CA Unpub Decisions

The juvenile court found that A.Z. had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). A.Z. appeals, asserting the juvenile court (1) made findings unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) violated his due process rights by continuing to preside over his jurisdictional hearing after considering his motion to exclude his confession; and (3) imposed a vague and overbroad probation condition. We affirm.

Terrance Andyearl Elbert appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211). He contends a pretrial identification violated his right to due process and the trial court failed to fully instruct on a lesser included offense. We affirm.

A.M. (Minor) appeals an order of the juvenile court adjudging him a ward and committing him to an out-of-home placement. He contends that his felonies should be reduced to misdemeanors, that the finding that he resisted officers should be reversed because the officers used excessive force, and that the court should not have removed him from his parents. We shall affirm the order.

Cross-defendant Alice Tse (Tse) appeals from an order denying her special motion to strike. Cross-complainants Patricia Singer and Richard Singer (Singer) alleged, in their third cause of action, that Tse falsely represented to others that Singer owned and controlled property alleged to be in “abhorrent” condition, when in fact, Tse was the sole owner and manager of the property. Tse filed a special motion to strike that cause of action, arguing her statements were “protected activity” under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court concluded Tse did not carry her burden of proving that the statements were “act[s] in furtherance of [Tse’s] right of . . . free speech” as defined in section 425.16, subdivision (e). We conclude the motion was properly denied.

Defendant Alexander James Perez appeals from the denial of his application to reduce his felony conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) to a misdemeanor under the terms of Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (f)). The trial court denied his application, finding that Proposition 47, on its face, does not apply to convictions under Vehicle Code section 10851.
While this case was pending on appeal, the California Supreme Court in People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page) held that a defendant who has been convicted of a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) is not categorically ineligible for relief under Proposition 47. (Page, supra, at p. 1180.)
Because Perez, like the defendant in Page, failed to present any allegations or evidence to show that his conviction was for theft of a vehicle valued at $950 or less, the trial court’s denial of his application was appropriate.

This isn’t so much a family law spousal support modification case as it is a discovery case. The parties disputed a fact: Did, or did not, Joan McCarty (Joan) get married in Mexico to Juan Lucero in 2013? Joan testified she did not, but her ex-husband, James McCarty (James), presented a certificate of marriage from a church in Mexicali showing she married Lucero on January 19, 2013.
There was one piece of easily obtainable evidence that might have impeached Joan’s testimony and confirmed that her nuptials to James McCarty were a remarriage: her tax return for 2013 which probably would have revealed her marital status for the year. There is no dispute James asked for Joan’s tax return for that year (as well as for the years 2014 and 2015) as early as November 2015, and was assured by Joan’s counsel right up through 2016 that there indeed was a 2013 return and it would be produced.

A jury convicted defendant Christopher Raymond Olague of two sex offenses against Jane Doe One (counts one and two), intimidating her from being a witness (count three), and possessing child pornography (count six). The jury acquitted defendant of two sex offenses against Jane Doe Two (counts four and five). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years and eight months, plus 15 years to life in prison.
Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for the sex offenses against Jane Doe One (kidnapping for the purpose of child molestation and child molestation). We disagree.
Defendant also claims that he was improperly held to answer for the alleged crimes against Jane Doe Two (child molestation and inducing a minor to engage in sexual conduct for a photograph), the trial court improperly refused to sever those two counts, and the court improperly admitted illicit photographs of Jane Doe Two. Again, we disagree.

This is the second appeal in this case. Soltan’s first appeal was from a judgment entered in June 2014 after she and her ex-husband, Eric Wintemute, had settled numerous issues of property division at the end of a month-long trial. Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the settlement agreement, Soltan wanted to keep on litigating. We affirmed the judgment, observing that “[o]ne point is clear from the record. The settlement was a global one; there were no remaining issues.”
Now Soltan has returned, after at least 10 more trial court hearings – hearings punctuated by remarks from the bench such as “absurd,” “unbelievable,” “delay and delay and delay,” “out of control,” “disingenuous” and “filled with inaccuracies” when referring to declarations filed under penalty of perjury, and thinly-veiled findings that Soltan and her counsel were lying. Soltan asks us to review both appealable and nonappealable issues, without even a nod toward the sta

T.C. (mother) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights over her now 16-year-old daughter Taylor C. (Taylor) and 12-year-old son, Byron C. (Byron). The judgment frees the children to be adopted by their legal guardian, paternal grandmother Linda C. (grandmother), who petitioned the court to terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to Probate Code section 1516.5. Mother contends (1) substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that it was in the children’s best interest to be adopted by grandmother, and (2) the court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). We reject her first contention, but remand the matter for purposes of compliance with ICWA’s notice and inquiry provisions.

A jury found appellant Jaime Joshua Alonzo, a convicted felon, guilty of possessing both a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1); count 2). In a bifurcated court trial, he admitted a prior serious felony that resulted in a prison sentence. He received an aggregate prison term of five years. Alonzo appealed, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. In an unpublished opinion in case number F068960, filed September 26, 2016, we remanded the matter for the trial court to conduct a new hearing on the motion for new trial.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial and denied the motion. Alonzo appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

Defendant and appellant S.H. (Father) is the father of E.N. (male, born in 2013) and M.N. (male, born in 2014; collectively, Minors).
On July 20, 2017, plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received a referral alleging general neglect and caretaker absence or incapacity due to C.N. (Mother) repeatedly smashing her head against a rock or radio, resulting in injury. Mother was transported to Loma Linda University Medical Center. Minors were in the care of the maternal grandmother (MGM).

A jury found defendant and appellant Georel Emmanuel Perez guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 2), and making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 3). The jury also found true that during the commission of counts 2 and 3, defendant personally used a knife. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of four years in state prison with credit for time served as follows: the midterm of three years on count 2, plus a consecutive one-year term for the knife use enhancement attached to count 2. A term of three years on count 1, a term of two years on count 3, and a term of one year for the enhancement attached to count 3 were stayed pursuant to section 654.

In 2012, Cicely Brewster lost her home to foreclosure after she could no longer make payments on her refinanced mortgage. This is her fourth lawsuit to regain her former residence. In this suit, a quiet title action, Brewster named as defendants American Brokers Conduit (ABC, the respondent in this appeal )—the lender on her refinanced loan, and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche)—the substituted trustee who initiated the foreclosure, assigned Brewster’s debt to another trustee, then purchased the property at the trustee’s sale. Brewster’s complaint alleged Deutsche was not a valid trustee due to untimely debt assignment. In May 2015, the trial court sustained Deutsche’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered a “Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice” in favor of Deutsche.

Defendant and appellant Lauren Anthony Gratiano appeals the denial of his Proposition 47 resentencing petition. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) The petition arose from his 2011 felony conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851.) The trial court ruled that Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions were ineligible for resentencing and denied the petition. After defendant’s petition was denied, the Supreme Court decided People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page), which held that Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions are not categorically ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18. (Page, at p. 1189.)
Pursuant to Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th 1175, we affirm the denial of defendant’s petition, without prejudice to the trial court’s consideration of a petition providing evidence of his eligibility.