CA Unpub Decisions

This is a second appeal by T.G., who challenges the 2017 juvenile court judgment terminating her parental rights to M.H. and selecting adoption as his permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted.) A previous similar judgment was reversed in a nonpublished opinion, on T.G.'s appeal of the November 2016 parental rights termination order and permanent plan of adoption. (In re M.H. (May 24, 2017, D071503) [nonpub. opn.] [our prior opinion].) This court concluded that the previous finding was unsupported by substantial evidence, on likelihood of adoption within a reasonable time, in light of the thrust of the reports and assessments prepared by respondent San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency). We accordingly reversed the judgment terminating parental rights and its related finding that the parent-child beneficial relationship exception did not apply.

Richard B. Eggson pleaded guilty to selling and possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11351.5.) He also admitted allegations that he was not eligible for probation and was subject to a sentencing enhancement based on prior drug crimes. (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(11); Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a).) In 2010 the trial court sentenced Eggson to nine years in prison. In 2015 Eggson was placed on postrelease community supervision (PRCS) (§ 3450 et seq.) under certain conditions.

Defendant and appellant Robert Moses appeals from an order granting a new trial in favor of plaintiff Helen Griner, after a jury in Griner's personal injury action had reached a verdict finding him negligent but that his negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Griner harm. Griner moved for new trial on grounds there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict (Code Civ. Proc., § 657). In granting the motion, the trial court ruled: "The evidence presented at trial does not support a finding that defendant's negligence did not contribute to plaintiff's harm." On appeal, Moses contends the new trial order must be reversed because the court did not give specific reasons on which it found insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.

Following an unsuccessful attempt to cash a stolen check, Defendant Adolfo Flores pled guilty to two felonies: unauthorized use of personal identifying information of another (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)) and burglary (§ 459). After entry of his guilty plea but before sentencing, Flores moved to reduce the charges to misdemeanors in light of intervening case authority that purportedly rendered his felony plea unlawful. The court partially granted the requested relief; it reduced the burglary charge but left the felony identity theft count unaltered.
Flores appeals, ostensibly from the partial denial of his motion. Yet his appeal suffers a fatal flaw that precludes us from reaching its merits. In substance, Flores's appeal challenges the lawfulness of his underlying plea. It thus requires a certificate of probable cause—which Flores neither sought nor obtained. Accordingly, we must dismiss his appeal.

Defendant Jeffrey Moore appeals from a judgment entered after he was convicted in two cases the trial court consolidated. In the first case, Moore was charged with making criminal threats to his ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend and the new boyfriend's neighbor, and violating a restraining order protecting the ex-girlfriend. In the second case (filed about five months after the first), Moore was charged with two counts of disobeying a no-contact order issued in the first case in favor of the ex-girlfriend, making a criminal threat to her, dissuading her from testifying against him in the first case, and burglary (by sneaking into her house to dissuade her from testifying). A jury found him guilty on all counts in the first case, but only the court-order violation counts in the second case. The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison. Moore contends the trial court erred by consolidating the two cases. We disagree.

On November 8, 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57, and the new law became effective the following day. As relevant to this writ proceeding, Proposition 57 eliminated the People's ability to directly file criminal charges against a juvenile defendant in a court of criminal jurisdiction (Adult Court).
In February 2012, the People filed a complaint against Jeremy Walker in Adult Court, alleging two counts of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one count of active participation in a gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) as well as various firearm enhancements. Walker was 17 years old at the time of the events giving rise to the charges. After a jury found Walker guilty as charged, this Court ruled that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at Walker's trial and reversed his convictions. Walker's case was remanded to the Adult Court, where it remained pending as of the effective date of Proposition 57.

Plaintiff and appellant Randall G. Salatino, as trustee of a family trust (Plaintiff), sued defendant and respondent Olivenhain Municipal Water District (the District or OMWD) and numerous other governmental and private party defendants, on theories including inverse condemnation, slander of title and quiet title. Plaintiff has owned and occupied rural residential real property since 2000, and alleges the District, among others, interfered with his 20-foot wide recorded access easement, which lies within a wider dirt roadway. Based on a different 30-foot easement granted to it along the same roadway, the District took action between 2000 and 2007 to install pipe and pumping improvements under and on the surface of the roadway area, and has maintained them through the present time.

This appeal arises out of a convoluted set of facts, as malicious prosecution actions often do. The underlying suit, brought by Catherine Herrick as cotrustee of her late father's trust, was based on an alleged loan secured by an apartment complex. The trust claimed that the borrower was delinquent in payments and fraudulently transferred the apartment complex to avoid its obligation. It sued the buyer of the apartment property—or rather, three parties it suspected were the buyers—too. The trust lost.
Based on that action, the purported buyers sued Catherine and the trust's attorneys for malicious prosecution. But the malicious prosecution action was short lived. It did not survive the various defendants' anti-SLAPP motions—which are now before us on appeal.
We affirm the orders in favor of Catherine and the trust attorneys.

Michael G. Dikes sexually abused his two stepdaughters numerous times over the course of approximately five years. As a result, a jury convicted Dikes on 22 counts of various forms of sexual misconduct with a minor, including 3 counts (counts 16, 18, and 19) of a lewd act upon a child in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) based on Dike's conduct on June 14, 2014, the day the abuse was discovered.

Defendant Zane Wallace Peterson contends the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence when it ordered him not to have contact with the family members of the deceased victim of one of his numerous arsons. The Attorney General agrees the no-contact order should be stricken, and we concur. The trial court had no statutory authority to impose the order, and the prosecutor made no showing to justify the order’s need.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), six counts of arson of a structure or forest land (§ 451, subd. (c)), and 15 counts of arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 44 years. Of significance here, the court also ordered defendant “to have no contact or knowingly attempt to contact in any manner the family of [the deceased victim].” Defendant contends this no-contact order is unauthorized, and we agree.

Following a jury trial, defendant Ramon Ruiz III was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and transportation of methamphetamine (§ 11379). The trial court sustained a strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c), (e)(1)), a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior drug conviction enhancement (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)) and sentenced defendant to serve a 12-year state prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) his suppression motion should have been granted because the warrantless search of the bag in his car was not supported by probable cause, (2) the search was the product of an unreasonably prolonged detention, and (3) his prior drug conviction should be stricken in light of changes to section 11370.2. Defendant also asks us to review the sealed record regarding his Pitchess motion.

A jury found defendant Sam Perez guilty of premeditated attempted murder, and sustained firearm and gang allegations. It acquitted two codefendants. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison in November 2015 for an aggregate term of 42 years to life. Preparation of the record and briefing were completed in May 2017.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to strike the entirety of the testimony of a witness who invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, in its instructions on attempted murder and the effect of voluntary intoxication on an unreasonable belief in self-defense, and in imposing sentence on the gang enhancement rather than increasing his minimum life term for the attempted murder.

Defendants Devon Jerome McBride and Marce Bushey assaulted the victim with firearms and took his car. A jury convicted both defendants of robbery and assault with a firearm and convicted defendant McBride of recklessly evading a peace officer. Sentenced to state prison, they appeal.
Both defendants contend: (1) the trial court erred by not staying the sentence for assault with a firearm under Penal Code section 654.
Defendant Bushey additionally contends: (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive terms for the crimes, and (3) a photograph lineup shown to the victim was unduly suggestive.
Defendant McBride additionally contends: (4) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of assault with a firearm, and (5) he is entitled to two additional days of presentence custody credit.
Of the contentions raised in the initial briefing, only the issue relating to custody credit has merit.

Plaintiff Aleksandr Vasilenko was hit by a car while crossing a public street between the main premises of defendant Grace Family Church (the Church) and the Church’s overflow parking lot. Vasilenko claimed the Church owed him a duty of care to assist him in safely crossing the street, and that the Church was negligent in failing to do so. The Church argued that it had no control over the public street and therefore did not owe Vasilenko a duty under the principle that landowners have no duty to protect others from dangers on abutting streets unless the landowner caused those dangers. The trial court agreed with the Church, and entered summary judgment in the Church’s favor. Vasilenko appealed, and we reversed, finding that the location of the overflow lot, which required the Church’s invitees to cross a busy thoroughfare in an area that lacked a marked crosswalk or traffic signal in order to get to the Church, gave rise to a duty under Civil Code section 1714.