CA Unpub Decisions

This is the companion appeal to Estate of Marsh (April 11, 2018, G054796) [nonpub. opn.] (Marsh 9), and the opinions will be filed concurrently. Both appeals arise from probate court orders made during the administration of the estate of Monroe F. Marsh (Monroe) following his death in 2009. In this appeal, Michael A. Weiss, appearing individually and as the executor for the estate of his deceased mother Jane L. Marsh (Jane), challenges a January 10, 2017, minute order approving two petitions seeking a preliminary distribution of Monroe’s estate. A few weeks after the January 2017 order, the probate court signed and filed a formal order on February 21, 2017, regarding the exact same subject matter. Weiss filed a separate appeal from the February order, which we considered in our Marsh 9 opinion.

Accredited Surety & Casualty Company (Accredited) appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to Penal Code section 1305, requiring it to pay the County of Orange $50,000 after an order declaring the forfeiture of its bail bond in that amount had become final. Accredited argues the judgment must be reversed because the trial court erred in denying its two successive motions for an extension of the period in which the forfeiture could be vacated. We affirm.

Defendants Germani Jermaine Mackie, Kyle Yarber, and Larry Bernard Tarver were charged in a consolidated amended information with kidnapping to commit robbery, robbery, false imprisonment by menace or violence; commercial burglary, criminal threat, attempting to dissuade a witness, and receiving stolen property. The information further alleged Yarber personally used a firearm in the commission of the charged offenses, Mackie personally used a deadly weapon, a knife,, each of the defendants was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), and Mackie and Tarver were vicariously armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)). Additionally, the information alleged Mackie served a prior term in state prison; and Tarver suffered two prior strike convictions, had two prior serious felony convictions, and served a prior term in state prison.

Michelle has appealed from two orders of the family court, one denying her request for attorney fees and a subsequent order denying her request for a new trial on the issue of her attorney fees.
The orders from which Michelle appeals arose from her request for attorney fees made in August 2015. The matter was not heard until January 2016, by which time the fees had mounted to over $37,000. In ruling on the request, the court found that 1) the activities generating the fees were unwarranted and 2) James could not pay them. The court’s findings roundly criticized Michelle and her counsel.
We affirm the orders denying the request for attorney fees and denying the request for a new trial.

Defendant/appellant William Houston Bickford pled no contest to one count of violating Penal Code section 21310. Defendant was placed on probation for three years. After defendant violated probation, the trial court terminated probation and imposed a sentence of two years in prison. Defendant appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Robert Michael Jiron (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of driving under the influence of a drug and causing bodily injury, during which he proximately caused bodily injury to two other persons and personally inflicted great bodily injury on three other persons (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, former subd. (e), 23558; Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a); count 1), child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 2), and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a); count 3). He was sentenced to 17 years 8 months in prison, and ordered to pay restitution, along with various fees, fines, and assessments.
On appeal, we hold: the enhancements alleged after defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing must be stricken; there was no prejudicial instructional error; the trial court erred by imposing full prison terms for enhancements attached to a subordinate term; and the sentence on count 3 must be stayed pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, we affi

After the juvenile court adjudged defendant and appellant, I.C., a ward of the court, he was prohibited from owning or possessing firearms until age 30. (Pen. Code, § 29820, subds. (a), (b).) Eventually, I.C. successfully completed his probation, and the court dismissed the petitions against him and ordered the related records sealed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786, subd. (a).) I.C. then sought relief from the firearms prohibition, which the court denied. I.C. argues on appeal that the court erred in denying this relief. We affirm.

Appellant Mary Ranae Farah appeals the judgment dividing property and dissolving her marriage to respondent David Lee Farah. Mary contests the judgment, as well as various other orders issued by the trial court, and requests a new trial. Because the record on appeal does not demonstrate any error, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Phillip Paul Vaca molested his two biological daughters, H.V. (Doe1) and P.V. (Doe2), when they were under the age of 14 years.
Defendant was convicted of three counts of lewd conduct with a child under 14 years of age by use of force, violence, duress, menace and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury against Doe1 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) committed between January 4, 2013, and January 15, 2015. In addition, he was convicted of one count of lewd conduct against Doe2 within the meaning of section 288, subdivision (a) committed between April 21, 2014, and January 15, 2015. Defendant was sentenced to 21 years to be served in state prison. A criminal protective order (CPO) was issued for defendant to have no contact with Doe1 and Doe2 until August 26, 2026.

Defendant and appellant Kerry Edward Gulla entered the Bank of America in Hemet with a forged check written in the amount of $3,000 and attempted to open a bank account in his name. Defendant was found guilty of one count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). In a bifurcated proceeding, after he waived his right to a jury trial, the trial court found defendant had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (e) & (c)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to four years to be served in state prison.
Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court breached its sua sponte instructional duty and violated his federal Constitutional due process rights by failing to instruct the jury with a definition of “value” as it pertained to whether the check’s value exceeded $950.

A jury convicted Domingo Grajeda Magdaleno of second degree murder for running over his girlfriend with his truck during a domestic dispute while her daughter looked on. On appeal, Magdaleno argues his murder conviction cannot stand because the trial court improperly excluded evidence crucial to proving he was instead guilty of voluntary manslaughter under a provocation theory. We affirm. The evidence Magdaleno cites is irrelevant to the issue of provocation and, in any event, the record does not support a provocation theory as a matter of law.

Plaintiff and appellant Jeffrey Hua sued defendant and respondent the Regents of the University of California (the University) for (1) negligence, (2) willful failure to warn/premises liability, and (3) dangerous condition of public property. The trial court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473c.) Hua contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment and sustaining the University’s evidentiary objections. We affirm the judgment.

A jury found Luis Antonio Hernandez guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child (Jane Doe) (§ 288.5) (count 4) and committing a lewd or lascivious act on a second child (Mary Doe) (§ 288, subd. (c)) (count 5). The trial court sentenced Hernandez to an aggregate term of six years and eight months in prison.
On appeal, Hernandez claims that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict finding him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Hernandez also claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument by mischaracterizing the evidence presented at trial. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Lorraine Martini sued defendants and respondents Bel Azure Homeowners Association (Association), Association's manager Morning View Associates, LLC (Morning View), and contractor City Service Contracting, Inc. (City Service) for negligence on a theory of a dangerous property condition after Martini tripped on loose gravel while accessing a private street within Association that was undergoing repaving. The jury returned a special verdict finding Association and Morning View each 35 percent negligent and Martini 30 percent negligent, but City Service not negligent. It awarded Martini $11,000 in past economic and noneconomic damages. Martini challenges the jury's verdict in City Service's favor, contending it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is fatally inconsistent with the verdicts of liability against Association and Morning View and it is the result of prejudicial instructional error.