CA Unpub Decisions

Shelly Rogers, the trustee of a family trust, appeals from an order enforcing a money judgment for delinquent child support against one of the trust beneficiaries. Rogers primarily contends the court failed to consider the beneficiary’s needs and the cash available in the trust to pay the judgment, failed to make findings, and failed to instruct her how to satisfy the judgment. Petitioner and respondent the Merced County Department of Child Support Services (Department) has declined to file a respondent’s brief. Rogers’s contentions are without merit, so we affirm.

We consider whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute relating to a computer game called ArcheAge. Aaron Van Fleet, Paul Ovberg, and James Longfield (collectively, plaintiffs) sued Trion Worlds, Inc. (Trion) asserting causes of action based on alleged misrepresentations regarding discounts that would be available within ArcheAge, and alleging other aspects of ArcheAge constitute an illegal lottery. Trion petitioned to compel arbitration of the dispute, but the ArcheAge End User License Agreement (EULA) does not contain an arbitration clause. Instead, it calls for any state law cause of action relating to the agreement to be litigated in San Mateo Superior Court. Trion’s Terms of Use does contain an arbitration clause, but it also provides it is “in addition to, and does not replace or supplant” the ArcheAge EULA, and, in the event of a conflict or inconsistency, the ArcheAge EULA “shall supersede” it. Based on this provision in the Terms of Use, we conclude t

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Franklin Sheldon Rich of stalking and criminally threatening his estranged wife, Maricor Rich, at various points in December 2014 and January 2015, and of criminally threatening Maricor’s divorce lawyer in January 2015. On appeal, Franklin argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury with CALCRIM 207 which stated the prosecution could prove the charged crimes took place “reasonably close” to—but not exactly on—specific days. Franklin also argues the court erred in imposing rather than staying concurrent terms for subordinate offenses. We modify the sentence and affirm the judgment as modified.

Gilbert Henry Anchondo (Anchondo) shot and killed two men in a parking lot behind an apartment building, hours after arguing with one of the victims. The next day, police officers observed Anchondo driving an SUV that belonged to one of the victims. Anchondo sped away from the officers and crashed into a school bus and other vehicles, causing the SUV to catch fire. Investigators found a charred gun grip in the burned vehicle. Cell site location data and eyewitness accounts also connected Anchondo to the murders. Anchondo now appeals from his first degree murder convictions as well as his conviction for evading a peace officer, causing serious bodily injury. Anchondo contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a medical examiner not present at the victims’ autopsies. He also contends that reversal is warranted because the jury was administered the wrong oath of service.

A jury found defendant Felton Humphries guilty of the first degree murder of his wife, assault with a deadly weapon of his infant daughter, resisting a peace officer, and interference with a police animal. On appeal, Humphries argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon convictions; (2) the court erred in refusing to give an imperfect self-defense jury instruction; and (3) the court’s denial of his motion for a continuance to retain private counsel violated his constitutional right to be represented by his chosen counsel. We find no merit in these claims and affirm the judgment.

Garwacki & Associates and Raymond Garwacki appeal from a judgment in an unlawful detainer action in favor of respondent landlord, 631 S. Olive LLC. Appellants assert that the three-day notice to pay rent or quit is defective. We agree and reverse the judgment.

Wilfredo Cruz appeals from his conviction and sentence for the murder of Norman Earl Edwards. Cruz contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in her closing argument by misstating the law defining deliberation and premeditation and by arguing facts she had not proved. Cruz also contends his trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to this misconduct. In a supplemental brief, Cruz asks us to remand his case to the trial court for the court to consider whether to strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill 620, which took effect on January 1, 2018.
We find no error in the prosecutor’s closing argument, and therefore affirm Cruz’s conviction. We remand the case to the trial court for the court to exercise its discretion to strike or to decline to strike the punishment imposed for Cruz’s intentional discharge of a firearm causing Edwards’s death.

Within minutes of receiving a report of suspicious activity at a residence, police detained appellant Jose Alfredo Delgado, who was nearby and carrying two cases. Ensuing searches revealed incriminating evidence. After being charged with various burglary- and drug-related offenses, Delgado moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the evidence was obtained after and as consequence of an unlawful detention. The trial court denied the motion, Delgado pleaded guilty to one charge, and a jury convicted him of the remaining charges. On appeal, Delgado renews his objection to the detention, and he raises new, more specific challenges to the ensuing searches. We reject Delgado’s argument that he was wrongly detained, and we conclude that Delgado forfeited his new challenges. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellant M.K. appeals after the juvenile court sustained allegations of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, vandalism over $400, and misdemeanor battery in a juvenile wardship petition. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) On appeal, appellant contends (1) substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that she committed assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury; (2) the court abused its discretion when it denied the defense motion to recuse the San Francisco County Office of the District Attorney, Juvenile Division; and (3) the court abused its discretion when it committed her to out of home placement. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

In this appeal from a disposition order declaring her a ward of the juvenile court, C.H. (Minor) challenges probation conditions that allow searches of her electronic devices and required her detention in juvenile hall for one weekend. We shall affirm the order.

Byron Gill, an African-American, began employment with the City and County of San Francisco (City) in 1996, working as a gardener. In 2013, Gill sought a promotion to district captain, without success, and then filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). And in 2015, while still employed by the City, Gill filed a complaint against it, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, essentially arguing, as his brief puts it, that after his DFEH complaint “the City found fault with almost everything he did on the job, suspended him for minor rule violations not enforced against other workers, passed him over for promotion, and even refused to allow him to transfer away from the supervisors who were making his work life miserable.”
The City brought a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

Gary Hines appeals from an order denying his petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code., §810 et seq. (GCA).) The court’s determination that Hines was not entitled to relief was not an abuse of its discretion, so we affirm.

A 15-year marriage between appellant David Fischer and respondent Joannie Fischer had its “ups and downs,” one down of which was David’s affair—an affair he promised was “over.” David nevertheless petitioned for dissolution; Joannie resisted; and the parties attempted reconciliation, in connection with which the trial court would later conclude David gave “conflicting messages.” Meanwhile, Joannie heard David’s phone, and saw a picture of the mistress. David walked in and confronted Joannie, who slapped him, scratching his neck, and in a subsequent confrontation grappling for the phone, shoved him. David moved for a domestic violence protective order. Following a lengthy hearing in which the court heard from seven witnesses, the court denied the request, in a thoughtful and comprehensive statement of decision. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a contract and fraud action brought by plaintiff N.A. Sales Company, Inc. (N.A. Sales), based on the alleged nonpayment for frozen fish and other products it supplied to Japanese restaurants. Defaults, and in some cases default judgments, were entered against several individual defendants, who N.A. Sales claimed were responsible for payment of the amounts owed or for other damages sustained by N.A. Sales. The defendants moved to vacate the defaults and default judgments on the ground of attorney fault, relying on the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. We conclude the court erred, because the motion and accompanying attorney declaration of fault satisfied the requirements of the mandatory relief provision of section 473(b). We therefore reverse.