CA Unpub Decisions

Rogelio Gerardo Mora Nunez appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), corporal injury to a girlfriend (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), and false imprisonment (§ 236; count 3). On appeal, Nunez contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed forcible rape. He also argues that the sentences on counts 2 and 3 should be stayed under section 654. We affirm the judgment.

Rogelio Gerardo Mora Nunez appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1), corporal injury to a girlfriend (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), and false imprisonment (§ 236; count 3). On appeal, Nunez contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed forcible rape. He also argues that the sentences on counts 2 and 3 should be stayed under section 654. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Ernestine Chaney (Chaney) of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) after she attacked but did not injure her mother with a knife. She argues that the court erred by denying her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the People’s case and that substantial evidence does not support the verdict. She also argues the court erred by instructing the jury with a pattern jury instruction on assault with a deadly weapon without modification and by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the misdemeanor crime of drawing or exhibiting a deadly weapon, other than a firearm, in a rude, angry, or threatening manner, commonly referred to as misdemeanor brandishing. She also contends her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to introduce portions of the transcript of the preliminary hearing that she now characterizes as “favorable” but were contrary to her defense at trial.

On appeal, Mancilla argues the trial court committed instructional error with respect to provocative act murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Rojas argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Both defendants also challenge numerous evidentiary rulings, and raise several sentencing errors. We affirm the judgments of conviction, vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.

This appeal involves the City of Manhattan Beach’s (city’s) approval of plans allowing appellant Joseph M. Paunovich (Paunovich) to build a home on property he owns in the city. Cross-appellants, Nancy and Rosario P. Armato (Armato), Paunovich’s neighbors to the east, challenged the city’s approval of the plans Paunovich submitted to the city. Following administrative proceedings, Armato filed an administrative mandamus action in the Superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.
After the writ was filed, Paunovich obtained over-the-counter approval for a revision to his earlier Coastal Development Permit (CDP) permitting him to convert a portion of a previously approved crawlspace into a 200 square foot below-ground basement storage area. Armato then filed a second amended writ petition, adding a new cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 related to the city’s approval of the basement. The Superior Court granted in part, an

Defendant Barboza argues his robbery conviction should be reversed and remanded to juvenile court pursuant to Proposition 57, which abolished the direct filing of criminal charges against juveniles in adult criminal court. Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 (Lara) vindicates defendant’s position that Proposition 57 is retroactive. However, defendant does not benefit from Lara because the judgment in his case is final.

Plaintiff Henry M. Burgoyne III and Karl Kronenberger co-founded a law firm from which Kronenberger later ejected Burgoyne. In this action, Burgoyne seeks to recover from the law firm’s accountants damages that he alleges the accountants caused him in the aftermath of this breakup. A jury that heard the evidence agreed with Burgoyne. They found the accountant, David Woo, and his firm, GoldsteinEnright, liable on breach of contract, professional negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action, and they awarded Burgoyne $292,000 in damages. Then the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the ground that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence. Because the question on a JNOV motion is whether the record contains substantial evidence that the plaintiff suffered damages in some amount—not whether the evidence supports the specific amount of damages awarded—we reverse.

Plaintiff Henry M. Burgoyne III and Karl Kronenberger co-founded a law firm from which Kronenberger later ejected Burgoyne. In this action, Burgoyne brings professional negligence and other claims against the accountants whom the firm hired after his departure, alleging they made errors in calculating how much the firm owed him when he left. The accountant, Monique Tiger, and her firm, Calegari & Morris, moved for summary judgment on grounds that they owed Burgoyne no duty in performing this work and he was not a third-party beneficiary to their contract with the law firm. The trial court granted the motion, and we affirm.

An employer hired a company to give financial seminars to employees. Unbeknownst to the employer, the seminars were actually sales pitches designed to gain clients. Several employees hired the seminar instructors, then later lost money in the 2008 financial crisis as the result of risky investments. The employees sued their employer, who settled, and both the employees and the employer sued the seminar provider. Following a trial that spanned more than a year, the trial court found in favor of both the employees and the employer against the seminar provider.
In these consolidated appeals, the successor company to the seminar provider attacks the judgments regarding both liability and the measure of damages awarded. The employer, meanwhile, appeals from an order awarding it some, but not all, of the attorney fees it incurred in the litigation. We affirm the judgments in all respects.

Before this court are an appeal and cross-appeal in dissolution of marriage proceedings involving respondent Linda M. Rock (hereinafter, wife) and appellant John A. Kavalaris (hereinafter, husband). A judgment of dissolution was entered in 2010. Husband appealed this judgment, and we affirmed in a nonpublished decision on March 19, 2013.
Husband now appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order awarding wife $28,437 in damages, representing 10-percent-per-annum interest on $89,132.94, the amount husband would have owed wife for her share of the family residence had he consummated the sale of this residence within a reasonable period of time following entry of the August 4, 2010 judgment rather than filed an appeal.

Defendant Heraclio Castrejon Ramirez appeals from a four-year prison sentence imposed for possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), with a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)–(i)). Upon defendant’s timely appeal, we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appellate counsel filed a brief stating the case and facts but raising no arguable issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant filed a letter that repeats, largely verbatim, arguments from his trial counsel’s unsuccessful suppression motion. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)
We have reviewed the entire record to determine if there are any arguable appellate issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 440–441.)

An information charged defendant Rafael Alvarez with two counts of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years of age or younger - counts 1 & 2), three counts of sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger - counts 3-5), and five counts of lewd or lascivious acts with a child by force, duress, or fear counts 6-10). The information alleged that all counts occurred between July 7, 2009 and March 11, 2012. A jury convicted defendant on all counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 95 years to life consecutive to 30 years, calculated as follows: two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for counts 1 and 2, three consecutive terms of 15 years to life for counts 3 through 5, and five consecutive six-year terms for counts 6 through 10.

Defendant, Todd Williams, appeals from a judgment of conviction following a plea of guilty. He contends he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights before pleading guilty to driving under the influence of drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) with three prior convictions. We affirm.

Appellant Taylor Evan Williams was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated assault on a police officer. The jury also found true sentence enhancement allegations that appellant personally used a firearm during his crimes. Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to support one of the assault counts, and the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to decide whether to dismiss the firearm enhancements in the interest of justice. We find appellant’s arguments well taken. Accordingly, we reverse in part and remand for resentencing.