the application of Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, to Ramirez’s case (contained in a new Part III, post).

This is a complicated construction defect case between a contractor who finished the foundation to an otherwise unfinished apartment complex in Irvine and a new owner who acquired the property several years later. When the new owner restarted the project with new contractors, it discovered flaws (or what were perceived as flaws) in that foundation. The new owner sued the old general contractor for those flaws, alleging negligence, breach of contract, breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty. The flaws litigated before the court were (1) the misplacement of the electrical and plumbing conduits in the foundation, and (2) a perceived “waviness” in the foundation. The new owner won on the misplacement of the conduits but lost on waviness, so we now have before us both an appeal and a cross-appeal.

Appellant Victoria Z. (mother) contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not allowing an evidentiary hearing on her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. We affirm.

Defendant Joshua Glenn Bishop contends on appeal the trial court violated the terms of his negotiated plea agreement when it sentenced him to three years rather than the agreed-upon two. The People concede and we agree. The parties also agree, as do we, that the matter must be remanded for sentencing in accordance with the plea agreement.