CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Appellant Star H-R, Inc. (Star) is a labor contractor that hired respondent Refugio Arreguin to work in a warehouse for one of its clients, appellant E. & J. Gallo Winery (Gallo). In applying for the job with Star, Arreguin signed an arbitration agreement, but he later brought individual and class-based claims against Star and Gallo in superior court. This case requires us to determine whether the arbitration agreement between Star and Arreguin is enforceable and, if it is, whether Arreguin’s class-action claims and claims against Gallo must also go to the arbitrator. The trial court found that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and refused to compel arbitration. We agree that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable but find no substantive unconscionability, and so reverse the order denying appellants’ motions to compel arbitration.
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Plaintiff Francisco Carrillo-Torres (Torres) was injured while working for a subcontractor on a home remodel project, and brought this premises liability action against the property owner, defendant Lanelle D. Torkelsen a/k/a Lanelle D. Bergen (Bergen) alleging negligence and seeking damages. Bergen moved for summary judgment, contending she owed Torres no duty. The trial court granted the motion and Torres has appealed.
We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted because this action is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3600 et seq.), and Torres did not present prima facie evidence that Bergen affirmatively contributed to the cause of Torres’s injuries. |
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Plaintiff Sabrina R. Newton appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (District) following the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the District on Newton’s employment discrimination action. Newton alleged the District wrongfully terminated her from her position as a Senior Claims Representative in the District’s Risk Management Department, because of her disability and on other prohibited bases, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.) (FEHA). We affirm the judgment.
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Defendant Courtney Christine Paet pleaded no contest pursuant to a plea agreement to felony possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), misdemeanor possession of clonazepam for sale (§ 11375, subd. (b)(1)), and misdemeanor possession of alprazolam without a prescription (§ 11375, subd. (b)(2)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on probation with numerous conditions.
On appeal, she challenges the court’s imposition of a search condition requiring her to submit to a warrantless search of “all cellular telephones in your possession or under your control, . . . any text messages, voice messages, call logs or [associated] photographs . . . .” Defendant contends that this condition was unconstitutionally overbroad because it impinged on her privacy. We conclude that the narrowly tailored cell phone search condition imposed by the trial court was not unconstitutionally overbroad, and we affirm the trial court’s probation order. |
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Defendant Felix Cruz appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of committing sodomy with a child under 10 years old, sexual penetration of a child under 10 years old, and a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years old. He contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of statements that he made during a police interview because they were “improperly elicited through express or implied threats of punishment” and thus involuntarily made. He also argues the trial court erred by allowing one of the victims, a then eight-year-old boy who was reluctant to testify, to have a support person near him during his testimony. He further argues the judgment of conviction must be reversed due to the cumulative effect of the claimed trial court’s errors.
We affirm. Viewing Cruz’s statements during the police interview under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude they were made voluntarily. |
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Ruben Tajimaroa was charged by information with five counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7), and two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a); counts 4, 5). The information included a sentence enhancement for committing specified sexual offenses against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e).)
A jury convicted defendant of counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7, and found true the multiple victim sentence enhancement. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 5, and it was dismissed by the court. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 40 years to life. |
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Scott C. Ellenson and Kapri Heckerman are the divorced parents of their adult son, B.E. B.E. is mentally and physically disabled. In 2008, Scott and Kapri settled a contested conservatorship proceeding over B.E. by agreeing to the entry of a negotiated order (2008 order) appointing Scott and Kapri as B.E.’s co-conservators and establishing a custody schedule. The 2008 order also contained a provision that one parent would pay the other parent a $250 daily payment for non-compliance with the custody and visitation schedule (per diem provision).
In 2015, Scott filed a petition to enforce the per diem provision for Kapri’s failure to assume custody of B.E. for 113 days (2015 petition). The trial court denied Scott’s petition. Scott contends the order denying enforcement of the 2015 petition (2015 order) should be reversed. |
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A jury found Lee Castellano guilty of second degree murder while personally armed with a knife. Castellano argues we should reverse his conviction because it rests on insufficient evidence. He also claims the trial court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 372, the flight instruction. We find his contentions lack merit, and affirm the judgment.
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Appellant Randy Lee Parkerson strangled Zoraida Reyes to death while they were having sex in the back of his car. At trial, appellant claimed Reyes wanted him to choke her to enhance her sexual stimulation, and her death was just an accident. Despite this, the jury convicted him of second degree implied malice murder. On appeal, he contends reversal is required because the jury’s instructions on his accident defense and the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter were flawed. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
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Defendants Germani Jermaine Mackie, Kyle Yarber, and Larry Bernard Tarver were charged in a consolidated amended information with kidnapping to commit robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1), robbery (§§ 211; 212.5, subd. (c); count 2), false imprisonment by menace or violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 3); commercial burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b); count 4), criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a); count 5), attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 6), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 7). The information further alleged Yarber personally used a firearm in the commission of the charged offenses (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), Mackie personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), each of the defendants was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), and Mackie and Tarver were vicariously armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (d)).
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The parties appeal and cross-appeal a judgment after a jury trial in this business dispute. Plaintiff and cross-defendant IIG Wireless, Inc. (IIG) obtained a judgment of $401,860 against defendant and cross-complainant John Yi. IIG also sued Lauren Kim, Yi’s fiancée, who moved for and was granted a nonsuit during trial. Yi obtained a judgment on his cross-complaint for $122,000, resulting in a final judgment of $279,860 in IIG’s favor.
Yi appeals the judgment and the court’s denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). In sum, he argues there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict, the court made numerous errors with respect to the introduction of evidence and its conduct of the trial, and the damage award of $122,000 on his cross-complaint was inadequate. IIG argues there was substantial evidence to support the verdict, the JNOV was properly denied, and the damage award on the cross-complaint should be reduced. |
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Appellant Shalander Dennis Givens was before the trial court after remand for resentencing on multiple felonies, including three counts of premeditated attempted murder, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and firearm enhancements. He filed an appeal and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. On this court’s own motion, we asked the parties to brief the applicability of Senate Bill 620 and the changes to Penal Code section 12022.53 to this case and its effect on the firearm enhancements.
The parties agree Senate Bill 620 is applicable to Givens’s case, but disagree on whether remand for the trial court to exercise discretion is required. We affirm without remand. |
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California’s version of “Megan’s Law” allows persons convicted of specified sex crimes to apply to the California Department of Justice (Department) to have their names, pictures, and other identifying information excluded from the Internet Web site the Department maintains to make information about registered sex offenders available to the public. (Pen. Code, § 290.46, subd. (e); Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1101.) Under section 290.46, subdivision (e)(2)(C), a person convicted of violating section 311.11 (possession of child pornography) is eligible for exclusion from the Web site if “all victims involved in the commission of the offense were at least 16 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense.”
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A Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of appellant Nicholas F. and he was placed in a foster home. Subsequently, Nicholas was the subject of a section 602 petition filed in December 2013; the section 602 petition was sustained. In October 2014, the dependency proceeding was terminated. After subsequent sustained section 602 petitions and multiple probation violations, the juvenile court committed Nicholas to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in November 2016.
After the dependency was terminated, information indicated Nicholas may have Native American ancestry. Nicholas contends the juvenile court erred prejudicially because it failed to provide notice pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 25 U.S.C. section 1901 et seq. to tribes and/or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), thus depriving him of due process. We disagree and affirm. |
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