CA Unpub Decisions

Richard Lynn Raines appeals after the trial court denied his Proposition 47 petition for resentencing on the ground he “pose[d] an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (See Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subds. (a)-(c); unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) Proposition 47 defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of [Penal Code section 677, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)].” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) Section 677, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) “enumerates a narrow list of super-strike offenses such as murder, rape and child molestation,” and contains a catchall for serious or violent felonies “punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1310 (Hoffman); § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII).)

Defendant and appellant Buddie Lee Ables entered a plea of no contest to the charge of receiving a stolen vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to county prison for a term of three years, suspended 18 months of the sentence, and granted 18 months of mandatory supervision. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Ronald Teran Gurrola was charged by felony complaint with receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, former § 496, counts 1 & 2) and theft of property valuing more than $400 (§ 487, count 3). Defendant pled guilty to count 1, and on August 24, 1983, a trial court sentenced him to two years in state prison. The court dismissed counts 2 and 3 in the interest of justice. On May 11, 2015, defendant filed a petition for resentencing, pursuant to section 1170.18 (Proposition 47), alleging that he believed the value of the property did not exceed $950. The court denied the petition without prejudice because it was unable to determine the value of the stolen property. Defendant filed a request to reconsider relief. The court denied the petition again.
Defendant now appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Aaron Marvin Gray, Jr., appeals his conviction for illegal possession of a firearm with a gang enhancement and for active participation in a criminal street gang. He contends that there is insufficient evidence to support either the gang enhancement or the active gang participation conviction. He also asserts a number of errors pertaining to the allegations based on prior convictions. We will reverse the judgment in part and remand for resentencing.

Defendant Victor Anthony Ramirez appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter resulting from an altercation in front of a bar during which Ramirez lethally stabbed another bar patron. On appeal, Ramirez challenges his conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in responding to a jury question regarding the meaning of "provocation." Specifically, Ramirez contends that in responding to the jury's question regarding provocation, the trial court failed to tell the jury that provocation is relevant not only to the offense of voluntary manslaughter, but that it may also be relevant to the complete defense of reasonable, perfect self-defense. Ramirez maintains that by not mentioning reasonable, perfect self-defense in answering the jury's question, the trial court improperly focused the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter and away from a consideration of provocation in the context of a complete defense

Defendant Michael Schmitt was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in 2003. In 2015, Schmitt was convicted of another felony and sentenced to prison. Schmitt's sentence included a one-year enhancement term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), based on Schmitt's 2003 felony conviction.
In 2017, Schmitt successfully petitioned to have his 2003 felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, which the electorate approved in 2014.
Schmitt contends that he is entitled to additional relief, based on the reduction of his 2003 felony to a misdemeanor. According to Schmitt, the court should "delete" his one-year prior prison term enhancement in the current case because the 2003 conviction supporting the enhancement is no longer a felony conviction.

“On November 4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47), which went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) Proposition 47 created a resentencing provision, codified at Penal Code section 1170.18, which provides that a person currently serving a sentence for certain designated felonies may petition for recall of the sentence to reduce felonies to misdemeanors. Defendant Winter James Thompson appeals from an order denying his petition to reduce a conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.
Defendant’s petition for resentencing was denied upon a determination that he was not eligible for relief under Proposition 47 because the commitment offense was violation of section 459, second degree burglary of a vehicle (see §§ 460, 461), which is as not among the eligible offenses listed in section 1170.18.

While intoxicated and fleeing from law enforcement officers, defendant Oleg Tarasuk drove his pickup truck across a pedestrian median, striking G. from behind and killing him instantly. Defendant was convicted by jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code , § 187), driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), driving with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or higher causing injury (id., subd. (b)), evading a pursuing peace officer in willful disregard for the safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), and resisting an executive officer in the performance of his or her duty (§ 69). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant was previously convicted of a serious felony offense (§ 667, subd. (a)), qualifying as a strike under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). Defendant was sentenced to state prison to serve an indeterminate term of 30 years to life.

The trial court denied defendant Thomas Jenkins Thomas’s petition for recall of sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act) based on a finding that resentencing him would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Pen. Code, § 1170.126; further unidentified section references are to the Penal Code.) The court based its dangerousness finding on defendant’s prior convictions, which included crimes of violence, his commitment offenses, which involved a firearm, and defendant’s recent conduct while incarcerated, including a rule violation for possessing a cell phone.
Defendant contends on appeal that the Act is unconstitutionally vague because the term “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is not adequately defined.

Mother J.H. (mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ following the juvenile court’s termination of reunification services for mother and her two children, A.H., born in March 2010, and G.H., born in April 2012. Mother asserts that the court’s ruling under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.22, subdivision (a)(1) —that returning the children to mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of children—was not supported by substantial evidence. We find that the court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore deny the writ petition on its merits and lift the stay entered on January 3, 2018.

Defendant and appellant Adan Mendez (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction of robbery and assault, challenging only the sentence. He contends that the sentence on count 2 was unauthorized, requiring remand for resentencing. He also requests that the case be remanded for resentencing of both counts, under the recently amended Penal Code sections 12022.53, subdivision (h) and 12022.5, subdivision (c). We conclude that the error in count 2 was clerical error which may be corrected on appeal without remand, and that remand under the recently amended statutes is unwarranted. We thus modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

Defendant and appellant Christopher Richardson appeals his robbery conviction in count 1, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant contends that the trial court gave an erroneous response to a jury question, that the advisements required prior to accepting his admission of prior convictions were incomplete, and that defense counsel rendered constitutionally inadequate assistance. We find no merit to defendant’s contentions, and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Douglas L. Bunton (Bunton) of the following felonies: forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2) ); forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(a)); and battery (§ 242). The trial court sentenced Bunton to an aggregate sentence of 100 years to life plus five years.
On appeal, Bunton advances four principal arguments. First, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after the rape and oral copulation victim, Olivia T., became upset while testifying and addressed certain comments directly to Bunton. Second, Bunton argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting video footage of Olivia’s out-of-court photo identification of Bunton as her attacker. Third, Bunton claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero motion (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) requesting that the court strike one of his prior “strike” convictions.

Defendant and appellant Oscar Meza (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered against him, contending that accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated, that the trial court erred in staying, rather than striking, a 10-year gang enhancement, that the court erred in refusing to award any presentence custody credit, and that the matter should be remanded for resentencing under the recently amended Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h). Finding that defendant’s challenge to the accomplice testimony is without merit, we affirm the judgment of conviction, but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing with directions.