CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jerald Jerrod Cousian was charged by information with one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), and that he had suffered two prison priors within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
A jury acquitted defendant of second degree robbery, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree robbery. Defendant admitted the two prison priors.
The court imposed a three-year state prison term by selecting the midterm of two years on the attempted robbery count, adding one year for one of the prison priors, and striking the second prison prior for sentencing purpose only.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and we appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel did not argue against defendant, but advised the court he was unable to find an issue to argue on defendant’s behalf. Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument on his own behalf, but he has not done so.

A jury convicted Rodolfo Aguilar of carrying a loaded, stolen firearm in public (Pen. Code, § 25850, subds. (a), (c)(2); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), and found he committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Aguilar contends there was insufficient evidence he knew or had reasonable cause to believe the firearm was stolen. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

A jury convicted Lawrence A. Mares, Jr., of premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a) [count 1]; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b) [count 2]), and assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c) [count 3]). The jury also found Mares personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a) [count 2], 12022.53, subds. (c) & (d) [count 3]) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a) [count 2].) Mares challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the assault on a peace officer conviction (count 3). For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

In this medical malpractice case brought by Nili N. Alai, M.D., and her husband, Sam Nabili, M.D., (together, plaintiffs) against Deborah Ya-Hui Shang, M.D., the trial court issued evidentiary sanctions against Alai for her repeated abuses of the discovery process. Plaintiffs also entered into a stipulation with Shang in which they agreed not to introduce certain other evidence at trial. The trial court’s orders in this case are a result of either Alai’s abuses, including violations of court orders, for which there are consequences, or the enforcement of the parties’ stipulation.
After plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that, without the excluded evidence, plaintiffs could not prove their case, the trial court granted Shang’s motion for a directed verdict and judgment was entered in Shang’s favor. We affirm. The trial court did not err in issuing the evidentiary sanctions or by denying plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.

Marvin Baldwin lost his home at a foreclosure auction in December 2010. (See Baldwin v. Bank of America (Feb. 7, 2014, B243789) [nonpub. opn] [2014 LEXIS 934 at p. 4] (Baldwin v. Bank of America ).) He sued Bank of America on a variety of causes of action. While his initial complaint was filed in propria persona, he was, at least as late as June 2012 when he filed a second amended complaint, represented by attorney Lenore Albert. (Ibid.) The trial court sustained Bank of America’s demurrer to the second amended complaint in 2012. Baldwin, still represented by Albert, appealed. (Id. at pp. 8-10.) Baldwin lost the appeal, mainly because he could not pay his loan. (See id. at p. 18.)
In 2015, Baldwin sued Albert for legal malpractice (Orange County Superior Court case number 30-2015-00784213). Albert responded with a cross-complaint for unpaid fees. She also named Bank of America and its law firm, Reed Smith LLP, as defendants.

This is the third of three appeals arising out of an omnibus complaint (Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2014-00738725) filed by attorney Lenore Albert against multiple persons and entities she alleges have defamed her. We call that complaint and the ensuing litigation the “725 action.” This appeal concerns but a single defendant in the 725 action, attorney David Seal.
By way of background, it was not until Albert’s second amended complaint in the 725 action that Seal was even mentioned by name. In the wake of that second amended complaint Seal brought an anti-SLAPP motion against Albert, the substance of which we discuss in what we call the Hannah appeal, G052748. In that appeal we affirm the trial court’s grant of Seal’s anti-SLAPP motion against Albert, with the sole exception of her claims he defamed her by telling people she was having sex with family members, a particular individual, and her dog.

This is one of three appeals arising out of an omnibus complaint (Orange County Superior Court case number 30-2014-00738725, or the “725 action”) filed by lawyer Lenore Albert against multiple defendants she alleges defamed her. All the appeals arise out of anti-SLAPP motions on which Albert was either entirely, or in part, the losing party: In G052748 (the Hannah appeal), we deal with anti-SLAPP motions brought by three attorney defendants, Mitchell Hannah, Devin Lucas, and David Seal. In this appeal G052204 (the Ragland appeal), we deal with the anti-SLAPP motions of internet provider Xcentric Ventures, and private individuals Pam Ragland, Karen Rozier and Maegan Nikolic. An attorney fee award in favor of Yelp, Inc., based on an earlier successful anti-SLAPP motion, is included in this appeal as well. And finally, in the third case G053172 (the Seal appeal), we deal with the merits of Albert’s own unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion against attorney David Seal’s cross-compla

Jose Luis Cruz, Jr., appeals from her convictions on two counts of residential burglary. She argues the trial court prejudicially erred under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b) and 352, by admitting evidence of her involvement in, and conviction for, a prior residential burglary. We reject her contentions and affirm the judgment.

A.L. (mother) appeals from orders terminating her parental rights to her daughters M.L. and A.M. Although she phrases her arguments differently in her briefs, boiled down to their essence, mother’s claims fall into three categories: (1) the social service agency’s preliminary assessment of A.M.’s adoptability and of the prospective adoptive mother’s suitability did not comply with the pertinent statutory requirements; (2) A.M. was not generally adoptable, and the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a finding that she was specifically adoptable; and (3) the juvenile court erred by not considering the sibling relationship exception before terminating mother’s parental rights.
We conclude mother forfeited her challenges to the assessment report by not objecting to its adequacy in the juvenile court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Leonzer Dell Jones, Jr., pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). Defendant also admitted he had suffered one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In return, the remaining charges and allegations were dismissed. The trial court imposed and suspended a seven-year prison sentence, and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions, including serving 210 days in county jail and participation in a drug rehabilitation program.
After defendant violated several terms of his probation, the trial court terminated defendant’s probation and sentenced defendant to the previously suspended seven-year prison sentence, despite the probation officer recommending defendant be given another chance at probation.

In 2008, in London, a battery in a handheld electronic gaming device started a fire. Previously, Planet Bingo, LLC (Planet Bingo) designed the device, had it manufactured by an independent contractor, and then shipped it to a distributor in the United Kingdom (UK). That distributor has now agreed to pay $2.6 million for the damages caused by the fire and has asserted a claim for this amount against Planet Bingo.
In this action, Planet Bingo is suing its liability insurer, the Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington). According to Planet Bingo, Burlington handled the claim for fire damages negligently and in bad faith, wrongfully failed to defend the claim, and wrongfully denied coverage for the claim. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings against Planet Bingo and in favor of Burlington, on the ground that the fire occurred outside the “coverage territory” as defined in the policy.

Defendant Francisco Humberto Real was convicted of first degree murder for killing Michael Cheatham in an apartment in Corona. Defendant worked for Cheatham’s medical marijuana business, and Cheatham owed defendant money. The prosecutor put on strong evidence that defendant beat Cheatham savagely on the back of the head with a skateboard. As Cheatham lie facedown on the floor bleeding, defendant removed his belt, wrapped it around Cheatham’s neck, and strangled him. The evidence also showed that defendant manufactured a makeshift suppressor for a handgun he probably stole from his brother-in-law and, at some point during the assault on Cheatham, defendant fired the gun but missed Cheatham. The primary cause of Cheatham’s death was blunt force trauma, and ligature strangulation was a contributing cause.

William Casey Aspinall appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Erik Even Daarstad and the Murrieta Valley Unified School District (District; collectively, the District defendants) on Aspinall's claims for negligence and negligent supervision. Aspinall suffered a severe concussion when he and a classmate collided while attempting to intercept a football during a drill in a football physical education (P.E.) class. Although the jury found the District defendants were negligent and had acted recklessly, the jury also found the District's defendants' actions were not a substantial factor in causing harm to Aspinall.
Aspinall contends the court prejudicially erred by misapplying the primary assumption of the risk doctrine (see Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 308) and excluding key expert evidence that would have established the District defendants' actions caused his harm.

A jury found defendant Robert Lee Nelson guilty of various counts including criminal threats and misdemeanor unlawful firearm use in violation of a restraining order. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the People to reopen their case to admit additional evidence regarding the restraining order, after the defense had moved for judgment of acquittal on that count. He also challenges the admission of several law enforcement statements suggesting he had repeated prior contacts with them and was dangerous. Finding no error, we will affirm.