CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Matthew Deante Morgan contends on appeal that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for felony resisting an officer. We affirm.

In this dispute involving a property known as the Forestiere Underground Gardens, appellant Andre Forestiere was a party to two actions in superior court: Case No. 14CEGC02771, before Judge Kapetan, and case No. 15CECG01076, before Judge Hamilton. Andre, acting in propia persona, filed a total of three appeals in these two cases, two from the case before Judge Kapetan and one from the case before Judge Hamilton. This opinion addresses Andre’s contentions in the two appeals he filed from the case before Judge Kapetan. These contentions all relate to decisions underlying the final judgment against Andre entered on August 5, 2016.
The trial court resolved the claims in Andre’s complaint partly by demurrer, partly by summary judgment, and partly after a bench trial. He challenges the court’s decisions at each of these stages. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

In this dispute involving a property known as the Forestiere Underground Gardens, appellant Andre Forestiere was a party to two actions in superior court: Case No. 14CEGC02771, before Judge Kapetan, and case No. 15CECG01076, before Judge Hamilton. Andre, acting in propia persona, filed a total of three appeals in these two cases, two from the case before Judge Kapetan and one from the case before Judge Hamilton. This opinion addresses Andre’s contentions in the two appeals he filed from the case before Judge Kapetan. These contentions all relate to decisions underlying the final judgment against Andre entered on August 5, 2016.
The trial court resolved the claims in Andre’s complaint partly by demurrer, partly by summary judgment, and partly after a bench trial. He challenges the court’s decisions at each of these stages. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joseph Haskell Maine was charged with the second-degree murders of Vanessa Carrillo and her unborn child (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [counts 1 & 2]); gross vehicular manslaughter of Vanessa while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a) [count 3]); felony driving under the influence (DUI) and causing bodily injury to Vanessa (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a) [count 4]); felony driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of or in excess of 0.08 percent and causing bodily injury to Vanessa (id., subd. (b) [count 5]); and misdemeanor driving without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a) [count 6]).

Defendant Bobby Darren Baker, a juvenile, was charged with the murder of Richard Zepeda in the first degree (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]) and gang conspiracy (§ 182.5 [count 2]). In connection with count 1, it was alleged he committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused Richard’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). In connection with counts 1 and 2, it was alleged defendant himself personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused Richard’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

This is the third time this case has been before us. At the conclusion of a court trial, Jeremiah Charlie Brewer (defendant) was convicted of sexual penetration by force , assault with intent to commit rape or forcible sexual penetration during the commission of first degree burglary, and kidnapping to commit rape or forcible sexual penetration. The court found true allegations in count 1 that defendant substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim inherent in the offense by kidnapping her, committed the offense during the commission of first degree burglary with the intent of committing sexual penetration by force, and kidnapped the victim to accomplish the offense. Defendant was sentenced to an unstayed term of 25 years to life in prison.

Defendant and appellant, R.L. (Mother), has eight children. Defendant and appellant, J.R. (Father), is the father of the youngest six of Mother’s eight children.
In the first of these consolidated appeals, in case No. E068478, Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s May 18, 2017, order summarily denying Mother’s Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition without a hearing. In that appeal, Mother claims the court erroneously failed to hold a hearing on the petition, in order to determine whether, as Mother was claiming, plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), violated the relative placement preference (§ 361.3) in failing to reassess the maternal aunt, M.G., for placement of Mother’s youngest five children, in February 2017.
In the second appeal, in case No. E069180, Mother and Father appeal the August 18, 2017, orders terminating parental rights to their youngest two children, twin girls M.J.R. and M.R.R.

The trial court granted a petition for coordination of four cases: (1) Prime Healthcare Services—Montclair, LLC, doing business as Montclair Hospital Medical Center (Montclair Hospital) sued California Physicians’ Service, doing business as Blue Shield of California (Blue Shield) and Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Company (Blue Life); (2) Prime Healthcare Services—Shasta, LLC, doing business as Shasta Regional Medical Center (Shasta Hospital), sued Blue Shield and Blue Life; (3) Veritas Health Services, Inc., doing business as Chino Valley Medical Center (Chino Hospital), sued Blue Shield and Blue Life; and (4) Alvarado Hospital, LLC, doing business as Alvarado Hospital Medical Center (Alvarado Hospital), sued Blue Shield and Blue Life.
Montclair Hospital, Shasta Hospital, Chino Hospital, and Alvarado Hospital (collectively. the Hospitals) brought two causes of action: (1) quantum meruit, and (2) money due.

In May 2015, defendant Mario Saul Reyes pled guilty to robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211; count 2) pursuant to a plea bargain. Reyes was granted probation and ordered to spend 270 days in custody. In November 2015, Reyes admitted a first violation of probation for failure to report after being released from custody. The court reinstated probation.
In January 2017, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on a second probation violation for failure to remain law abiding in combination with a preliminary hearing in a new case (No. CD270320). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Reyes to be in violation of probation, and found probable cause in case No. CD270320 on count 1, felony violation under section 69 (battery against an officer), and on count 2, a misdemeanor violation under section 148.9, subdivision (a) (false identification).
At the sentencing hearing, Reyes was denied probation and sentenced to the midterm of three years in prison on the probation violation.

The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA), found at Penal Code section 11164 et seq., sets forth the procedures for initiating, conducting, and challenging child abuse investigations.
Under CANRA, an investigation of child abuse may result in a report with one of three possible findings: unfounded, substantiated or inconclusive. "Unfounded" means that the report "is determined by the investigator who conducted the investigation to be false, to be inherently improbable, to involve an accidental injury, or not to constitute child abuse or neglect . . . ." (§ 11165.12, subd. (a).) "Substantiated" means that the report "is determined by the investigator who conducted the investigation to constitute child abuse or neglect . . . based upon evidence that makes it more likely than not that child abuse or neglect . . . occurred." (§ 11165.12, subd. (b).)

Defendant Blackie Florencio Alvarez appeals from a judgment entered after his no contest plea to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and admission to a probation violation based upon the same conduct. The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause for defendant’s challenge to the revocation of his pro. per. status preceding these pleas.
Defendant argues the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562] when it revoked his pro. per. status without adequate reasons. He also requests the court correct the probation order to conform to the trial judge’s oral pronouncement striking a $63.50 fee.
Because we find the trial court erred in revoking defendant’s right to represent himself resulting in an automatic reversal under People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814 (Butler), we do not reach the fee issue.

Defendant Dimitri Alexander Tanksley appeals his conviction for unlawfully causing a fire, contending the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury with an optional paragraph from the standard instruction over his objection. We agree the trial court erred, but find no prejudice and affirm.

C. M. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s adjudication finding true various firearm and drug violations. He contends: (1) the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop because the officer unlawfully prolonged the stop; (2) the court erred by admitting his custodial confession because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights; and (3) he asks us to review the sealed records from an in camera Pitchess hearing to determine whether the trial court erred when, after reviewing the records, it found no discoverable information.
We reject minor’s contentions and affirm.
To avoid duplication, we explain the relevant facts as we discuss each contention.

A pit bull owned by Ruben Cambra mauled an elderly woman. Soon after the mauling, defendant Theodore Jason Scherbenske raced to the scene and hurried away with Cambra and the pit bull. A jury convicted defendant of being an accessory after the fact to the crime of failing to maintain control of a dangerous animal, and the trial court placed him on probation.
Defendant now contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction, (2) the trial court failed to identify Cambra as the perpetrator in the instruction for accessory after the fact, and (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury concerning the elements of failure to maintain control of a dangerous animal as they related to Cambra.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of being an accessory after the fact to the crime of failing to maintain control of a dangerous animal.