CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Alan Warner and his wife, Patricia Warner, sued Wright Medical Technology, Inc. (Wright Medical), for strict products liability and negligence after a section (the stem) of plaintiff’s hip prosthesis fractured. Plaintiff has since undergone a series of additional surgeries to revise the hip replacement and to address persistent infections in his hip joint, conditions which have substantially and negatively impacted plaintiffs’ quality of life. A jury found plaintiff’s stem suffered from a manufacturing defect and awarded plaintiff $2 million for past pain and suffering and $2 million for future pain and suffering; Mrs. Warner received $500,000 for loss of consortium. After plaintiffs rejected a proposed remittitur, the court ordered a new trial on damages only. Both sides appeal.

Allen K. (father) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights as to S.W., an Indian child, following a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing). Father contends the court did not follow the Indian Child Welfare Act’s placement preferences (ICWA) (25 U.S.C., § 1900 et seq.), and that there is insufficient evidence his continued custody of S.W. was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to her.
We disagree and affirm.

Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence following his guilty plea to robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 1538.5, subd. (m); 211.) Defendant argues his suppression motion should have been granted because the prosecution violated the Harvey-Madden rule. (People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516 (Harvey); People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017 (Madden).) We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Amber Sue Majesty appeals from the court’s order extending her commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026.5.

The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36) permits third strike offenders serving indeterminate life sentences for crimes that are not serious or violent felonies to petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1170.126 et seq.) If a petitioning offender satisfies the statute’s eligibility criteria, they are resentenced as a second strike offender “unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) Defendant and appellant Bobby Joe Jimmerson appeals from an order denying his petition for recall and resentencing of his indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life for his current commitment offense of first degree residential burglary (§ 459) under section 1170.126, subdivision (f). Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the order.

The trial court entered a permanent protective order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) enjoining Chris Figueroa from contact with his former girlfriend, Niesha Goodell. (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq. (all unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code).)
Both Figueroa and Goodell testified that, after a breakup, Figueroa repeatedly made unwanted contact with Goodell, sending numerous text messages as well as waiting outside her work, school, and home to talk to her or attempt physical contact. These events culminated in Figueroa sending Goodell and her new boyfriend an obscene picture in a fit of pique. The trial court found Figueroa had committed acts of domestic violence, which under the statute includes harassment, and imposed a permanent restraining order effective for one year.

A jury convicted Gregory Bernard Lacy (Lacy) of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a minor 10 years old or younger . McLean-Lacy maintains the trial court erred by not staying her sentence under count 14 pursuant to section 654.
We conclude none of Lacy's arguments have merit. However, we agree with McLean-Lacy and, as such, we modify the judgment as to her accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments.

The People appeal from the denial of their motion for reimbursement of costs under Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (b). The appellate division of the Superior Court of San Diego County transferred the matter to this court stating that the amount in controversy exceeded $25,000; thus, it lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter. (§ 1305.5.) We conclude that the matter was erroneously transferred and that we lack statutory jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the matter is remanded to the appellate division of the Superior Court of San Diego County.

The People appeal from the denial of their motion for reimbursement of costs under Penal Code section 1306, subdivision (b). The appellate division of the Superior Court of San Diego County transferred the matter to this court stating that the amount in controversy exceeded $25,000; thus, it lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter. (§ 1305.5.) We conclude that the matter was erroneously transferred and that we lack statutory jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the matter is remanded to the appellate division of the Superior Court of San Diego County.

A jury convicted Maurice Flournoy of one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of aggravated battery (§ 243, subd. (d)). The jury found that Flournoy personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The court found Flournoy had suffered one serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), a "strike" prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Flournoy pled guilty to resisting an executive officer (§ 69); misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2)) and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594).
The court sentenced Flournoy to a determinate term of 15 years four months in prison.

Following a jury trial, defendant Ricardo Antonio Rodriguez was convicted of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle with a prior conviction for the same offense. The trial court placed defendant on three years’ formal probation.
On appeal, he contends trial court should have granted his Penal Code section 1118.1 motion to acquit because the prosecution did not submit evidence that the car’s value exceeded $950. We shall affirm.

After unsuccessfully pursuing relief in the superior court, petitioner Felix Barney brought this petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claims he was incompetent at the time of his plea to a charge of indecent exposure. (See Pen. Code, § 314 [statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code].) We issued an order to show cause returnable to us and referred the matter for a hearing and evidentiary determination by a referee, the Honorable Richard Vlavianos, judge of the San Joaquin County Superior Court.
The referee’s report and findings have been submitted to the court, and the referee has credited overwhelming evidence supporting a finding that petitioner was incompetent when he entered his plea. We reach the same conclusion and shall allow petitioner to withdraw his plea.

Defendant Daquan Javon Cooper pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)—count five of amended information.) Thereafter, a jury found him guilty of two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211—counts two and three of second amended information) and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)—count four). The jury also found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 20 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Defendant further contends the jury’s finding of guilt on the felon in possession of firearm offense is not supported by substantial evidence.

Defendant Daquan Javon Cooper pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)—count five of amended information.) Thereafter, a jury found him guilty of two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211—counts two and three of second amended information) and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)—count four). The jury also found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery offenses. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 20 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Defendant further contends the jury’s finding of guilt on the felon in possession of firearm offense is not supported by substantial evidence.