CA Unpub Decisions

R.T., mother of the minor C.O., appeals the juvenile court’s order denying her petition for modification without an evidentiary hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395.) The petition sought continued reunification services with her now 17-year-old son, the minor in this appeal. We will affirm the juvenile court’s order.

A jury found defendant Steven Lee Mortensen guilty of driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding, he admitted he had served two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of five years in prison, calculated as follows: the upper term of three years for evading a peace officer, plus two 1-year consecutive terms for the prior prison term enhancements, plus a concurrent term of one year in county jail for resisting a peace officer. On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction for resisting a peace officer must be reversed because the crime of resisting a peace officer is a necessarily included offense of the crime of evading a peace officer.

Defendant Clifford Johnson appeals an order denying his petition to reduce his 1988 felony conviction for receiving stolen property to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (f)). Attached to his petition to recall, defendant included a copy of a hearing in his 2001 Colorado case where the 1988 California case for receiving stolen property (Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. A643787) was at issue as a prior offense. The trial court denied defendant’s petition on the basis that: “The attached sentencing transcript is from a Colorado case. This court has no jurisdiction in Colorado.” We agree with the parties that although defendant’s supporting documentation may have been confusing, his intent was to challenge his 1988 California conviction under section 496, subdivision (a), as he indicated on the recall petition itself. The trial court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of defendant’s petition. We remand to allow it to do so.

Appellants Stephen S. (father) and J.G. (mother) (collectively parents) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights on the sole ground the notice and inquiry provisions required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law were insufficient. Father contends respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) provided defective notice under ICWA when it listed the paternal great-grandfather in the incorrect location on the required form. Father also contends the Department failed in its “continuing duty” of inquiry under California law when mother notified the juvenile court after the hearing on termination of parental rights had been set that she “may have American Indian heritage” and wanted to ask her grandparents.

Bahman Rezaipour (Rezaipour) was previously employed by Los Angeles County as a clinical psychologist with the Department of Mental Health (DMH). DMH terminated Rezaipour from his employment effective March 22, 2011, after it investigated and substantiated charges of sexual harassment, tampering with county property and insubordination.
Rezaipour appealed his termination to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (the Commission). The Commission assigned a hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing in the matter. The evidentiary hearing lasted from September 2011 to June 2013, including at least 38 days of testimony. The hearing officer then prepared a written decision finding that Rezaipour was properly discharged from his position and recommending that the action taken against Rezaipour be sustained.

The jury found defendant and appellant Robert John Paiz Aguilar guilty of first degree murder, three counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. As to the murder count, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm , personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. The jury found that the murder was committed to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members. As to counts 1–3, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm, and the crimes were committed to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members. As to count 4, the jury found that defendant personally used a firearm, personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and that the crime was committed to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members.

Norris Miller appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him on three counts of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and one count of resisting an officer by means of threats and violence (§ 69). Miller contends the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by allowing him to continue representing himself at trial without requiring a psychiatric evaluation. We affirm.

In 1998, defendant Marine Nazaryan and her now-ex-husband purchased a home located at 1068 and 1068-A Rosedale Avenue in the City of Glendale (Property). In 2002, the ex-husband executed a quitclaim deed transferring sole title to the Property to his sister. In 2005, the sister recorded the subject deed of trust, which was executed in favor of Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (Greenpoint) and secures a refinancing loan against the Property (2005 Deed of Trust). About a year later, Nazaryan obtained a judgment in a marital dissolution proceeding awarding her sole title to the Property. For several years after obtaining title to the Property, Nazaryan made regular payments on the loan secured by the 2005 Deed of Trust. In 2012, a written assignment was executed, transferring all beneficial interest in the deed of trust and the underlying loan to plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon (Bank of New York).

Efrain Salinas, Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial. The jury convicted Salinas of assault with a deadly weapon, a car, and found true the allegations he suffered a prior serious felony conviction and a prior conviction for which he served a prison term. Salinas contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to bifurcate the trial on his prior convictions as untimely without evaluating the prejudice he would suffer from the jury hearing evidence of his prior felony convictions. We agree, but find the error was harmless.
Salinas also contends the trial court erred in applying the 15 percent limitation on accrual of his presentence conduct credits applicable to violent felonies, and requests correction of a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. We modify the judgment to award Salinas the full 384 days of presentence conduct credits and order that the abstract of judgment be corrected. We affirm the judgment as modified.

Leo Lloyd Adams appeals from a judgment entered after his jury conviction of two counts of first degree murder and three counts of attempted murder, as an aider and abettor, with gang and firearm enhancements. He contends the trial court erred in not instructing the jury about voluntary manslaughter, based on imperfect defense of another. He also contends defense counsel was ineffective for not advising him of his right to testify. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff Jodie Westphal, appearing in propria persona, appeals after a jury returned verdicts against her on her claims against defendant Kirsten Priebe. In her complaint, Westphal alleged that she had sold real property to Priebe but Priebe never paid her as promised. On appeal, Westphal complains about various aspects of the proceedings below. As she has not supported her claims with citations to the record and makes no reasoned argument in support of reversal, we affirm.

Defendant Greg Geston appeals from a conviction of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child. He argues that the conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed sua sponte to give the jury a unanimity instruction. We are not persuaded, and we therefore affirm.

An employer hired a company to give financial seminars to employees. Unbeknownst to the employer, the seminars were actually sales pitches designed to gain clients. Several employees hired the seminar instructors, then later lost money in the 2008 financial crisis as the result of risky investments. The employees sued their employer, who settled, and both the employees and the employer sued the seminar provider. Following a trial that spanned more than a year, the trial court found in favor of both the employees and the employer against the seminar provider.
In these consolidated appeals, the successor company to the seminar provider attacks the judgments regarding both liability and the measure of damages awarded. The employer, meanwhile, appeals from an order awarding it some, but not all, of the attorney fees it incurred in the litigation. We affirm the judgments in all respects.

An employer hired a company to give financial seminars to employees. Unbeknownst to the employer, the seminars were actually sales pitches designed to gain clients. Several employees hired the seminar instructors, then later lost money in the 2008 financial crisis as the result of risky investments. The employees sued their employer, who settled, and both the employees and the employer sued the seminar provider. Following a trial that spanned more than a year, the trial court found in favor of both the employees and the employer against the seminar provider.
In these consolidated appeals, the successor company to the seminar provider attacks the judgments regarding both liability and the measure of damages awarded. The employer, meanwhile, appeals from an order awarding it some, but not all, of the attorney fees it incurred in the litigation. We affirm the judgments in all respects.