CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiffs James D. Minidis (James Minidis) and Lynn M. Minidis (collectively, the Minidises ) sued defendants Michael Marsh (Marsh) and Mary Dousette (Dousette) (collectively, Defendants) for malicious prosecution. In response, Defendants, pursuant to section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed a special motion to strike the Minidises’ lawsuit—a so-called anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, ruling that the Minidises failed to demonstrate a probability of success on their claim and awarded them attorney fees.
On appeal from the trial court’s order granting Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the Minidises argue that the trial court was wrong to conclude that they failed to show that Defendants lacked probable cause when they initiated the underlying litigation. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the orders.

Appellant L.D. (Father) appeals from a domestic violence restraining order, a child custody order, a visitation order, and the court’s failure to act on a peremptory challenge to a judicial officer. Respondent V.A. (Mother) sought a domestic violence restraining order against Father pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code , § 6200 et seq.) (DVPA). Mother prevailed at trial and obtained a domestic violence restraining order against Father for one year. Father’s biological children were placed in Mother’s sole legal and physical custody. Father was also temporarily denied visitation rights. Following the trial and issuance of the order, Father filed a peremptory challenge to the bench officer, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
Father contends the trial court erred in granting the restraining order, child custody order, and visitation order. Father further appeals the trial court’s failure to act on his peremptory challenge. We affi

Appellant L.D. (Father) appeals from a domestic violence restraining order, a child custody order, a visitation order, and the court’s failure to act on a peremptory challenge to a judicial officer. Respondent V.A. (Mother) sought a domestic violence restraining order against Father pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code , § 6200 et seq.) (DVPA). Mother prevailed at trial and obtained a domestic violence restraining order against Father for one year. Father’s biological children were placed in Mother’s sole legal and physical custody. Father was also temporarily denied visitation rights. Following the trial and issuance of the order, Father filed a peremptory challenge to the bench officer, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
Father contends the trial court erred in granting the restraining order, child custody order, and visitation order. Father further appeals the trial court’s failure to act on his peremptory challenge.

Earl D. Williams challenges by appeal and petition for writ of habeas corpus a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated kidnapping and of making criminal threats. Williams contends insufficient evidence supports the aggravated kidnapping conviction because no evidence suggested either that he moved the victim a substantial distance or intended that the kidnapping facilitate another, separate crime. He further contends the trial court made several evidentiary and instructional errors. We affirm the conviction and deny the petition.

In this medical malpractice action, Jennifer Shannon-Yeganhe appeals from the judgments entered after the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by Dr. Alen Ternian, Dr. Eli Baron, and Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. Shannon-Yeganhe contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the orders granting the doctors’ motions for summary judgment, which she brought on the ground her counsel had abandoned her. She also contends the trial court erred in granting Cedars-Sinai’s motion for summary judgment because there were triable issues of material fact on the elements of her cause of action and on Cedars-Sinai’s statute of limitations defense.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shannon-Yeganhe’s motion to set aside the orders granting the doctors’ motions for summary judgment, but the court erred in granting Cedars-Sinai’s motion for summary judgment.

Mother appeals the summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to modify a prior order bypassing her for reunification services regarding her now 14-year-old daughter A.M. She claims the court erred by denying her petition without a hearing. We disagree and affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to quash and traverse a search warrant, defendant Prudencio Gerardo Najar-Elias pled no contest to several drug and weapons related charges and was sentenced to nine years in state prison. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea” and on the denial of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. His attorney has submitted a brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and has advised defendant of his right to submit a supplemental brief, which he has not done. Based on our independent review of the record on appeal, we have concluded that there is no arguable issue warranting further briefing.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true substantive offense allegations that appellant, K.B., a minor committed attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). At the dispositional hearing, the court adjudged K.B. to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placed him on probation, subject to various conditions, in his mother’s home.
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not responded to this court’s invitation to submit additional briefing. We affirm.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), appellant Emile Pernell Richard, Jr. pled no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted to having suffered a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues and requesting we conduct an independent review of the entire record on appeal. Appellant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Gary E. Goddard appeals from his guilty plea for providing a place for the production and distribution of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)). Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.
Appellant has simultaneously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing his counsel provided ineffective assistance in advising him about the consequences of his guilty plea. We summarily deny the petition.

Defendant Angel Marroquin was convicted of five counts of committing a lewd act (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of committing an aggravated lewd act (§ 288, subd. (b)) with a 12-year-old girl (Jane). On appeal, defendant challenges only his conviction on the aggravated count. He contends: (1) the court erred in failing to instruct on unlawful sexual intercourse (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) as a lesser included offense; (2) there is no substantial evidence of force or duress to support the jury’s verdict; (3) CALCRIM No. 1111, which instructs the jury that consent is not a defense to the charged crime, violated his rights to due process, to present a defense and to trial by jury; and (4) the admission of expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome violated his rights to due process and trial by jury. We find no prejudicial error and shall affirm the judgment.

This appeal concerns a long-running family dispute over 37 acres of land on which appellant Patricia Rock (Rock or Patricia) and her adult daughter and son-in-law (Lisa F. Rhead and Raymond Rhead) are tenants in common under a written agreement. After a five-day court trial on the Rheads’ complaint for ouster, partition, quiet title and declaratory relief and Rock’s cross-complaint for breach of contract, reformation, and set-off, the court quieted title to the Rheads as to their concurrent right, with Rock, to control and manage the property, and denied all other requested relief. Rock now raises three issues on appeal: the judgment in favor of the Rheads’ quiet title cause of action is erroneous, the court abused its discretion by misapplying the doctrine of judicial estoppel and rejecting Rock’s claim for reformation of the tenants in common agreement, and the court erred in denying Rock’s motion for new trial. We affirm the judgment.

In this appeal we review a referendum petition challenging an ordinance passed by the Monterey Peninsula Water Management District (the District), which imposed a water supply charge on properties located in the District. The Monterey Peninsula Taxpayers’ Association and three of its officers (collectively, MPTA) sought a writ of mandate and declaratory relief to invalidate the ordinance and place its referendum on the ballot for the next local election. The superior court denied the requested relief. On appeal, MPTA renews its claims that (1) the referendum complied with the Elections Code and therefore should have been submitted to the voters, (2) the ordinance violates the District’s enabling law, and (3) the ordinance violates article XIII D of the California Constitution. We will affirm the judgment.

We are now on the eighth and ninth appeals filed by attorney Michael A. Weiss in his never-ending quest to wrest the assets of the deceased husband of his now deceased mother from the deceased husband’s son and grandchildren. In this ninth appeal, Weiss, individually and as the executor of the estate of his deceased mother, Jane L. Marsh (Jane) , appeals from the February 21, 2017, formal order granting two petitions for preliminary distributions for the estate of Jane’s deceased husband, Monroe F. Marsh (Monroe). The notice of appeal indicates Weiss also seeks to “collaterall[y] attack” several prior court orders. Respondents, who are executors of Monroe’s estate, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal along with a request for judicial notice. Weiss opposed the motion and objected to the request for judicial notice.