CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Jarrod Boxie of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. He was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in (1) not ordering the disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant, (2) denying his motion for a new trial, and (3) staying a gang enhancement. We conclude the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for disclosure of the informant’s identify, or denying a new trial. As to the gang enhancement, the attorney general concedes and we agree it should be stricken.
In supplemental briefing, defendant contends that legislation effective January 1, 2018, ending the statutory prohibition on a trial court’s ability to strike a firearm enhancement applies and requires a remand for a new sentencing hearing. We agree that remand is required for the exercise of the trial court’s discretion to decide whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the new legislation

A jury convicted Christina A. Denisoff of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) (Count 2)) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) (Count 3)). The jury found true sentencing enhancement allegations that Denisoff personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Denisoff to two years in state prison.
Denisoff appeals. She contends: (1) the court erred by excluding the victim’s prior inconsistent statement as impeachment evidence; and (2) she was improperly convicted of both counts of assault for “identical conduct involving a single victim.” We conclude Denisoff’s conviction for assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury is necessarily included within her conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.

Petitioner J.C. (mother), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order issued at a post-permanent plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3) setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her daughters, now 13-year-old N.L. and 10-year-old H.L. In her petition, mother asks this court to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and direct the juvenile court to order visitation or return the children to her custody. We conclude mother’s petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 and dismiss the petition.

Respondent and cross-appellant Erik Hansen and several relatives (the “Hansens”) own about 382 acres of farmland in Tulare County (APN 291-010-009; the “09 parcel”). Appellant and cross-respondent Sandridge Partners, L.P., (Sandridge) owns an adjacent parcel of about 250 acres (APN 291-010-005; the “05 parcel”). This case centers around approximately 10 acres on the southwest part of Sandridge’s 05 parcel. The parties refer to this roughly triangular-shaped area as the “Disputed Land.”
Hansen Ranches, a partnership between Erik and several relatives, has farmed the 09 parcel for as long as Erik can remember. For 30 years, Erik participated in the farming of the 09 parcel, and now he manages the day-to-day farming operations. When Erik began managing farming operations, there was already an irrigation ditch on the 09 parcel. The irrigation ditch generally runs along the border between the 09 and 05 parcels.

The victim in this case, Thomas H., was punched in the head by defendant Devinnci Dishan Pye after he insulted defendant’s girlfriend. The blow caused Thomas to fall and sustain a head injury that rendered him comatose. Defendant was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (GBI) (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) (count 1)) and battery resulting in the infliction of serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d) (count 2)). The jury convicted defendant of both counts and found true the sentence enhancement for personal infliction of GBI attached to the assault charge. (§ 12022.7.) The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years for assault plus a three-year sentence enhancement for personal infliction of GBI, for a total determinate term of seven years. Pursuant to section 654, the court imposed and stayed the upper term of four years for the battery conviction.

J.A. (father) and D.V. (mother) are married and have at least three children together. G.A. (G.), the eldest of these, had a baby of her own when she was just 16. In a separate dependency proceeding, the baby was removed from her custody.
Meanwhile, G. was using drugs, including methamphetamine, and she was showing signs of mental illness (possibly drug-induced). She was frequently AWOL from both home and school. She failed to comply with her reunification services plan. When Children and Family Services (CFS) investigated, it concluded that the parents were failing to supervise G. and, in addition, that the father had a drinking problem.
CFS therefore filed dependency petitions regarding not only G., but also her younger siblings, J.A. (J.) and A.A. (A.). The children were not detained. The juvenile court declared all three children dependents.

A jury convicted Jose Luis Lopez of transporting for sale more than 10 kilograms each of heroin and methamphetamine based on evidence U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents (border patrol) acquired incident to a stop on Interstate 10 near the California-Arizona border. Lopez sought to exclude the evidence, arguing the agents did not have reasonable suspicion he was engaged in criminal activity when they stopped him.
One of the agents explained they decided to stop Lopez because he was alone, driving an older-model minivan in a “highly used” smuggling corridor, appeared to push himself back behind the door frame when he first passed the agents, changed lanes as they approached from behind in the fast lane, did not look at the agents as they drew alongside him, drove at 50 miles per hour in a 70 mile-per-hour zone, and had recently crossed the United States-Mexico border. The trial court held the stop was justified, and Lopez appeals.

In a second amended complaint, plaintiff and appellant Valerie Whitaker (Employee) sued her former employer, defendant and respondent State of California Department of Food and Agriculture 46th District Agricultural Association (CDFA) and two people who work for CDFA. Employee brought 12 causes of action primarily related to alleged discrimination. The trial court sustained a demurrer, without leave to amend, on two of the causes of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10) and granted summary judgment on 10 of the causes of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c). Employee raises 17 issues on appeal. We modify the award of costs, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Douglas Jordan was tried before a jury on one count of continuous sexual abuse with a child under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (5)(a), and one count of a lewd act upon a child in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). During deliberations, one of the jurors reported to the court that another juror had made a comment in the hallway that made her uncomfortable, and that she and another juror felt pressured by some of the other jurors. After speaking with the juror, the court determined the jury was deliberating in an appropriate manner and sent the jurors back to continue deliberations. The following day, the jury reached a verdict and found Jordan guilty on both counts.
On appeal, Jordan asserts the juror's statement to the trial court indicated potential jury misconduct, that the court failed to adequately investigate the issue, and that this court must reverse his conviction as a result.

Defendant Isiah Mincey appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury trial. The jury convicted Mincey of 10 counts, including pimping, pandering, and human trafficking of a minor, related to two female victims.
On appeal, Mincey raises two arguments regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury. We conclude that the Supreme Court has already spoken with respect to both of Mincey's claims. Although Mincey argues that the Supreme Court did not consider the "constitutional" question that he is raising with respect to the first issue, we disagree. For this reason, we affirm the judgment.

Carlton Roark appeals the trial court's order granting terminating sanctions and entry of default judgment following his noncompliance with the court's order to preserve evidence. Roark contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing terminating sanctions against him under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2023.030, subdivision (d). He argues his former employer, San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU), did not suffer prejudice from his destruction of computer files, which a neutral computer forensic expert recovered; he did not destroy the files willfully or with malice; and the court did not first impose lesser alternative sanctions. Roark further contends the court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay an excessive default judgment that was unjustified because, under the parties' separation agreement, SDCCU was only entitled to a maximum of $30,000 in sanctions.

Zain Jawed appeals the denial of his writ petition to set aside a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) administrative decision suspending his driver's license for driving with alcohol in his system while on probation for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23154, subd. (a).) Jawed contends that at the administrative hearing the DMV failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting into evidence the results of the preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test administered to him, and the evidence otherwise failed to establish that he had a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 percent or greater. We conclude that the DMV laid a sufficient foundation for admission of the PAS test and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Valentina Estrada of assault upon a peace officer (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (c); count 2), battery causing serious bodily injury to David Obeso (§§ 242, 243, subd. (d); count 3), making a criminal threat to Esmeralda Sanchez (§ 422, subd. (a); count 5), vandalism over $400 (§ 594, subd. (a); count 6), fleeing a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 7), simple assault and battery of David
(§ 240; count 8), and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a); count 9). As to count 3, the jury found true an allegation that Estrada personally inflicted great bodily injury
(§§ 1203.075, subd. (a), 12022.7). The court sentenced Estrada to five years eight months in state prison.
Estrada's sole contention is that insufficient evidence supports the criminal threat conviction. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the disposition of the estate of James E. Pilley (Pilley). Pilley was the sole shareholder of a business that operated two residential care facilities. In 2004, Pilley decided to sell one of the facilities and set up a trust, the Pilley Investment Trust (PITv1), to hold the proceeds of the sale, in order to reduce the taxes associated with the sale. Pilley transferred the real property of the facility to the trust and the trustees, Edward and Jayne Pilley, and sold the facility for $1.5 million. Pilley and the PITv1 trustees then executed a private annuity agreement (the PAA), by which the trustees agreed to assign back to Pilley the $600,000 that the trust had received as the down payment for the property, and to pay Pilley the remaining $900,000 from the sale in installments.