CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Roosevelt W. (Father) and K.W. (Mother), each self-represented, appeal the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights over their child “Kim” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and denying Father’s last-minute request to appoint new counsel or permit him to represent himself. For the reasons discussed, we affirm the court’s orders.

Defendant Charles Murata appeals an order of the superior court granting a Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) restraining order. (Fam. Code, §§ 6200, 6300.) The court did not abuse its discretion in granting this order. We affirm.

T.V. is the mother of a 13-year-old daughter and 14-year-old son. Daughter appeals from the dependency court’s order granting presumed father status to the minors’ stepfather, as well as the jurisdictional order dismissing domestic violence allegations against mother and stepfather. She also argues the trial court erred in not disqualifying the siblings’ counsel due to a conflict of interest. We affirm.

In this appeal, Michael W. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s exertion of dependency jurisdiction over his daughter, M.W. J.W. (mother) challenges the court’s failure to notify the Cherokee tribe after she reported possible Cherokee heritage, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, but, as the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) concedes must be done, order a limited remand to the juvenile court to give the notice required by ICWA.

J.W. (mother) and Michael W. (father) challenge the juvenile court’s exertion of dependency jurisdiction over their daughter, D.W. Mother further challenges the court’s refusal to continue the dispositional hearing and the ensuing dispositional order removing D.W. from her custody. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s orders and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying a further continuance of the dispositional hearing.

The juvenile court removed two-year-old O.G. from her parents’ physical custody, finding the parents’ propensity to engage in domestic violence posed a substantial risk of harm to the child’s health and safety. (See Welf. Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1).) On appeal from the removal order, mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the substantial risk finding. She argues the existence of a restraining order and her recent pledge to have no more contact with father compelled the juvenile court to allow her to retain physical custody of O.G. during the dependency case. The record shows, however, that despite a prior restraining order and over a year of voluntary services the parents continued to engage in violent altercations in their daughter’s presence. The evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding. We affirm.

A jury found Luis A. Vela (defendant) guilty of repeatedly molesting two of his step-granddaughters, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for 55 years to life. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserts that the trial court erred in placing time limits on voir dire, and contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Because none of these arguments warrants reversal, we affirm.

A jury found Luis A. Vela (defendant) guilty of repeatedly molesting two of his step-granddaughters, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for 55 years to life. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserts that the trial court erred in placing time limits on voir dire, and contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Because none of these arguments warrants reversal, we affirm.

A homeowner entered into a forbearance agreement with her bank that allowed her to make reduced loan payments for a year. When the bank subsequently denied her application for a loan modification and told her she still owed the difference between the year’s worth of regular payments and reduced payments, she sued. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank. We conclude there was no error, and affirm.

Three gang members drove into rival gang territory in a caravan and gunned down a rival gang member who was walking down the street. After a joint trial, a jury convicted each of them of varying degrees of murder and found that the crime was gang related. On appeal, the defendants claim that the People’s gang expert impermissibly offered an opinion on their guilt; that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that two of the three defendants’ incriminating statements to jailhouse informants needed to be corroborated; that the trial court misinstructed on the gang enhancement; that the trial court erred in imposing sentence on the gang enhancement; and that they are entitled to a remand for the trial court to consider whether to strike the 25-year firearm enhancement in light of the newly enacted Senate Bill (SB) 620. Only defendants’ last two arguments have merit. Accordingly, we affirm their convictions and remand for resentencing.

Here the trial court determined that a felony conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 10851, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, categorically did not qualify for treatment under Proposition 47, making theft offenses misdemeanors. Thereafter, our Supreme Court decided People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175. Page determined that a violation of section 10851 qualifies under Proposition 47 if the defendant can prove the violation constituted theft and the value of the vehicle was $950 or less. We reverse and remand to give the defendant an opportunity to so plead and prove.

In this family dispute, an adult daughter sued her two older brothers and her father after her father quitclaimed the family home to the eldest brother to manage it for him. The trial court upheld that property transfer, rejected daughter’s claims seeking to divide up the home and father’s cash while he was still alive, and ruled that daughter was required to hand over the rent she collected for leasing out part of the family home. In this appeal, daughter asserts that the trial court was wrong to find her not credible and that the court made several other legal errors. Her arguments lack merit, so we affirm.

The People charged appellant, Fahim Anthony Multani, in a single information, with various crimes of domestic violence against two former girlfriends, Georgina A. and Jennifer P. They alleged that Multani tortured Georgina while the couple dated and cohabitated in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, and that Multani tortured Jennifer and committed other crimes against her while they were cohabitating in 2012. At the trial, the People offered evidence that Multani also committed uncharged acts of domestic violence against a third woman, M.M., with whom he had a romantic relationship and cohabitated from 1998 to 2000.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Multani of the count involving Georgina. He now appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions on the following counts involving Jennifer: count 2 – torture (Pen. Code, § 206), count 6 – corporal injury to a fellow parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and three counts of battery against a fellow parent.

Defendant Victor Edgar Soto was convicted of murder and attempted murder for a gang-related shooting that occurred in 1996. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial request for discovery of officer personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). In addition, the parties agree that the trial court made several minor sentencing errors.
After we issued an opinion in this case on September 20, 2017, the California Supreme Court ordered that we vacate our previous opinion and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 620, which amended Penal Code section 12022.5. Having done so, we remand the case for the trial court to correct the sentencing errors identified below, and to conduct a new sentencing hearing to consider whether to strike or dismiss the section 12022.5 firearm enhancements. We otherwise affirm the judgment.