CA Unpub Decisions

Jeremy Crowl pleaded guilty to attempted grand theft. (Pen. Code, §§ 487, subd. (a), 664.) The trial court suspended imposition of his sentence for three years and granted formal probation. As a condition of his formal probation, Crowl was required to "[s]ubmit [his] person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media . . . to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [the probation officer] or law enforcement officer."
Crowl appeals. He contends the condition requiring him to submit his "computers" and "recordable media" to warrantless search is unreasonable, unconstitutionally overbroad, and impermissibly burdens the constitutional rights of third parties. We conclude the challenged condition is reasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and Crowl's remaining contentions were forfeited by his failure to raise them in the trial court.

Plaintiff and appellant Kirk Broten sued his former employer, defendant and respondent Target Corporation, for several causes of action, including retaliation and wrongful termination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code, sections 12900 et seq., 12965 (FEHA). A jury found by special verdict that Target had two "substantial motivating" reasons to discharge Broten: his complaint of harassment, and his poor job performance, and awarded no damages. After trial, Target moved for costs. Broten moved to strike and tax Target's costs. The court granted Broten's motion to tax in part and denied it in part. Broten also unsuccessfully moved for his attorney fees under FEHA.

Defendant John Robert Harreld pleaded no contest to willful infliction of a corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and was placed on formal probation with various terms and conditions. After admitting a violation of probation, the court reinstated defendant on probation with modified terms. Following a bench trial for a second violation of probation, the court found defendant violated the terms of his probation and sentenced him to the upper term of four years in state prison.
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After examining the record, we conclude that the $400 domestic violence fee imposed under section 1203.097 should have been $500 under the version of the statute then in effect. We shall modify the judgment accordingly, and affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Ray Ignacio Diaz has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We find no errors that arguably would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant and therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Laura Meridel Debell contends the abstract of judgment does not correctly state the number of days of credit awarded by the trial court during its pronouncement of judgment. The People concede, and we will order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.

Driving to work at around midnight on a desolate Yolo County Line road, his van slowed by a partially deflated tire, Mark Cullen’s path was suddenly blocked by a white pickup that sped ahead and then stopped in front of him. Forced from his vehicle at gunpoint by a passenger from the pickup, Cullen tried to run but was stopped, beaten, knifed, shot, run over by his own van and left for dead, but lived to identify his attackers, defendant Danny Joe Stearman, the uncle of Cullen’s ex-wife with whom he had been embroiled in a heated child custody dispute and David Earl Bristow, Stearman’s friend, paid to assist in this murderous enterprise. Convicted in a joint trial before separate juries of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, assault, and associated enhancements, they appeal.

Petitioner M.G. is the presumed father of three children, ages two, five and six. He seeks extraordinary relief from an order setting a hearing to select a permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l).) We deny the petition, which contains no factual summary, no argument, and no citations to the record or to statutory and case authority. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 8.452(b)(3).) Absent this information, there is no basis for granting relief.

F.G. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court adjudging him a ward of the court and committing him to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer for suitable placement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) We conclude that a probation condition prohibiting F.G.’s presence on a school campus unless he is enrolled therein is constitutional, and we affirm. (In re Edward B. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1236-1238 [school campus probation condition not impermissibly vague].)

Plaintiff Leonard Romo was injured by security staff employed by defendant Los Angeles Dodgers, LLC, while attending a baseball game. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against defendant, and the jury awarded him $175,000 in economic damages for past medical expenses, $150,000 for future medical expenses, $50,000 in past noneconomic damages, and $100,000 for future noneconomic damages. The damage award was reduced by 33.33 percent due to plaintiff’s own negligence.
On appeal, defendant contends the award for past and future medical expenses is not supported by substantial evidence. Concerning past medical expenses, defendant contends there is no evidence that plaintiff incurred or paid any expenses. Defendant also contends that since the economic damages are not supported by substantial evidence, the noneconomic damages award also must be reversed, reasoning that “the cost of medical care is an important indicator of a plaintiff’s non-economic damages.”

Fabian Hernandez Jiminez was convicted by jury on nine counts related to sexual assaults on children. He challenges the denial of his Wheeler/Batson motion. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, overruled in part by Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79.) We agree with the trial court that appellant cannot establish a prima facie showing of discrimination and therefore affirm.

The complaint that underlies this appeal arose from a series of events related to defendant, Lisa Tanner’s, dispute with her estranged husband, Michael Tanner, who was in a postseparation romantic relationship with plaintiff. Defendant made a special motion to strike this complaint pursuant to California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied the special motion, finding that the case did not involve protected speech. Applying the required de novo standard of review, we agree and affirm the judgment.

Defendants and respondents Dr. Lukas Alexanian (Alexanian) and Glendale Adventist Medical Center (Hospital) (collectively Alexanian/Hospital) demurred to the first amended complaint (FAC) of plaintiffs and appellants, Judith Vukov, M.D. and Judith Vukov, M.D., Inc. (collectively Vukov ). The trial court sustained that demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court reasoned that the FAC added causes of action that were not within the scope of amendment allowed by the trial court when it sustained Alexanian/Hospital’s demurrer to Vukov’s original complaint and found that the FAC was a sham pleading. Because we conclude that the trial court should have overruled the demurrer as to Hospital, we reverse the judgment as to that defendant. Because we hold that a Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 (section 1278.5) claim will not lie against an individual physician, we affirm the judgment as to defendant Alexanian.

This appeal arises from plaintiff Thris Van Taylor’s challenge to the judicial foreclosure of his property. Respondent One United Bank (United) sued successfully for foreclosure in 2009, and the property was sold at a foreclosure sale later that year. Approximately five years later, in 2014, Van Taylor sued United for breach of contract arising from the foreclosure, and violation of his right to redeem the property. United successfully demurred to the complaint on the ground the action was time-barred. The court dismissed the action, and Van Taylor now appeals. He argues the action was timely. We conclude that some of Van Taylor’s claims were time-barred, and his complaint otherwise failed to state a cause of action. Therefore, the demurrer was properly sustained. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Shamusideen A. Aliu and defendant and respondent Elavon Inc. entered into an agreement. After Elavon terminated the agreement, Aliu sued Elavon for breach of contract and for interference with contractual and prospective economic relationships. After a bench trial, the trial court found for Elavon on all causes of action. Aliu appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment. We disagree and affirm the judgment.