CA Unpub Decisions

In August 2017, the juvenile court denied appellant Krista B. (mother) services to reunify with her then three-year-old daughter, K.B., two-year-old son, Charles B., and one-year-old daughter, Penny C., because of her “extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs” and resistance to prior court-ordered treatment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(13).) Mother contends the court’s denial of services order was error because substantial evidence does not support application of the statute and, alternatively, providing her reunification services served the children’s best interests. We affirm.

Michael R. appeals an order declaring his minor son, now 12-year-old Elijah Z., free from his custody and control under Family Code section 7822. Section 7822 provides that a petition to free a child from a parent’s custody and control may be granted where “one parent has left the child in the care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision for the child’s support, or without communication from the parent, with the intent on the part of the parent to abandon the child.” (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3).) Michael contends the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that he intended to abandon Elijah within the meaning of section 7822. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Preston James Nolan III, of inflicting injury upon a spouse or cohabitant (count 1; Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor false imprisonment (count 2; Pen. Code, § 263), the lesser included offense of the count 2 charge of false imprisonment by violence. The court sentenced defendant to four years of incarceration.
After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the facts and a statement of the case. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Steven Edward Woods pled guilty to various offenses charged in a nine-count amended felony complaint. He was accepted into the drug court treatment program (drug court) and waived his Penal Code section 4019 credits as a condition of participating in it. The court placed defendant on probation for three years under specified terms, which included serving 184 in county jail. The court ordered him to report to the probation department and drug court upon release. Defendant subsequently violated his probation by failing to keep the probation officer informed of his residence and using methamphetamine. The court terminated probation and drug court. It then sentenced defendant to a total term of six years in state prison and awarded 267 days of custody credits. The court held multiple restitution hearings, and the parties stipulated to the amounts ordered at each one.

Defendant and appellant, Shawn Daniel Bradehorst, appeals from the order denying his Proposition 47 petition to reduce his felony conviction for violating Penal Code section 487b to a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, §§ 490.2, 1170.18, subd. (f).)

Salvatore A. Buono (Husband) appeals from the order denying his Request for Order to modify child custody and visitation. He contends the trial court (1) erred in applying the significant change in circumstances standard of proof to the request to modify visitation; (2) erred in finding that modification of an interim custodial order required a showing of a change of circumstances; and (3) abused its discretion in finding there was no change in circumstances. We agree with Husband’s first contention; however, the record demonstrates there was confusion as to what Husband sought to modify, i.e., just visitation, or visitation and child custody. Given this confusion, we must reverse the order and remand the matter for clarification and further consideration of Husband’s request consistent with the principles explained in this opinion.

Defendant Adam James Sanford robbed two sets of victims in quick succession. After taking money from the second set of victims, he turned, ran, and fired his gun. A jury found him guilty of multiple crimes including robbery with a finding that he had intentionally discharged a firearm during the commission thereof.
On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the escape rule as it pertains to the firearm enhancement. He also challenges the prosecution’s failure to disclose the criminal history of one of the victims. Finally, he contends reversal is required to allow the trial court to consider striking the firearm enhancement pursuant to the newly enacted Senate Bill No. 620.
We agree with defendant’s final contention. We will remand to allow the trial court to exercise its newfound discretion under Senate Bill No. 620. We will also order a corrected abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Juan A., is the presumed father of 14-year-old I.V. and eight-year-old Y.V. The juvenile court found father’s history of committing violent felonies, including his use of a deadly weapon in a 2014 carjacking, placed the girls at risk of serious harm, and denied father reunification services on that basis. (See Welf. Inst. Code, §§ 300, subd. (b), 361.5, subd. (b)(12).) Father contends the dependency petition’s operative allegation was insufficient to sustain jurisdiction, the juvenile court failed to make the requisite findings with respect to its disposition order, and the court improperly relied upon an uncertified CLETS rap sheet in bypassing reunification services. We find no error in the court’s rulings. Father’s petition is denied.

V.A. (Mother) appeals jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made by the juvenile court involving Mother’s children M.M., R.M. and R.M., minors coming under the juvenile court law. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b)(1) & (g).) We conclude, among other things, that the juvenile court did not err in requiring Mother to participate in substance abuse treatment. We affirm.

Nels Boyd Anderson appeals from the judgment entered after pleading guilty to possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) and admitting a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck the prior prison term enhancement and sentenced appellant to a three-year middle term.

M.R. (Mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court awarding sole legal and physical custody of her son S.H. to his father, ordering visitation to Mother “[a]s arranged by the parents,” and terminating dependency jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4) We affirm.

Emmanuel Gonzales Guillen appeals the trial court’s order committing him to the Department of State Hospitals for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.). Appellant contends (1) the evidence fails to establish that his severe mental disorder was a cause or aggravating factor in his commission of the commitment offense (§ 2962, subd. (b)); and (2) the court applied an incorrect standard of proof in finding that appellant met the MDO criteria. We affirm.

In August 2016, the District Attorney filed a petition against appellant, M.B., then age 14, under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 602), alleging one felony count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(l)), and one felony count of driving/taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In September 2016, appellant admitted the petition’s allegations. The court dismissed the grand theft count, sustained the remaining count and ordered appellant home on probation.
On March 14, 2017, the Probation Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 (section 777), alleging appellant violated the terms of her probation by, among other things, engaging in acts of vandalism. On March 17, 2017, the District Attorney filed a second section 602 petition alleging that appellant, then age 15, committed one count of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)). Appellant denied the allegations of both petitio

In August 2016, the District Attorney filed a petition against appellant, M.B., then age 14, under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 602), alleging one felony count of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(l)), and one felony count of driving/taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In September 2016, appellant admitted the petition’s allegations. The court dismissed the grand theft count, sustained the remaining count and ordered appellant home on probation.
On March 14, 2017, the Probation Department filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 (section 777), alleging appellant violated the terms of her probation by, among other things, engaging in acts of vandalism. On March 17, 2017, the District Attorney filed a second section 602 petition alleging that appellant, then age 15, committed one count of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)). Appellant denied the allegations of both petitio