CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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This is a slander of title dispute between two companies holding a joint interest in an annual right to extract water from the Chino Basin, a large groundwater basin in the Inland Empire. At the time of the alleged slander, California Steel Industries, Inc. (California Steel) and CCG Ontario LLC (CCG) held a joint right to extract 630 acre-feet (af) per year, as tenants in common. CCG enjoyed the first priority to the water, or the first right to use it, and California Steel had a second priority—that is, it could use whatever amount CCG did not use during a given year.
The dispute at the heart of this case arose in late 2008, when CCG sold the annual right to extract the 630 af to a third party, Aqua Capital Management LP (Aqua), without disclosing California Steel’s interest in the water. During negotiations, CCG told Aqua that California Steel no longer held an interest in the water, when CCG knew that was not the case. |
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Juan D. Chavez appeals a judgment entered after the jury determined that he was a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and the court recommitted Chavez to the Department of State Hospitals for one year. Chavez contends that certain expert witness testimony was admitted in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) and, as such, his due process right to confrontation was violated, warranting reversal. We conclude that any error was harmless and affirm the judgment.
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After plaintiff and appellant Lorraine Martini obtained a special verdict finding defendants and respondents Bel Azure Homeowners Association (Association) and its manager Morning View Associates (Morning View) each 35 percent negligent with respect to injuries she had suffered after falling on Association's premises, she moved for $145,212.67 in attorney fees and costs, claiming she was the prevailing party under Association's covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&R's), Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5, and Civil Code section 5975, subdivision (c) of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Davis-Stirling Act; § 4000 et seq.). The trial court denied her motion, ruling her case was "not an action 'to enforce or interpret any of the covenants, conditions or restrictions' in the CC&R's" but instead was "a common law negligence case," and no contract or statute authorized an attorney fee award.
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Defendant David John Arnold appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of resisting an executive officer. On appeal, Arnold contends that the trial court erred in admitting a recording of a jail telephone call that Arnold had with another individual in which Arnold admitted that he "did all of it." According to Arnold, he had other criminal cases pending against him at the time, and his statement could have referred to the other cases, and not to the present case. Arnold contends that the admission in evidence of the statement may have improperly misled or confused the jury, and ultimately violated his rights to due process, confrontation, and a fair trial. Arnold argues in the alternative that the court should have also admitted the contents of other jail calls in which Arnold denied guilt, under the rule of completeness.
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Chelsea Saunders pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace officer with a firearm and making a criminal threat, and admitted to a firearm-use enhancement allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (d), 422, 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(11), (23), (31).) As part of her guilty plea, Saunders agreed to a stipulated sentence of 17 years 8 months. Shortly after, Saunders moved to withdraw her guilty plea, claiming she misunderstood the plea agreement because she thought she had agreed to a sentence of 17 months 8 days. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Saunders did not meet her burden to show she misunderstood the plea agreement and denied the motion. On appeal, Saunders contends the trial court abused its discretion. We reject her arguments, and affirm.
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Chelsea Saunders pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace officer with a firearm and making a criminal threat, and admitted to a firearm-use enhancement allegation. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (d), 422, 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(11), (23), (31).) As part of her guilty plea, Saunders agreed to a stipulated sentence of 17 years 8 months. Shortly after, Saunders moved to withdraw her guilty plea, claiming she misunderstood the plea agreement because she thought she had agreed to a sentence of 17 months 8 days. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Saunders did not meet her burden to show she misunderstood the plea agreement and denied the motion. On appeal, Saunders contends the trial court abused its discretion. We reject her arguments, and affirm.
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Raul H., father of 13-year-old Genesis H., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring Genesis a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), removing her from Raul, and terminating jurisdiction with a custody and visitation order (commonly referred to as an “exit order”) awarding sole physical and legal custody of Genesis to her mother, Mildred H. Raul contends substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding that his violent altercations with Mildred put Genesis at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. He also contends substantial evidence did not support removal. Finally, he contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by including in its exit order a requirement that Raul’s visits with Genesis must be monitored by a person approved by Mildred or by a professional monitor at Raul’s expense. We affirm.
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The juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over an infant after finding she was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm due to her parents’ ongoing domestic violence. Her father appeals this finding as well as the court’s subsequent order removing the infant from his custody. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) cross-appeals the court’s dismissal of two alternative statutory grounds for dependency jurisdiction based on the parents’ same conduct. The juvenile court’s orders were supported by substantial evidence, and we accordingly have no occasion to reach the Department’s cross-appeal. We affirm.
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Defendant Arthur Manuel Villegas appeals following his admission of a violation of his probation. The trial court revoked defendant’s probation and sentenced him to two years in custody. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the revocation and ensuing judgment, and he requested that the court issue a certificate of probable cause to appeal. The trial court denied the requested certificate of probable cause.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), defendant’s counsel filed an opening brief requesting this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issues exist, but we find an error in the abstract of judgment and will order the clerk of court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm. |
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Defendant Eligio Alvarez Manriquez (defendant) appeals the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351, count 1), transportation of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a), count 2), and conspiracy to commit sale or transportation of cocaine (Pen. Code , § 182, subd. (a)(1), count 3). Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress cocaine seized from the rear area of a car in which he was a passenger. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
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After pleading no contest to felony assault with a deadly weapon and admitting three prior Illinois felony convictions (two of which the trial court subsequently struck), defendant Peter L. Burchett contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and seeks reversal and a remand for resentencing. The trial court signed a certificate of probable cause, but it did not include any facts to support its issuance. Defendant has not demonstrated any prejudice, and we affirm.
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A jury found defendant Josue Sanchez guilty of 11 felony counts of sexual and physical abuse of his daughter (A.S.), stepdaughter (A.H.), and son (M.S.). Ordering the sentences to run consecutively, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 138 years, eight months to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the prosecution to amend the information during trial to conform to proof or, in the alternative, his retained trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the amendment. Defendant further contends the trial court erred by imposing consecutive indeterminate life sentences on counts 1, 3, and 8—all involving the same victim—because consecutive sentences on subordinate counts 3 and 8 were not mandated under Penal Code sections 667.61, subdivision (i) and 667.6, subdivision (d). |
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A jury found defendant Jeremy Rakisits guilty of second degree murder; the trial court imposed a sentence of 40 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause when it admitted the dying victim’s testimonial statement to deputies. Defendant also argues remand is necessary to permit a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and to give the trial court the opportunity to exercise discretion under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h) to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement.
As defendant concedes, our Supreme Court recognizes a victim’s dying declaration does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Defendant was afforded a sufficient opportunity at his sentencing hearing to make a record under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, so we do not remand for that purpose. |
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In the underlying action, the court awarded Tahoe Reno Industrial Center (Tahoe Reno) $1.275 million in fees and costs, which were to be paid by Bronwood, LLC (Bronwood). The members of Bronwood are Richard Katzenbach (Katzenbach) and Woodstone, LLC (Woodstone). One of Woodstone’s members is Michael Rosenfeld (Rosenfeld) (collectively with Bronwood and Katzenbach, Defendants).
In a subsequent action, Tahoe Reno sought to enforce the judgment against Defendants by alleging the following causes of action: alter ego liability; declaratory relief; and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) (UCL). Defendants demurred and the trial court sustained those demurrers without leave to amend. On appeal, Tahoe Reno challenges the trial court’s ruling with respect to the alter ego (first cause of action) and declaratory relief (second cause of action) claims only. |
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