CA Unpub Decisions

Eric Wayne Caples appeals the denial of his Proposition 47 resentencing petition. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) The petition arises from appellant’s 2012 felony conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851.) The trial court ruled that Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions are ineligible for resentencing; it did not consider whether the facts of this case support reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor.
After appellant’s petition was denied, the Supreme Court decided People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). Page holds that Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions are eligible for resentencing if the petitioning defendant shows (1) the vehicle was worth $950 or less, and (2) the sentence was imposed for theft of the vehicle rather than posttheft driving or a taking without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. (Page at p. 1188.)
The record is inadequate regarding the two factual showings that must be made under Page.

Cecilia Hoh was just shy of her 90th birthday when she was admitted to Glendale Adventist Medical Center (Glendale Adventist), complaining of swelling and pain in her right foot. While at Glendale Adventist, Ms. Hoh was seen by Dr. Jilbert D. Issai and Dr. Kin C. Wong. After several days of treatment, Ms. Hoh passed away on August 27, 2011.
On August 23, 2013, Ms. Hoh’s nephew, Gregory Wong, and her sister, Mabel Hoh (collectively plaintiffs), filed a complaint stating claims for wrongful death and fraud against Glendale Adventist, Dr. Issai and Dr. Wong (collectively defendants). That original complaint was never served. On January 5, 2015, plaintiffs filed and served a first amended complaint that abandoned plaintiffs’ personal claims for wrongful death and fraud, and stated only a survivor claim on behalf of their decedent pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereafter the Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.).

Defendant and appellant Ariel Chazanas (Ariel) appeals an order denying his petition to compel arbitration of claims asserted against him in a lawsuit filed by his grandmother, Mindlea Chazanas (Mindlea). The operative first amended complaint (FAC) included a cause of action against Ariel for breach of contract and sought an accounting.
Ariel contends the trial court erred in denying his petition to compel arbitration because two operating agreements relevant to this litigation contained arbitration provisions and he never waived his right to compel arbitration of Mindlea’s claims against him.
We conclude Ariel has failed to meet his appellate burden to show error. We therefore affirm the order denying the petition to compel arbitration.

Monica Randazzo entered into a marital settlement agreement that required her to convey her interest in a commercial property to her former husband, Luis Esquibel. Randazzo delivered a grant deed to Esquibel, which he failed to record. Fifteen months later, the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a prior court order directing Esquibel to pay Randazzo over $52,000 in child support arrearages. Following the sale, Randazzo quitclaimed any remaining interest she may have had in the property to the purchaser.
Esquibel filed a breach of contract claim alleging Randazzo’s execution of the quitclaim deed constituted a breach of their marital settlement agreement. Randazzo moved for summary judgment, arguing that she had conveyed her entire interest in the property to Esquibel, and that the quitclaim deed was only intended to remove her name from the recorded title.

Monica Randazzo entered into a marital settlement agreement that required her to convey her interest in a commercial property to her former husband, Luis Esquibel. Randazzo delivered a grant deed to Esquibel, which he failed to record. Fifteen months later, the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a prior court order directing Esquibel to pay Randazzo over $52,000 in child support arrearages. Following the sale, Randazzo quitclaimed any remaining interest she may have had in the property to the purchaser.
Esquibel filed a breach of contract claim alleging Randazzo’s execution of the quitclaim deed constituted a breach of their marital settlement agreement. Randazzo moved for summary judgment, arguing that she had conveyed her entire interest in the property to Esquibel, and that the quitclaim deed was only intended to remove her name from the recorded title.

The trial court entered a judgment confirming an attorney-client fee arbitration award in favor of attorney Ian Feinberg and his law firm Feinberg Day Alberti & Thompson, LLP (collectively Feinberg) against a former client, Enova Technology Corporation (Enova). Enova appeals, contending that service of the petition to confirm the fee award was defective, rendering the judgment void. We conclude that Feinberg substantially complied with service requirements and that Enova had actual notice of the petition. We shall therefore affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Jorge Tuyubbriceno of multiple crimes against Sophie G.: simple assault (Pen. Code, § 240, subd. (a), felony false imprisonment (§ 236), and two counts of misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). Tuyubbriceno appeals from the judgment, contending his felony false imprisonment conviction must be reversed, or reduced to a misdemeanor, because of instructional error or insufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

Plaintiff Orzell Long appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as well as the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. Long claims the defendants failed to meet their burden to set forth evidence establishing that one or more elements of his causes of action cannot be established. He also argues that there are triable issues of material fact, that his separate statement in opposition to the summary judgment motion complied with statutory requirements, and that the court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. We reject these contentions and shall affirm.

Defendant McCormick & Company, Inc. (McCormick) appeals from an order directing it to pay $32,399 in monetary sanctions to plaintiff Center for Environmental Health (the Center) in connection with a discovery dispute in this action to enforce the California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.5 et seq.) (Proposition 65). McCormick contends the trial court erred in imposing sanctions because McCormick did not misuse the discovery process or act without substantial justification by unsuccessfully opposing the Center’s motion to compel discovery responses or by including the Center’s product testing information in its motion for a protective order. We shall affirm the order.

A jury convicted Frederick Gates of six felonies and a misdemeanor as a result of four different incidents of domestic violence against his girlfriend, L.S. Gates makes four assignments of error: (1) he was denied his right to a public trial when the courtroom was briefly closed to spectators during re-hearing on a motion in limine; (2) trial counsel’s failures to object to certain testimony and to call three defense witnesses constituted ineffective assistance; (3) the court should have offered to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (4) the court failed properly to apply Penal Code section 654 in sentencing. We will affirm.

Largely on the strength of testimony offered by two experts, a jury found Guillermo Rodriguez to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) and the trial court committed him to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term.
Shortly after the conclusion of briefing in this matter, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), which substantially limited the admissibility of case-specific expert testimony. We requested, and received, supplemental briefing addressing the impact of Sanchez on this appeal. We conclude that, under Sanchez, the expert witnesses in this case improperly testified to case-specific hearsay that was not independently proved by competent evidence or covered by a hearsay exception. Because this evidentiary error was prejudicial, we reverse.

Nina Frank (Wife) appeals an order of the family court allocating payments Husband received from his employer between community and separate property. We shall affirm the order.

Nina Frank (Wife) appeals an order of the family court allocating payments Husband received from his employer between community and separate property. We shall affirm the order.

Plaintiff Diane Minish sustained serious personal injuries after she fell off a forklift on premises owned by defendant Hanuman Fellowship (the Fellowship). Minish initially reported that her injuries occurred while she was working as a volunteer, doing construction work for the Fellowship. Both Minish and the Fellowship reported the injury to the Fellowship’s workers’ compensation carrier and Minish received more than $270,000 in workers’ compensation benefits. Minish also filed an action with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB).
More than a year after the accident, Minish filed this civil action seeking damages for personal injuries. The Fellowship answered and asserted that workers’ compensation was Minish’s exclusive remedy. Minish argued the exclusive remedy rule did not apply because the Fellowship failed to comply with the requirements of Labor Code section 3363.6 for extending employment status to its volunteers.