CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Tito Ace Thomas appeals from an order placing him on probation following his pleading nolo contendere to robbery (Pen. Code § 211) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). He argues the trial court erred in imposing certain fines and assessments as terms of his probation. We agree and modify the court’s order to separately impose those fines and assessments.
Appellant also argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process when it made support of his dependents “as directed by [his] probation officer” a condition of his probation. He argues this condition is unconstitutionally vague and improperly delegates judicial authority. We agree in part and modify the court’s order accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s order.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Victor Hugo Cazarez of the following offenses: count 1—aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205), with a further finding that defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.7. subd. (e)); count 2—misdemeanor child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (b)); count 3—dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1)); and count 4—infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, girlfriend, or child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), with a finding defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.7 subd. (e)). Defendant was sentenced in count 1 to an indeterminate term of life in prison. Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in the county jail in count 2, with credit for 180 days served. A consecutive sentence of three years in prison was imposed in count 3. A nine-year state prison term was imposed in count 4, consisting of the upper term of four years for the charged offense and three years f

On September 13, 2016, Jesus Manuel Arreola pled guilty to unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) with a prior theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 666.5). The trial court granted Arreola’s request for probation on the conditions, among others, that he serve six months in a residential drug treatment program and obey all laws.
On February 28, 2017, the trial court found Arreola in violation of probation for resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148) and possession of a methamphetamine pipe (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364). The court revoked his probation and sentenced Arreola to serve three years.

The jury convicted defendant and appellant Martin Ruiz Sanchez of continuous sexual abuse (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a) [count 1]); lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a) [counts 2, 3, and 4]); oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b) [count 5]); misdemeanor child molestation (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1) [counts 6 and 7]); and forcible lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1) [count 8]). The jury found that counts 1–5 and 8 involved children and multiple victims within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2).

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Wesley Garcia (defendant) of two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder and one count of carrying a loaded, unregistered handgun. The jury also found true allegations that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury in connection with each attempted murder charge. We consider whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We are also asked to decide whether a remand to the trial court is warranted (a) because defendant had no sufficient opportunity at sentencing to preserve a record for later use at a youth offender parole hearing, or (b) so that the trial court will have an opportunity to exercise discretion—recently conferred by the enactment of Senate Bill 620—to strike one or both firearm sentencing enhancements the jury found true.

The jury found defendant and appellant Anthony Q. Philyaw guilty in counts 1 and 2 of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)), in counts 4 and 5 of making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), in count 7 of false imprisonment by violence (§ 236), in count 9 of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and in count 10 of sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)). As to counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7, the jury found true the allegations that Philyaw personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

Defendant Glenn Wright (defendant) was convicted on two counts of second degree burglary, and as a third strike offender, he was sentenced to fifty years to life in prison. Many years later, defendant filed Proposition 36 and Proposition 47 petitions to recall his sentence. The trial court denied both petitions based on its finding that resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We affirmed the denial of defendant’s Proposition 36 petition in a prior opinion, relying on the more permissive dangerousness standard that applies to Proposition 36 cases as contrasted with the Proposition 47 standard, namely, whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of committing certain especially serious or violent felonies. In this appeal from the denial of defendant’s Proposition 47 petition, we conclude the difference in the two statutory standards is dispositive—under the restrictive standard of dangerousness that applies, defendant’s Propositi

Plaintiff Fergus Lewis was a bus driver for defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). He was fired after he refused to drive a bus without his equipment bag, and reported to various MTA personnel that it would be “unlawful” for him to drive without his bag. He sued the MTA and the County of Los Angeles, alleging whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subds. (b), (c)). The trial court sustained the MTA’s demurrer to the operative complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivision (g), allows the imposition of sanctions when a litigant disobeys a court order to provide discovery. The trial court found that the defendants, employing a variety of devices and excuses, failed to obey its order for pretrial discovery and imposed monetary sanctions. The trial court also found that defendants had violated a second order related to a mental health examination of plaintiff. The trial court’s order is unclear as to whether it awarded sanctions for one or both of these violations. Because defendants were not afforded an opportunity to be heard regarding the imposition of sanctions for violating the mental health examination order, the trial court’s sanctions order of December 6, 2016, is conditionally reversed and remanded. If the trial court’s order was intended to impose sanctions solely on the failure to produce documents, the trial court shall reinstate the sanctions order. If the trial court’s order

Respondent Tosh Berman sued appellant Darrick Angelone for defamation following a series of articles in an on-line gossip blog that accused respondent of a number of dishonest and fraudulent acts. Appellant failed to respond to this suit and a default judgment was entered against him. He appeals from this judgment. Recognizing that he failed to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner, appellant argues that the judgment was void at the time it was entered and, therefore, may be challenged at any time pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). We find that judgment was neither void on its face nor does any extrinsic evidence establish that it is void. Thus, this appeal is untimely and we have no jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

Benito Acuna appealed from a judgment entered upon his jury conviction of gang-related first-degree murder in People v. Acuna (June 15, 2011, B223744) [nonpub.opn.]. This court remanded the matter for a new Pitchess hearing to determine whether material information had been omitted in the initial Pitchess review conducted by the trial court. Following remand, a second Pitchess hearing was held and the trial court made no new disclosures. Appellant asks that we independently review the sealed transcript of the second Pitchess hearing to determine whether material information was omitted. We conclude that material, discoverable information was omitted and remand for its disclosure and further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Appellant also argues we must remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion, recently conferred by the passage of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), to strike firearm use enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53. We agre

Following an arbitration conducted pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in a business line of credit contract, a judgment in favor of Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) in the amount of $135,032.14 was entered against Appellant Anthony Dalia (“Dalia”).
On appeal, Dalia asserts that he did not agree to mandatory arbitration as part of the business line of credit contract.
We affirm.

Eastgate Petroleum, LLC (Eastgate) appeals a judgment dismissing its writ of mandate/inverse condemnation action against defendants County of San Luis Obispo, San Luis Obispo Environmental Health Services, Linnea Faulkner and Aaron Labarre (County defendants) following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court ruled Eastgate’s challenge to an administrative decision imposing civil penalties for Eastgate’s violation of hazardous materials regulations (Health & Saf. Code, § 25404.1.3) was barred by the running of the statute of limitations.

Following a bench trial, defendant Cozette Brockmeier obtained a judgment in her favor, and an award of costs and attorney fees, against plaintiff Douglas Converse. Plaintiff alleged that defendant hired him for a construction project at her home, but fired him without paying for his services. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract and common counts, and defendant filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and negligence.