CA Unpub Decisions

Carlos S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights as to his child J.S. Father claims the court did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and its corresponding provisions under California law (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). As relevant here, those laws require juvenile courts to inquire whether a child in a dependency proceeding is an Indian child, and if so, to inform the tribe of which the child is a member. (See In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5 (Isaiah W.).) We affirm.

M.Z. appeals from August 23 and 25, 2017 disposition orders entered after the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition and declared appellant’s 12-month-old son, E.Z. a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b) & (g).) Appellant contends, among other things, that the trial court erred in removing the child from her care, in granting the biological father a 35-day extended visit, and in ordering that the supervised visits take place in San Luis Obispo County. We affirm.

In this dependency case, the juvenile court found jurisdiction over the minor, C.R., based upon five separate counts under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (c). The court ordered C.R. to remain in mother’s custody with monitored visitation for father. During the pendency of this appeal, the court terminated jurisdiction over C.R. and awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of C.R., with monitored visitation for father. The Department of Children and Family Services (Department) contends father’s appeal is moot. We agree and dismiss the appeal.

Aaron B. (father) appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating jurisdiction over his five-year-old daughter, K.B., and reinstating a prior family court order giving K.B.’s mother, T.A. (mother), sole legal and physical custody of K.B. and denying father visitation with the child. Based on father’s refusal to participate in any court-ordered services and failure to visit K.B. for more than four months before the court terminated jurisdiction, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Reynaldo Abram Luna (appellant) appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one count of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 212.5, subdivision (c), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The jury found true the allegation that appellant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife) in the commission of the robbery. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court imposed the low term of two years in state prison for the robbery conviction, stayed a sentence of two years for the assault with a deadly weapon conviction, and stayed the one-year enhancement for the personal use of a knife. The court awarded total credits of 290 days, consisting of 253 days actual custody and 37 days conduct credit.
Appellant timely appealed the judgment of conviction, and we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.

Paul A. Bridges appeals the trial court’s order granting Wesley Willis’s special motion to strike his complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16, subd. (i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13) [order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable].) Bridges contends: (1) the court erred in its analysis of the anti-SLAPP procedure, and (2) he demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. We affirm.

On August 18, 2016 Charles Rivera Jr. pleaded no contest to unlawfully selling or transporting marijuana on January 22, 2016, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a). The court placed Rivera on probation for three years. The terms and conditions of Rivera’s probation included that he complete a 180-day residential treatment program, refrain from owning, using, possessing or selling any controlled substance or associated paraphernalia, and not violate any laws. (L.A. Super. Ct. No. NA103445.)

Ogbemudia Uware Ogbeiwi appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted in count 1 of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), and in count 2 of second degree robbery. (§ 212.5, subd. (c).) Appellant admitted the prior conviction allegations (§§ 667, subds. (a)–(i), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) as well as the allegation that he was out on bail at the time of his arrest (§ 12022.1). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years in state prison. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever the robbery from the burglary charge. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Carl James Sohn (Sohn), an attorney, filed the present action to recover unpaid legal fees from defendants and respondents Oriental Mission Church (Church) and its senior pastor, Hyung Jim Bob Park (Park), (collectively, Defendants). Defendants demurred, asserting that the complaint on its face disclosed the action was time-barred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal.
We conclude the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants’ demurrer on statute of limitations grounds. Sohn’s causes of action for breach of written contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, governed by a four-year statute of limitations, are timely and must be reinstated. As for Sohn’s other causes of action—breach of oral contract, quantum meruit, and negligent misrepresentation—Sohn adequately alleged that Defendants are equitably estopped to assert the statute of limitations defense.

K.W. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order concerning her then-five-year-old son, K.W. The court believed K.W. had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, severe emotional harm as a result of Mother’s repeated allegations that K.W.’s father had sexually abused K.W. notwithstanding of police and Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigations that concluded the allegations were unsubstantiated. We consider whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and its order removing K.W. from Mother’s physical custody.

A jury convicted Ashanti Logie (defendant) of one count of assault with a semi-automatic weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2) ; count 2), finding he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense, and of two counts of carrying a loaded, unregistered handgun in public (§ 25850, subd. (a); counts 3 and 4). On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in (1) admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements concerning the crime after determining he was feigning memory loss, (2) advising the jury defendant’s videotaped statements to the codefendant were adoptive admissions, (3) admitting into evidence that defendant was a member of the Rolling 30’s Harlem Crips criminal street gang, and (4) failing to stay imposition of the sentence on one of two counts of carrying a loaded, unregistered firearm. Defendant also seeks a remand to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancement.

Plaintiff Cynthia Foreman (plaintiff) sued her employer, defendant City of Lynwood (the City), asserting claims for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 (section 1102.5) and various violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) based on wide-ranging allegations of mistreatment by the City and fellow City employees spanning more than five years. The trial court sustained the City’s special and general demurrers to plaintiff’s second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend, and she appealed from the ensuing judgment against her. We affirm.

This appeal involves a trust. But trust among the parties is not present here. The trustor’s widow receives the income for her life, and the trustor’s children from a prior marriage receive the remainder. The children objected to the trustee’s accounts and his petition to borrow money secured by the trust corpus. The trial court approved the trustee’s accounts and petition. The court also found the children’s objections were made without probable cause and in bad faith. The court awarded attorney fees and costs to the trustee and life beneficiary. We affirm.

Appellant Bernice Noflin leased and later purchased a new 2009 Volkswagen Tiguan (vehicle) from defendant Volkswagen of Downtown L.A., L.P. (VW–DTLA). The vehicle was covered by a manufacturer’s standard new vehicle warranty. Between July 2008 and September 2014, Noflin experienced numerous mechanical and electrical problems with the vehicle and delivered it on 14 occasions to VW–DTLA for repair. By November 19, 2014, Noflin had decided the vehicle was a “lemon” and demanded that defendants Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (Volkswagen) and VW–DTLA provide her a refund or replace the vehicle under the provisions of the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code section 1790, et seq. (Song–Beverly Act, or the Act). By January 28, 2015, Volkswagen had extended three increasing offers to repurchase Noflin’s vehicle. None was accepted.