CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Cedric Moore appeals from a trial court judgment as well as orders denying motions for reconsideration and to vacate the judgment. We dismiss the appeal as untimely.

Defendant Davaughn Love (Love) drove defendant Antwoine Vaughn (Vaughn) into rival gang territory, where Vaughn got out of the car and starting shooting “wildly” at a man standing on the sidewalk with his family; many of the bullets hit the man as he tried to flee across an intersection, other bullets hit a passing car. A jury convicted Love and Vaughn (collectively, defendants) of attempted premeditated murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle, and convicted Vaughn of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendants attack their convictions as being invalid due to errors in jury selection, with the jury instructions, with the admission of evidence, and with the sufficiency of the evidence as well as due to prosecutorial misconduct. Their arguments lack merit. Defendants also attack their sentences and seek a remand so the trial court can exercise its discretion to strike their firearm enhancements. These arguments have merit

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Daniel Delgado of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted robbery, based on evidence that he hit a bicyclist with his car and then tried to grab the victim’s belongings. Appellant claims the trial court erroneously admitted two pieces of evidence: a prior misdemeanor conviction of an eyewitness and police officer testimony about a statement from a paramedic at the scene. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to impeach the witness by asking about misdemeanor misconduct. On the other hand, we find that the officer’s testimony regarding the paramedic’s statement was irrelevant and therefore its admission was in error. However, any error from the admission of either piece of evidence was harmless. We therefore affirm.

Plaintiff Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. filed a lawsuit against defendants Robbin L. Itkin and Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, alleging legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty during their representation of plaintiff in a bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court denied plaintiff’s ex parte motion to substitute an expert witness after the discovery cutoff date had passed (and denied a second ex parte motion to permit a late designation), finding plaintiff’s conduct in connection with the expert designation and its delay in seeking the substitution were unreasonable. At a bench trial, the court granted a motion for judgment for defendants after plaintiff presented its evidence.
Plaintiff contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to substitute a new expert.

After suffering a late-term miscarriage, the fetus’s mother and father sued the mother’s treating physicians and the clinic employing them. The parents’ complaint alleged a single claim, but was murky about what that claim was. The trial court construed the claim solely as one for wrongful death and granted judgment on the pleadings (because wrongful death of a fetus is not a viable claim under California law). Mother has appealed. Because a mother’s emotional distress is a “patently obvious” consequence of medical malpractice leading to the death of a late-term fetus or a stillborn child (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1080 (Burgess)), we must reasonably infer that the negligent care of the mother leading to the death of the late-term fetus caused mother to suffer emotional distress; as such, her complaint validly states a claim for medical malpractice. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant and appellant Sharon Williams appeals from a civil harassment restraining order entered against her pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, after a hearing, in a proceeding brought by plaintiff and respondent Erika Rios. The restraining order expired by its own terms on January 15, 2017. Because the order has been extinguished, no appellate relief can be granted. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot.