CA Unpub Decisions

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2020, more than 18 months after minors J.H. (then ten years old) and J.B. (then two years old) were removed from appellant mother D.B., the juvenile court terminated family reunification services for Mother and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for the children.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Benjamin M. Reznik and Matthew D. Hinks for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen & Shapiro, Andrew Baum and Craig H. Marcus for Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiffs and appellants MDR Boat Central, L.P., and MDR Boat Central, LLC (collectively MDR), appeal from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents County of Los Angeles and Board of Supervisors for the County of Los Angeles (Board) in this breach of contract action concerning the development, lease, and operation of a boat storage facility on County land in Marina del Rey.
We affirm the judgment.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stuart M. Rice, Judge. Affirmed.
Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP, Jeffrey Tsao, Steven C. Amundson and Mark R. Wilson for Defendant and Appellant.
Henry M. Lee, Hoffman & Pomerantz, LLP and Andrew S. Pomerantz for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Yong Lee appeals from an order denying YNOT Community Services and Lee’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 to set aside the default and default judgment entered against them. On appeal, Lee contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion because he was never served with the summons and complaint, he did not have actual notice of the action, and his lack of notice was not caused by his inexcusable neglect or avoidance of service. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.
Citron & Citron, Thomas H. Citron and Katherine A. Tatikian for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Allen Saltzman, Tom M. Allen and Erica L. Saltzman for Defendant and Respondent.
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Plaintiffs and appellants Dr. Morteza Khaleghi and Creative Care, Inc. (collectively, plaintiffs) sued defendant and respondent Wendy McEntyre for defamation. Thereafter, the trial court granted McEntyre’s special motion to strike, commonly known as an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), and awarded her attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs now appeal the order. We affirm.

J.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over her son D.P. (born in 2018) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the juvenile court and the social services agency, Contra Costa County Children and Family Services (CFS), failed to comply with their inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law (§ 224).
We conclude the record does not demonstrate that the juvenile court satisfied its duty of inquiry, nor does it show CFS complied with its duty to inquire with extended family members regarding D.P.’s possible Indian ancestry. Therefore, there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA was inapplicable.

Armed with an operable taser gun, Rayana Amani Fudge went into
a big-box retail store, filled a shopping cart with merchandise, wheeled it outside, and then threatened store employees with the taser when they tried to apprehend her. The prosecution charged Fudge with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, statutory references are to this code). Fudge waived her right to counsel (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta)) and pled no contest to the charge. Thereafter, she moved to withdraw the plea. The trial court denied the motion; it suspended imposition of sentence and placed Fudge on probation.
On appeal, Fudge contends the trial court erred by permitting her to waive her right to counsel, and she challenges the denial of her motion to withdraw the plea. Fudge also argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request mental health diversion. Finding none of these contentions persuasive, we affirm.

Michael Dennis Johns, Jr., was charged in an information with two counts of felony driving under the influence with three prior convictions for driving while under the influence within the past 10 years (counts 1 and 2; Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subds. (a) & (b), 23550); misdemeanor hit and run with property damage (count 3; § 20002, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor driving without a license (count 4; § 12500, subd. (a)). A jury convicted Johns of driving under the influence (§ 23152, subd. (a)), hit and run with property damage (§ 20002, subd. (a)), and driving without a license (§ 12500, subd. (a)). The court found true three prior convictions for driving while under the influence with the past 10 years (§ 23550). On appeal, however, Johns challenges only his misdemeanor hit and run conviction. He argues there was insufficient evidence of property damage and insufficient evidence that he knew of property damage. We disagree and affirm.

BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the written opinion filed on July 20, 2022 is modified as follows: On page 13, after the first sentence of the last full paragraph ending with “and we concur,” add as footnote 5 the following footnote, which will require the renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
5 At oral argument and in a subsequent petition for rehearing in this matter, counsel for appellant suggested that there were at least ten months in the second period of impracticability (while she sought out a new expert) during which the statute of limitations should be tolled. We reject the notion that these events tolled the statute of limitations. Borrayo cannot avail herself of the protections afforded by section 583.340, subdivision (c) because she was not reasonably diligent in bringing her case to trial. (See Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th 717, 731 [to permit tolling under section 583.340, subdivision (c), the trial court “must determine whether plaintiff has shown a circumstance of

Appellant, I.L., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as to E.L. The sole issue raised on appeal is that the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with their duty of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2 ; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) The Department concedes that the inquiry was insufficient but contends that any error was harmless. We conclude that the Department’s investigation was prejudicially insufficient and reverse and remand for the limited purpose of assuring compliance with ICWA.

This is the second appeal in this matter. In 2018, a jury found defendant Antonio Villa guilty of spousal battery causing corporal injury with a prior spousal battery conviction. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (f)(1).) The trial court found Villa had suffered a prior strike conviction and three prior prison terms. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court imposed a total prison term of 10 years, consisting of the middle term doubled to eight years for the strike prior, plus two consecutive one-year terms for two of the prior prison term enhancements.
In his first appeal, Villa argued his prior prison terms should be stricken under a retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 136, which eliminated most types of prior prison term enhancements including those that had been imposed on Villa. We concluded the claim was meritorious, so we reversed the judgment and remanded for the trial court to strike those enhancements and resentence Villa. On resentencing, the trial cour

BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on July 26, 2022, be modified as follows:
On page 17, at the end of the first sentence in the first partial paragraph, insert the following footnote:
In a petition for rehearing, Andrade points out that the DSM-5’s definition of pedophilic disorder is limited to an interest in prepubescent children and that Sidhu’s use of “pubescent” is inaccurate rendering his expert opinion entirely unreliable and mandating reversal. We disagree. Whether Sidhu misspoke or there was a transcription error, Simon accurately described pedophilic disorder as an abiding sexual interest in prepubescent children and diagnosed Andrade with pedophilic disorder. The testimony of a single mental health expert witness is sufficient to support a finding that a person suffers from a severe mental disorder. (People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 879.)

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Vibhav Mittal, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
INTRODUCTION
Jose P., the father of the minor Samantha P., appeals from the order vesting jurisdiction over Samantha in the juvenile court and the disposition order removing her from his custody. Samantha came to the attention of Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) when her school reported bruises on her arm. Samantha claimed that Maria B., Jose’s wife or live-in girlfriend, had caused the bruising. Jose did not believe Samantha and proffered several alternative theories for how she acquired the bruises.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Annette Rees, Judge.
Jill Smith for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Maria Elena Ratliff, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
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Petitioner Zachary S. (father), through counsel, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 18 month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22) on May 6, 2022, terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing on September 6, 2022, as to the children, Z.S, M.S., and I.S. The petition contends the juvenile court erred by finding that return of the children to father’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment and that the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) provided reasonable services. Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to continue father’s reunification services to the 24-month revi

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Stephen D. Schuett, Judge.
Mahoney & Soll, Paul M. Mahoney and Richard A. Soll for Plaintiff and Appellant.
McCartney Dallmann, N. Thomas McCartney and Matthew C. McCartney for Defendant and Respondent.
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Plaintiff and appellant Ayala Boring, Inc. (Ayala) appeals from a January 4, 2021 postjudgment order of the Kern County Superior Court awarding attorney’s fees to defendant and respondent HPS Mechanical, Inc. (HPS) under Civil Code section 1717. , Ayala makes three contentions. First, the order “should be reversed because the contract at issue is a third-party beneficiary contract and there was no evidence of any prevailing party attorney’s fee clause in that contract.” (Capitalization omitted.) Second, “there is no right to attorney’s fees on the second and third causes of action,” i.e., restitution and conversion. (Capitalization omitted.) Finally, “the court abused its discretion in awarding $70,882.5