CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Timothy Scott Clyde of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, causing injury to an elder adult with force likely to cause great bodily injury, and attempting to dissuade a witness. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison.
Defendant now contends (1) he was denied due process and the right to counsel of his choosing when the trial court said defendant’s newly retained counsel would have to comply with the existing trial schedule; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys did not request a continuance; (3) the trial court should have stayed his four-year sentence for attempting to dissuade a witness; and (4) the trial court erred by imposing an enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.15 rather than section 1170.1. In addition, the Attorney General claims (5) the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by staying rather than striking one of the prior prison term enhancements.

D.B. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition to reinstate family reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) and terminating parental rights to her daughter, A.V. (§ 366.26.) Mother contends the court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

In this appeal from a judgment based on a final arbitration award, appellants challenge the denial of their petition to vacate the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(5).) We conclude the petition was properly denied.

Defendant Timothy Lee Allen appeals following his jury conviction of the first degree murder of Taburi Watson, with true findings on allegations the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(4) & (b)(1)(C)), a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing Mr. Watson’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d)&(e)(1)), and defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The jury also convicted defendant of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited by law (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1) (now § 29800)), with a true finding on the gang allegation appended to that count. Defendant admitted a prior robbery conviction. The court sentenced defendant to 80 years to life. s

The City of Pasadena filed a nuisance abatement action against several businesses and individuals related to medical marijuana dispensaries, which are prohibited by the Pasadena Municipal Code (PMC). The defendants in that action later filed a lawsuit against the City of Pasadena, and the two cases were deemed related. In each of the two actions, the trial court granted Pasadena’s request for injunctions, prohibiting defendants from operating their medical marijuana dispensaries in Pasadena. The defendants appealed from each order, and we consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, defendants assert three main arguments: that the relevant Pasadena Municipal Code ordinance sections do not render medical marijuana dispensaries a nuisance per se, one relevant ordinance section was not properly enacted, and counsel for Pasadena lacked authorization to bring the actions. We disagree on each point, and affirm.

In this employment discrimination action, the trial court entered judgment for defendants based on a summary judgment ruling. Plaintiff Leslie Wilkerson appeals, arguing there are triable issues of material fact regarding both the statute of limitations defense and his substantive claims. We conclude summary judgment was properly granted based on the statute of limitations defense and affirm.

Cynthia Somin gave Dashiell Porter a failing grade in her English 101 class at El Camino Community College. Porter responded by going to her office, yelling, and shaking his fists at her. When Somin did not change Porter’s grade, he sent her 14 vulgar and threatening messages through a social media platform over the course of a year. Some of Porter’s messages said he would kill Somin if she did not change his grade.
Somin’s employer filed a petition for a workplace violence restraining order against Porter under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8. After the trial court denied the petition, Somin sought a civil harassment restraining order against Porter under section 527.6. Prior to the hearing on Somin’s petition, Porter requested an accommodation for his learning disabilities and autism pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 1.100. In particular, Porter asked the court to allow his parents to speak on his behalf.

Thomas I. Mahon (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the County of San Mateo (County) and the San Mateo County Board of Supervisors (Board) on his action for inverse condemnation. His claim was predicated on delays in issuing design review permits for two homes he proposed to construct in a residential neighborhood. We affirm.

Respondent Noel Yi is the owner of a vacant lot in Oakland. In 2015, he sued appellants Afrika Town Garden Collective and its members to stop them from maintaining a community garden on his property. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining appellants and anyone acting on their behalf from entering onto or remaining on respondent’s property. We affirm.

Jacob Michael Renshaw (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition to designate his 2009 conviction of second degree burglary as a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 1170.18. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred when it denied his motion because his second degree burglary conviction constituted shoplifting under section 459.5. The People concede the error. We accept the People’s concession as well taken and will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant Matthew Cisneros appeals following his sentencing after pleading no contest to one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code , § 192, subd. (a)), with enhancements for using a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and committing the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Cisneros contends his plea bargain was faulty because he could not properly waive his right to a parole hearing under section 3051. He further contends the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the maximum restitution fines available. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Edward Daniel Martinez pled guilty to trespass by threat (Pen. Code, § 601) and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The court placed him on formal probation for a period of three years and required him to apply for the mental health court program. Defendant subsequently had his probation revoked and reinstated several times, for failing to comply with his probation conditions. He was also accepted into the mental health court program, but was later terminated for refusing to take his prescribed medication. The court eventually terminated defendant’s probation and imposed total terms of 16 months and 60 days. The court also awarded him custody credits, which resulted in him being released.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal, in propria persona, based on the sentence or other matters that occurred after the plea.

Plaintiff and appellant Wayne Siggard sued defendants and respondents Larry J. Hudack and Marianne S. Hudack, and others for malicious prosecution and conspiracy. Larry and Marianne (collectively, the Hudacks) moved the trial court to strike Siggard’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court granted the motion. Siggard contends the trial court erred because Siggard demonstrated a probability of prevailing. We affirm the judgment.

More than six months after defendant Fredy Jaciel Moreno Castro's default was taken in this personal injury action, he moved for relief from the default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The trial court denied his motion, finding it had no power to relieve the default on the grounds of excusable neglect and that equitable relief from the default was not available because Castro had not shown any extrinsic fraud. Thereafter, the trial court denied Castro's motion for reconsideration, conducted a prove-up hearing and entered judgment in Loving-Spears's favor in the amount of $564,000.
On appeal, Castro argues: the trial court had the power under section 473, subdivision (a)(1) to relieve him from the default on the grounds of his excusable neglect; that he should have been provided with equitable relief from the default; and that Loving-Spears's counsel had an ethical obligation to advise employees of Castro's insurer before taking Cast