CA Unpub Decisions

In 2008, Flores was convicted of second degree robbery, a violent offense, and sentenced to two years in prison. In 2010, while still on parole for that conviction, Flores fled when an officer tried to make a traffic stop. The ensuing chase covered more than 30 miles, with multiple dangerous traffic infractions. Finally, Flores rammed an occupied police vehicle and tried to run over an officer. For multiple evading and assault convictions, Flores was sentenced to a term of 16 years four months for nonviolent offenses. While incarcerated, Flores had violations for fighting, battery on an officer with an unknown liquid, and resisting an officer. He completed vocational computer training.
Flores sought consideration for parole under Proposition 57. He submitted a letter to the Board, which a hearing officer reviewed and considered. The hearing officer denied parole, finding Flores posed an unreasonable risk of violence to the community.

In the late hours of August 3, 2021, Torres led Oxnard police officers on a vehicle pursuit that reached 100 miles per hour. During the chase, Torres failed to stop at stop signs and passed another motorist on the road shoulder. The officers eventually arrested Torres at his home.
The Ventura County District Attorney charged Torres with felony evasion of an officer with willful disregard, and misdemeanor driving without a license. (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.2, subd. (a), 12500, subd. (a).) Torres later entered a guilty plea to the felony evading count and the court dismissed the misdemeanor count following the prosecutor’s motion.
Prior to and following the entry of his guilty plea, Torres and the trial court discussed whether Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a), requires 180 days of custodial time as a condition of probation. Torres filed a brief asserting that Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a) does not mandate any minimum confinement as a condition of probation.

As the only issue raised in father’s appeal is ICWA
compliance, we focus on the facts and procedural background relevant to that issue.
1. Parents’ Dependency History
Both parents have a history with the dependency courts. Father’s three older children (by a different mother) became dependents in 2014 and 2016. In those cases, father filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) form, and the juvenile court found no reason to know that father’s children were Indian children as defined under ICWA. Proceedings were eventually terminated and a family law order provided their mother full custody.
In October 2017, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of mother’s older child (by another father), alleging mother and her male companion (father in the present case) engaged in domestic violence and mother abused drugs. In January 2018, the court sustained jurisdiction over the older child and removed the older child from mother’s custody. The court ordered reunificatio

The family has been the subject of three prior dependency proceedings in 2013 and 2016. In 2013 and 2016, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petitions alleging that mother’s heroin use put J.C. at substantial risk of serious physical harm on behalf of mother’s three children, alleging that father failed to protect the children; and in 2017, DCFS filed a petition alleging that mother tested positive for opiates at M.C.’s birth and father failed to protect the children from mother’s drug use. In 2018, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and awarded father sole legal and physical custody of the children.
In June 2019, DCFS filed another section 300 petition on behalf of the three children alleging that J.G. tested positive for opiates at birth, mother had a history of substance abuse, and father had failed to protect the children from mother’s substance abuse.

Appellant filed his original complaint in October 2019. The complaint did not set forth intelligible causes of action. It simply alleged without more that LAPD’s “crimes include: Stalking tort, police harassment, malice, extreme and outrageous conduct, intentional tort, credible threat and Title 42 Section 1983 of the United States Code.” The complaint included only extremely broad allegations describing LAPD’s behavior, such as: “When ever he leaves his place of residence for work, groceries or to socialize he is stalked and harassed by a multitude of Los Angeles Police Department Officers.” There are no dates or locations for these allegations.
The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend, explaining “the complaint fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain. There are no discernible causes of action in the complaint.

On August 9, 2019 the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral alleging that the prior day Mother drove with then-10-month-old A.H. while under the influence of methamphetamine and marijuana, and she was involved in a car accident in which the other driver was at fault. On September 5 the Department filed a dependency petition on behalf of A.H. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
On January 9, 2020 the juvenile court sustained the allegations Mother had a history of substance abuse including cocaine and marijuana and was a current abuser of methamphetamine and marijuana. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana on August 8, 2019, and she tested positive for marijuana on August 13 and 27, 2019.

Dr. Johnson performed spinal surgery on plaintiff in April 2014. Plaintiff subsequently sued Dr. Johnson, Cedar-Sinai Medical Center, and Does 1-100, stating a single cause of action for professional negligence.
In the operative complaint, plaintiff alleged the surgery performed by Dr. Johnson caused a variety of conditions including foot drop, leg paresthesia, abnormal gait, pain, inability to sleep, fatigue, stress, depression, and the inability to work. Plaintiff alleged these conditions “resulted from improper surgical technique used by Dr. Johnson, and that he had not been properly treated. More specifically, [plaintiff] discovered that the excessive bone removal, which had been performed, would thereafter preclude the preferred techniques for correcting the residual pathology, which had not been addressed in spite of identical pre-operative symptoms.”

1. The Hollanders Insured Their Art Collection with XL Specialty
Gail and Stanley Hollander (collectively, the Hollanders), a married couple, acquired an art collection over a period of time. (See Hollander v. XL Capital Ltd. (May 1, 2018, B276621) [nonpub. opn.] (Hollander VII) [indicating Gail and Stanley were married].) In exchange for a premium of $24,966, XL Specialty Insurance Company (XL Specialty) issued the Hollanders an insurance policy, effective from March 2, 2005 to March 2, 2006, that covered their fine art. In the event the fine art were destroyed, the Hollanders would be entitled to collect the “scheduled value” of the property—i.e., the amount assigned to the artwork in a schedule to the policy.
Paragraph 8 of the policy provides a different method of valuation in the case of a “partial loss” to the fine art. That portion of the policy provides in full:
“PARTIAL LOSS AGREEMENT[ ](As Respects Fine Arts Only)

“Kent Boone drove over the crest of an incline on Highway 12 in Solano County around 6:15 a.m. on March 31, 2007, and was met head on by a Ford Expedition driven by [Soto]. Boone died at the scene from blunt force injuries suffered in the collision.

“The accident was witnessed by [A.B.], who testified that he was driving east on Highway 12, a two-lane road with solid double lines in the middle, when he noticed [Soto’s] vehicle in his rear view mirror approaching rapidly and swerving back and forth between the lanes. [A.B.] slowed and moved to the shoulder of the road to avoid [Soto], who passed by at a speed [A.B.] estimated to be 85 to 90 miles per hour. As [Soto] went up an incline, he drifted over into the westbound lane and collided with Boone’s vehicle, which emerged going in the other direction.

A. The first suspension of proceedings
In September 2017, defendant was charged by complaint with one count of rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)). He initially appeared represented by a private attorney, but by December 2017, he asked to be represented by the public defender or to represent himself. The public defender accepted the appointment but by January 2018, defendant made a Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)) for the appointment of substitute counsel. The trial court denied the Marsden motion, but the public defender declared a conflict, and so did the attorney appointed thereafter. Then in March, defendant again sought new counsel. In April, he filed a Faretta motion (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta)) to represent himself. Defendant represented himself for about two weeks before requesting counsel. Shortly after being appointed, defendant’s fifth attorney declared a doubt as to defendant’s competency.

In 1988, when she was 59 years old, Priscilla Allen purchased a life insurance policy from Central Life Assurance Company. After buying the policy, Allen transferred it to the Priscilla Allen Insurance Trust, with Reed as the trustee. Through a series of transactions, the policy was acquired by various companies, eventually being held by Aviva as the insurer.
None of the parties were able to produce a copy of Allen’s actual policy, but Aviva produced a “specimen policy” that a company official attested included the same terms as Allen’s policy. Reed produced no evidence to the contrary.
The policy was a flexible-premium, adjustable-life policy, meaning that Allen could pay more than the cost of the premium, in which case the policy’s surrender value would increase, or Allen could pay less than the cost of the premium, in which case any amount owed for the premium would be deducted from the account value, so long as it had positive balance, to keep the policy in effect.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregg L. Prickett, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Martin Kassman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.


In 2015, a jury convicted Paul Anthony Stewart of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)) and found true enhancement allegations that he personally had discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and had committed the offense to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Stewart to a seven year prison term on the attempted murder conviction, with a consecutive 10 year sentence on the criminal street gang enhancement and a consecutive 25 years to life sentence on the discharge of firearm enhancement.

Appeal from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Aaron W. Heisler, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Appeal dismissed in part and judgment affirmed.
Herzog, Yuhas, Ehrlich & Ardell, Ian Herzog and Evan D. Marshall, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Adam E. Streisand, Nicholas J. Van Brunt and Valerie E. Alter for Defendants and Respondents.

This is a factually complicated case, but despite appellants’ hyperbolic briefing, not a difficult one. Thomas S. Tedesco, by his alleged guardian ad litem Stephen Carpenter, and trust beneficiary, Debra Wear, represented by Ian Herzog and Evan D. Marshall of Herzog, Yuhas, Erlich & Ardell (the Herzog firm), appeal from the judgment dismissing a trust petition, order denying motion for new trial, and an order denying Wear’s motion for leave to file amended petition.

On or about June 3, 2020, defendant committed acts of domestic violence against the victim. On June 8, 2020, the trial court issued a criminal protection order against defendant.
On November 12, 2020, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a first amended complaint charging defendant with kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a); count 1), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236; count 3) and dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)).
On November 19, 2020, defendant pled no contest to count 1, in exchange for no initial state prison with a 365-day lid and a maximum of eight years in prison.
On January 22, 2021, the trial court suspended imposition of judgment and granted defendant three years’ formal probation with 365 days’ jail time.