CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant and appellant Lino Alvarez-Murga guilty of one count of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) A trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

This case involves a settlement agreement entered into in 2010 by defendants and appellants Chic Home Trends, Inc., and Pissamai Patamakanthin, as well as Pissamai’s late husband, Sommai Patamakanthin, to settle a lawsuit filed by plaintiff and respondent G&O Chino Property Partnership (plaintiff or G&O).
In 2016, G&O filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, or for orders for execution of a stipulated judgment that was entered against Chic Home Trends as part of the settlement agreement. The court issued an order assigning certain funds, held in the trust account of defendants’ attorneys, to plaintiff. In their opening brief, defendants contended that rather than enforcing the settlement agreement, the trial court’s order rewrote the agreement, to their detriment.

Zain Jawed appeals the denial of his writ petition to set aside a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) administrative decision suspending his driver's license for driving with alcohol in his system while on probation for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23154, subd. (a).) Jawed contends that at the administrative hearing the DMV failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting into evidence the results of the preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test administered to him, and the evidence otherwise failed to establish that he had a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 percent or greater. We conclude that the DMV laid a sufficient foundation for admission of the PAS test and affirm the judgment.

Jennifer F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to minor S.F. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the court erred by finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) We shall affirm.

Defendant Garry Wayne Tankersley pleaded guilty to committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The trial court found true the allegations he had two prior rape convictions that qualified as strikes under the three strikes law (§ 1170.12), and had committed a prior and present sex offense within the meaning of section 667.6, subdivision (a). After denying his Romero motion to strike one of his strike priors, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Romero motion. He further contends the trial court’s order requiring him to submit to acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) testing must be reversed. We will reverse the AIDS testing order and remand this matter for the limited purpose of permitting a further hearing on the issue of AIDS testing at the election of the prosecution. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Tyler Richard Johnston appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) We will reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Respondent Marc David Marullo obtained a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against pro. per. appellant Amy Nguyen, his former girlfriend, and the court denied Nguyen’s request for a DVRO against Marullo following a contested trial in which both Marullo and Nguyen testified. Nguyen appeals the order granting the DVRO against her. Marullo did not respond to the appeal.
Although difficult to discern from her opening brief, which does not include appropriate citations to the record or coherent legal authority, Nguyen contends the DVRO should be reversed because Marullo did not serve her with his petition and she was unaware he was seeking a DVRO against her at the time of trial. She also claims the court improperly described the job title of one of the witnesses that testified during trial, and that the attorney she eventually hired to represent her was not responsive.
We conclude the trial court did not err in granting the DVRO against Nguyen.

In December 2015 defendant Jeffrey Lemus stabbed and killed Kelly Choate with a knife during a physical altercation at a bar. A jury acquitted defendant of first and second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) but found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the allegation he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing sua sponte to properly instruct the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 505. He argues the trial court erred in omitting the following optional paragraph in CALCRM No. 505: “[If you find that the defendant knew that __________ <insert name of decedent/victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]”

Defendant Cassandra Rae Jones violated probation and committed a new felony offense, possession of methamphetamine for sale. The trial court sentenced her to an aggregate three-year eight-month term, including the upper term of three years for the possession for sale, and ordered her to pay various fines and fees.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term, (2) the trial court erred in imposing a drug program fee without determining her ability to pay, and (3) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to a supplemental probation report fee imposed without a finding of her ability to pay.
We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Anthony Jerrell Taylor, Jr., appeals from a conviction for first degree burglary, misdemeanor battery, and false imprisonment. At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, held midtrial, the victim’s mother revealed she had previously witnessed defendant punching the victim. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court permitted the victim’s mother to testify to that incident under section 1109.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to perform a section 352 analysis before admitting that evidence of domestic violence. He also contends admitting that evidence violated his right to due process. He finally contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to strike an irrelevant sheet that was attached. We agree with the third contention. We will order a corrected abstract of judgment and otherwise affirm.

Kelley Jaye Widrin petitioned for the dissolution of her marriage to Bruce Rodney Powers, Jr., in January 2012. The trial court entered a judgment on reserved issues in August 2015 (the parties describe it as also being a judgment of dissolution, although box 4a on the form is not checked), and Powers filed a timely notice of appeal. Briefing was finally completed in October 2017.

A jury found defendant Aquelin Crystal Talamantes guilty of first degree murder and assault on a child under eight with force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death. The trial court sentenced her to 25 years to life in prison.
Defendant now contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder; (2) she was denied her right to counsel when the trial court allowed her expert to be called as a prosecution witness, but if her lawyer mishandled the issue, she received ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court gave an inadequate response to the jury’s report of an impasse in deliberations.
We will affirm the judgment.

David Allen Morrison appeals an August 7, 2017 order revoking and terminating probation, and sentencing him to 16 months felony jail based on a 2016 conviction by plea to identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and possession of Alprazolam (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2)).
We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsel’s examination of the record, he filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.
On January 26, 2018, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. No response has been received from appellant.

Celia A. appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights over two children, nine-year-old P.A. and two-year-old Angel A. Celia contends the court violated her right to due process by denying her request to present testimony on the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Even if Celia had presented the testimony she offered to give, Celia could not demonstrate the parent-child relationship exception applied because she did not maintain regular visitation with her children. Therefore, any error was harmless, and we affirm.