CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Michael Lucero guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and assaulting a child under the age of eight with force likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child's death (id., § 273ab, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Lucero to a prison term of 25 years to life.
Lucero contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in three separate evidentiary rulings: (1) admitting certain evidence of domestic violence that Lucero perpetrated on his cohabitating girlfriend, who was the mother of the victim; (2) excluding certain evidence regarding whether the mother of the victim performed sexual acts with other men at a strip club where she worked; and (3) excluding certain evidence concerning drug use by the mother of the victim. Lucero also contends that the trial court erred in denying his ex parte application to allow a polygraph test to be performed on him prior to sentencing.

Defendant Roger Coble, a mentally disordered offender, appeals his involuntary commitment to the State Department of Mental Health. He argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by failing to personally advise him and obtain his personal waiver of that right. He also argues insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s extension of his commitment. We agree with defendant’s first argument, and therefore need not consider his second. Accordingly, we reverse.

A jury found defendant Jose Manuel Aguilera guilty of attempted murder and sustained a firearm and a gang enhancement in connection with the offense. It was unable to reach a verdict as to two other counts of attempted murder of two other victims, as to which the trial court declared a mistrial. Pursuant to the gang enhancement, the court sentenced defendant in August 2015 to state prison for a minimum indeterminate life term of 15 years, as enhanced with a minimum indeterminate life term of 25 years for the firearm violation. Defendant appealed in September 2015; the case was fully briefed (including supplementary briefing requested by the court) in February 2018.
On appeal, defendant maintains that there is insufficient evidence.

After David K. Brandon purchased an apartment building in Texas from No Mas Tomas, LLC, he defaulted on a promissory note securing a portion of the purchase price. Consequently, he was sued by the principal of No Mas Tomas, Thomas Mitchell. Mr. Brandon cross-complained against the real estate broker and salesperson, cross-defendants Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services, Inc., and Jeffrey Mark Miller, who represented both Mr. Brandon and No Mas Tomas in the transaction.
Cross-defendants petitioned to compel Mr. Brandon to arbitrate his claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement between Mr. Brandon and No Mas Tomas. Mr. Brandon opposed arbitration on several grounds. The trial court denied the petition on the basis that cross-defendants were not parties to the purchase agreement between Brandon and No Mas Tomas, despite well-settled law establishing the right of the parties’ agent to enforce an arbitration agreement. We reverse.

Plaintiff Wimbledon Financing Master Fund, Ltd. (Wimbledon) appeals from an order staying this action under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30, subdivision (a). Wimbledon is a Cayman Islands entity, and its lawsuit alleges that the defendants engaged in fraud in soliciting investment in, and operating, another Cayman Islands entity, the Aramid Entertainment Fund Limited (AEF). The trial court found that the Cayman Islands is a more convenient forum for Wimbledon’s claims, and therefore stayed the case to permit a lawsuit to be filed there.
Wimbledon contends that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and abused its discretion in finding that the Cayman Islands is a more convenient forum for this action. We conclude that the trial court applied the correct standard and appropriately exercised its discretion. We therefore affirm.

Appellant Michael Young appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by jury on two counts of grand theft from the person (counts 1 & 2; Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a) ) each with findings the offense involved a taking exceeding $500,000 (§ 186.11, subd. (a)(2)) and prosecution of the count began within four years of the date the crime should have been discovered (§§ 801.5, 803, subd. (c)(1)), and with findings as to counts 1 and 2 appellant took property of a value exceeding $1.3 million (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(3)) and $65,000 (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(1)), respectively. We affirm.

During an audiotaped police interview, defendant and appellant Jose Venegas (defendant) confessed to shooting 19-year-old victim Kenneth Deras (Deras). Defendant, a member of the Metro 13 criminal street gang, told the police he shot Deras, a member of rival gang South Side Montebello, in self-defense. The claim of self-defense was not the defense at trial, however; instead, defendant argued he was not the shooter and falsely confessed to the contrary only under pressure. The jury rejected that defense and found defendant guilty of first degree murder. In his appeal from his conviction, we issued an opinion rejecting defendant’s challenge to the admission at trial of certain cell-phone-related evidence, as well as defendant’s contentions that the prosecution committed prejudicial Griffin error (i.e., commenting on defendant’s decision not to testify) and improperly displayed a slide not in evidence during closing argument.

Appellant D.C. (appellant), born May 2001, contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the Challenge Academy, a program within the Solano County juvenile hall. We affirm.

The juvenile court found that A.Z. had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and declared him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). A.Z. appeals, asserting the juvenile court (1) made findings unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) violated his due process rights by continuing to preside over his jurisdictional hearing after considering his motion to exclude his confession; and (3) imposed a vague and overbroad probation condition. We affirm.

C.R. (Minor) was placed on probation for six months without being adjudged a ward of the court after admitting allegations that he possessed a stun gun and possessed marijuana. Then, after he violated terms of his probation, he was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation subject to a new set of terms and conditions that included an electronics search condition, authorizing searches of his electronic devices and requiring him to provide any codes to access them. On appeal, Minor argues that the electronics search condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and unconstitutionally overbroad. We conclude that the condition is reasonable under Lent, but overbroad, and therefore we will modify it.

The City and County of San Francisco, along with the city tax collector and treasurer (collectively, the City), obtained an order from the superior court granting their petition to enforce an administrative subpoena. The subpoena requires HomeAway.com, Inc. (HomeAway) to disclose data about rental transactions involving accommodations located in San Francisco that were arranged using a HomeAway Web site.
On appeal, “[w]e review de novo the question whether the subpoena meets the standards for enforcement. [Citation.]” (State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841, 854.) HomeAway contends that the City’s subpoena does not meet these standards because it violates the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (the SCA), which regulates the government’s ability to compel disclosure of some electronic data stored on the Internet. HomeAway also contends that enforcing the subpoena would violate its customers’ constit

Defendant and appellant Brandon Gabriel Hidalgo (appellant) contends the trial court erred in instructions relating to self-defense in his trial for attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and other charges. He also contends the court erred in finding him ineligible for probation and sentencing him to a seven-year prison term. We affirm.

Before Proposition 47 was passed, Michael Greene pleaded no contest to a felony count of identity theft and a felony count of second degree burglary. The basis for the burglary charge was Greene entering a bank and withdrawing money from an account that he had opened in someone else’s name. Greene subsequently petitioned under Proposition 47 for recall of his sentence on the burglary charge and resentencing for shoplifting. The trial court denied the request based on its understanding that the identity theft conviction disqualified Greene for resentencing on the burglary conviction. We conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of the law was in error; furthermore, most of the alternative reasons advanced by the Attorney General to support the trial court’s ruling have been rejected by our Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858 (Gonzales), issued after briefing in this case was complete.

This is appellant Abhijit Prasad’s second appeal over the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of administrative mandamus against the Santa Clara County Department of Social Services (Department). In his first appeal, Prasad challenged the Department’s determination that child abuse allegations levied against him by his older daughter were substantiated. (Prasad v. Sessions (Jan. 22, 2015, H039167) [2015 Cal.App.Unpub. Lexis 393] (Prasad I).) After determining the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review, we reversed and remanded the matter for a new hearing in which the trial court was ordered to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. Following our remand, the trial court conducted a new hearing and again denied Prasad’s petition for writ of administrative mandate.