CA Unpub Decisions

Julie Ann Romo pleaded guilty to four counts of grand theft of personal property in excess of $950. (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a).) The court sentenced Romo to five years in local custody. In October 2017, following Romo's petition requesting that the superior court recalculate her custody credits, it ordered Romo's immediate release because she had served her sentence.

Jesus Arpallan was charged with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), with the use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Arpallan entered into a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to burglary (§ 459). The robbery charge and the weapon enhancement were dismissed.
The court granted Arpallan probation subject to various terms and conditions. One of the conditions imposed (6n.) required Arpallan to: "Submit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by P.O. or law enforcement officer."

Dennis Dierenfield, William Gilmer, Tye Wynfield, and NNN 1818 Market Street 13, LLC (TIC 13) (Dierenfield, Gilmer, and Wynfield collectively Individual Appellants; Individual Appellants and TIC 13 collectively Appellants) appeal an order granting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s (Wells Fargo) motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Appellants contend the superior court erred in granting the motion because Wells Fargo's motion was based on a forum selection clause in a mortgage agreement and none of the Appellants are parties to that agreement. In addition, Appellants maintain the court erred in finding they are closely related to the contractual relationship or are third party beneficiaries for purposes of enforcing the forum selection clause against them. Finally, Appellants insist the court erred in determining that the forum selection clause was mandatory instead of permissive. We agree with Appellants that the subject forum selection clause is permissive.

A jury convicted Brian Gitre of driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) (count 1) and driving with a measurable blood alcohol causing injury (§ 25153, subd. (b)) (count 2). As to both counts, the jury found him guilty of personally inflicting great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8) & 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personally inflicting bodily injury to more than one victim (§ 23558). The jury further found him guilty of willfully refusing a peace officer's request to submit to chemical tests. (§§ 23612 & 23577.)

Anne Hoppe appeals a summary judgment in favor of her employer, the City of San Diego (the City), in her lawsuit alleging gender discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) based on the promotion of male candidates instead of her to each of four open positions over a period of six years. The trial court determined that section 12960, subdivision (d) barred Hoppe's claims because Hoppe failed to file an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) within one year of each date the City failed to promote Hoppe. Hoppe asserts the trial court erred in reaching that conclusion because she filed her administrative complaint within one year of when the City announced who was promoted to the two most recent positions, and because the continuing violations doctrine applies to preserve her two earlier claims.

Francisco Rolando Cabello appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18. The court denied the petition because the court determined Cabello's felony conviction for taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), was categorically ineligible for resentencing as misdemeanor petty theft (Pen. Code, § 490.2, subd. (a)). However, the California Supreme Court recently held a defendant whose conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), was for the theft of a vehicle worth $950 or less is eligible to be resentenced to misdemeanor petty theft under Penal Code section 490.2, subdivision (a). (People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1180, 1184, 1187–1188 (Page).) As the record establishes Cabello's conviction was for vehicle theft and the value of the vehicle he stole was worth less than $950, Cabello's conviction is eligible for resentencing as misdemeanor petty theft.

In this consolidated appeal, defendant Steven Kezma Samra challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion brought pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11361.8 (one of the statutes enacted in 2016 as part of the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, Proposition 64) to redesignate and dismiss his felony conviction for using a minor to sell marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361; unless otherwise stated, statutory section references that follow are to the Health and Safety Code). He also challenges the trial court’s partial denial of his motion to redesignate and dismiss his felony conviction for cultivation of marijuana (§ 11358) under section 11361.8. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

On October 3, 2015, defendant Joseph Lamar McKeever broke into a home, assaulted the 72-year-old woman who lived there, tried to sexually assault her, and took jewelry and $900 from her before leaving. He was 17 years old at the time.
The People elected to charge defendant as an adult pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with the intent to commit rape during the commission of a burglary, attempted rape as a lesser included offense of rape, and robbery, along with an enhancement for a victim older than 65. The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for seven years to life plus seven years.
Defendant contends on appeal that under the recently enacted Proposition 57, his conviction should be conditionally reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider whether he is suitable for trial in adult court.

A jury found defendant Gordon Charles Grissom guilty of 32 sexual offenses committed against one minor victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to 54 years in prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress statements made to detectives because he made the statements during a custodial interrogation without first receiving Miranda warnings, and (2) requiring defendant to reimburse law enforcement for medical examinations occurring after sentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1h.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, but we will modify the judgment to strike the order requiring defendant to reimburse law enforcement for future medical examinations and affirm the judgment as modified.

On June 8, 2016, petitioner Meggen G. Massey entered a no contest plea to one count of arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts, a five-year sentence, and an agreement to receive 50 percent custody credits. On January 4, 2017, the trial court sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement to the mid-term of five years. Her counsel asked: “That is a 50 percent sentence, correct, Your Honor?” The court confirmed: “That is correct. That was the agreement.”
Arson is a violent and serious felony under sections 667.5, subdivision (c)(10) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(14), however, and Massey’s credits are statutorily limited to 15 percent. (§ 2933.1, subd. (a).) Accordingly, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has advised Massey she is receiving credits at a 15 percent rate, not the promised 50 percent.

Kristjan T. Kristjansson appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, defendants’, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., demurrer to appellant’s wrongful foreclosure complaint. We affirm.

Christopher Anthony Galante appeals his conviction, by jury, of one count of committing a lewd act on a child who is under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) , and two counts of committing a lewd act on a minor who is over 14. (§ 288, subd. (c)(1).) The victim of each lewd act is D.L., a niece of appellant’s wife who lived with appellant, his wife and their children during most of her high school years. The jury further found, on count 1, that appellant had substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) With respect to all offenses, the jury found that D.L. was under 18 when the offenses occurred and that the prosecution commenced before her 28th birthday. (§ 801.1, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of nine years and four months in state prison. We affirm.

J.E. appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) for two counts of second degree robbery (counts 1 and 2; Pen. Code, § 211) , receiving property not exceeding $950 in value (count 3; § 496, subd. (a)) and two counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (counts 4 and 5; § 245, subd. (a)(4)), with a gang enhancement finding on counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B).) The trial court declared the robberies and assaults felonies, placed appellant in a community camp program for five to seven months, and set the maximum term of physical confinement at 24 years 10 months. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1).)
We reverse the gang enhancements. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 75-76 (Prunty).) Appellant, a member of the Venice 13 gang, assisted members of another gang, the Venice Shoreline Crips, in the commission of the charged offenses.

Plaintiffs and appellants C&P Construction Company, Inc. (C&P) and Paul Cabuta (together, Plaintiffs) sued Hiller & Hiller, CPAs (Hiller) after allegedly discovering misappropriations of C&P’s corporate funds. The trial court granted Hiller’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that Hiller caused them injury. We affirm the judgment and impose monetary sanctions against Cabuta and his attorney.