CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant’s initial contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly imposed a penalty assessment of $450 on the drug program fee imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.7. He argues the language of section 11372.7 demonstrates it is a fee, not a fine. And, as a fee, it is not subject to penalty assessments.
For each conviction of enumerated drug offenses, section 11372.5 imposes on defendants a criminal laboratory analysis fee not to exceed $50, and section 11372.7 imposes a drug program fee not to exceed $150. In our decision in People v. Moore (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 558, review granted September 13, 2017, S243387 (Moore), we concluded the criminal laboratory analysis fee is a fine or penalty, subject to additional penalty assessments under Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000. (Moore, at p. 571.)

Defendant Erik Lee Bunnell appeals from the trial court’s order recalling and resentencing some of defendant’s felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. He claims the trial court erred in finding he was ineligible for resentencing on his felony convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)) and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). Defendant also contends the trial court erred in resentencing him to the same cumulative sentence after it reduced two other felony convictions to misdemeanors. We conclude the trial court erred in determining defendant was not eligible for resentencing for his violation of Vehicle Code section 10851; otherwise, we will affirm the trial court’s order resentencing defendant.

Appellant Rachel Darcy Brown pled no contest to one count of child custody deprivation (Pen. Code, § 278.5, subd. (a)). She was sentenced to the upper term of three years in county jail. The remaining counts and allegations against her were dismissed. She was awarded 324 presentence custody credits. We appointed counsel for appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no arguable issues were raised. On January 23, 2017, we advised appellant that she had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or arguments that she wished us to consider. No response has been received to date.

Anthony H., the 17-year-old father of 10-month-old Jonathan A., appeals from the juvenile court’s findings declaring his son a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Anthony argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that his substance abuse put Jonathan at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. We affirm.

Defendant Gary Dean Boatwright was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and placed on probation. While on probation, he was arrested for felony vandalism. As part of a plea deal in the vandalism case, defendant admitted violating probation in this case. The court terminated probation, sentenced him to two years in state prison in this case, and dismissed the vandalism case. Our independent review of the record has revealed no arguable appellate issues. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Sheryl Sirignano appeals from the denial of her petition seeking redress for her mother’s sale of an asset of the family’s irrevocable trust of which petitioner was a beneficiary. The probate court denied her petition principally on statute of limitations grounds because her mother sold the property in 2004, but petitioner did not commence her action until 2015. On appeal, petitioner asserts that the statute was tolled under equitable principles of delayed discovery and estoppel. We find that the facts pleaded establish that petitioner had no knowledge of the transfer until after her mother’s death, thereby tolling the statute of limitations, and reverse the trial court’s order on her first and second causes of action for enforcement of trust and accounting, and affirm on the third and fourth causes of action for imposition of constructive trust and enforcement of abatement rights.

Appellant Michael Lee Yochem pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), with admission of two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Immediately before entry of his plea, the trial court denied his second Marsden motion to discharge his appointed trial counsel. Appellant obtained a certificate of probable cause, and argues on appeal the trial court erroneously denied his Marsden motion and that he should be permitted to vacate his plea. Appellant asserts any errors in the denial of his Marsden motion were not forfeited by the entry of his guilty plea because his contentions go to the “constitutional, jurisdictional or other ground going to the legality of the proceedings” under Penal Code section 1237.5. We disagree, and affirm.

personally inflicted great bodily injury in the course of resisting an executive officer. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction allegations. The trial court found true the allegations that defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions, one of which was also a serious felony conviction. The court also found true the allegation that defendant had served a prior prison term. The court sentenced defendant to a total of 55 years to life in prison, consisting of a term of 25 years to life for the assault conviction, pursuant to the Three Strikes law, a five year enhancement term pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and a 25 years to life term for the resisting conviction, also pursuant to the Three Strikes law.

In November 2013, the Office of the State Labor Commissioner (Commissioner) within the California Department of Industrial Relations (Department) cited plaintiff Goni Enterprises, Inc. (Goni) for failing to secure workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. The Commissioner issued a stop order requiring Goni to immediately stop using any employee labor until the company secured workers’ compensation insurance. The Commissioner also issued a penalty assessment requiring Goni to pay more than $30,000 for failing to have such insurance. The Commissioner provided Goni instructions explaining its rights to administratively appeal the stop order and the penalty assessment pursuant to the procedures established by the Labor Code. Goni never administratively appealed the stop order or the penalty assessment.
In August 2014, Goni filed a complaint against the Department seeking declaratory relief and withdrawal of the penalty assessment.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between a homeowner, appellant Joe Latourelle, and a water company, Cienega Springs Water Company, Inc. (CSWC) over unpaid water bills. CSWC filed a lawsuit against appellant and he cross-complained against CSWC, the Glendora Police Department (GPD), and affiliated individuals. In his cross-complaint, appellant alleged that over the course of about a month in 2014, individuals acting on behalf of CSWC trespassed repeatedly onto his property and damaged his water system; appellant further contended that these individuals were accompanied and assisted by GPD officers. This appeal concerns the claims against the GPD and its officers. The trial court sustained successive demurrers as to these claims and ultimately dismissed them without leave to amend.
We conclude that appellant has adequately alleged a claim for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

Marcos Munoz appealed from the judgment entered on his conviction for first degree murder, with firearm and gang sentence enhancements, contending insufficient evidence supported the gang enhancement finding and admission of hearsay evidence violated his due process rights. In an opinion filed on October 20, 2017, we concluded the gang enhancement was supported by substantial evidence, and although the trial court erred in admitting hearsay, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirmed the conviction.
Before our opinion became final, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 620, which amends Penal Code section 12022.53 to give trial courts discretion to strike, in the interest of justice, certain firearm use sentencing enhancements. (See Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (h); Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2.) The amendment became effective on January 1, 2018. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).)

Salvador G. Preciado, Jr., a senior and former football player at Panorama High School (PHS), died after attending a private, off-campus party. He and his successors-in-interest, his parents Irma Guevara and Salvador Preciado, Sr., brought the instant wrongful death action against, among others, the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or the school district). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of LAUSD concluding as a matter of law that the school district was not vicariously liable for the actions of the unpaid PHS football-team volunteer who gave decedent a ride home before he died. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a dispute of operative facts with the result that the question is one of law to which Munoz v. City of Palmdale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 367 (Munoz) applies. Munoz held that an unpaid volunteer of a public agency was neither an employee nor a servant of the agency for respondeat superior purposes.

Plaintiff Gintaras Vilutis (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant NRG Solar Alpine LLC’s (Solar Alpine) special motion to strike his complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute). Solar Alpine operates an alternating current photovoltaic energy generating facility (solar farm) in Antelope Valley; plaintiff hoped to obtain a contract to sell trees to Solar Alpine for use in its required community remediation efforts. To that end, plaintiff attended a public meeting of the Fairmont Town Council at which Solar Alpine presented its annual report to the community. Plaintiff’s claims against Solar Alpine arise from a hostile verbal exchange between plaintiff and another community member that occurred during the course of the meeting.

Petitioners F.G. (Mother) and R.M. (Father) each filed a petition for an extraordinary writ seeking review of the court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights and a permanent plan for seven-year-old H.M and six-year-old Z.M Petitioners contend the court erred in denying them further reunification services after the 12-month review hearing and in reducing visitation. We deny the writ petitions on the merits.