CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted James Wilkerson of one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) and one count of threatening a public officer (§ 71). Wilkerson admitted to three prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668), and one serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)). After striking two of Wilkerson's prior strikes, the trial court sentenced Wilkerson to a nine-year prison term.
Wilkerson makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that insufficient evidence supports the conviction for making a criminal threat (§ 422). Second, he contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to sustain an evidentiary objection based on relevancy during the testimony of a prosecutor who witnessed Wilkerson make the threats at issue in this case. We conclude that Wilkerson's arguments lack merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.

In this action brought pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Res. Code, § 21000 et seq.), plaintiff and appellant 4140 E. Hammer Lane, LLC, appeals from the trial court’s denial of its petition for writ of mandate directing the County of San Joaquin (the County) and its Board of Supervisors (the Board) to vacate its approval of amendments to its general plan and zoning ordinance relative to a certain parcel of real property and its approval of a negative declaration relative to those amendments. Appellant contends the trial court erred in concluding it lacked standing to file suit based on its failure to object to the general plan amendment and zoning ordinance amendment.

In 2012, a jury convicted defendant Isaac Dabour Dawson of second degree robbery, assault with a firearm, being a felon in possession of a firearm, attempted second degree robbery, and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. The jury also found true enhancement allegations for firearm use and personal infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate prison term of 19 years 8 months and an indeterminate prison term of 50 years to life.
Defendant subsequently moved for Proposition 47 resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Although the trial court did not rule on the motion, it determined on its own motion that defendant’s sentence was unauthorized and imposed and stayed additional firearm enhancement sentences.

Plaintiff Belinda Smith obtained two loans from Washington Mutual Bank, FA (Washington Mutual) to purchase a house. The loans were secured by the house. Subsequently, defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan) acquired assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual. Smith defaulted on her loans and JPMorgan initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and purchased the property at a trustee’s sale. Smith filed a complaint and an amended complaint against JPMorgan. The trial court sustained JPMorgan’s demurrer to the amended complaint without leave to amend. Smith appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and in not taking judicial notice of certain documents. In addition, Smith contends she has a constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial on her complaint. We shall affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Robert Dunlap was severely injured when he lost control of a borrowed Ford F-250 pickup truck towing a van, after the van’s right front tire blew out and the truck’s steering locked. Plaintiff and his wife, Jessica Dunlap, sued the seller of the used truck -- defendant Folsom Lake Ford (FLF) -- alleging FLF was liable for failing to replace the truck’s worn ball joints, which caused the truck’s steering to lock.
Vehicle insurers destroyed the truck and the van for salvage before experts could inspect them, through no fault of the parties.
A jury found defendant liable and awarded damages to the Dunlaps.
FLF appeals, contending plaintiffs’ expert evidence was speculative, and the destruction of the vehicles left plaintiffs unable to prove causation. FLF argues the trial court made evidentiary and instructional errors in allowing the case to go to the jury, and the court erred in denying FLF’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or new

Appellants Brandon Eib, Michael Brunson, and Jared Brown (Appellants) sued Sizzler USA Restaurants, Inc., C Food Concepts, Inc., and coworker Rebekah Johnson (Respondents) claiming they were subjected to sexual harassment, retaliation, negligent supervisions/retention, assault, battery, and wrongful termination while employed at a Sizzler restaurant in Sacramento.
After some discovery and an unsuccessful mediation, Respondents made offers of compromise to each of the appellants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998 which offers included an agreement that Respondents would pay Appellants’ attorney fees incurred prior to October 29, 2013, in an amount to be agreed upon or, failing an agreement, in an amount to be determined by the court. Appellants appeal contending the trial court arbitrarily reduced counsels’ hourly rates and time, arbitrarily denied Appellants’ expert witness fees, and, the request being unopposed, should have granted a 1.2 lodestar multiplier.

This case -- the subject of prior appeals and a bankruptcy stay -- deals with redevelopment contracts entered in May 2000 between plaintiff Civic Partners Stockton, LLC (Civic) and defendants City of Stockton (City) and Redevelopment Agency of the City of Stockton (Agency). On our own motion we take judicial notice (Evid. Code, § 459) that, following the legislative dissolution of redevelopment agencies, the City of Stockton has become the Agency’s successor. (City Resolution No. 11-0251, Aug. 23, 2011, implementing Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, chs. 5-6.) Since the pertinent events occurred before dissolution, we use the term “Agency” to avoid confusion.
In the operative “FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR RESTITUTION,” Civic claims the City and Agency breached contracts for Civic to redevelop a hotel building, instead gave the project to new developers, and transferred to them Civic’s development plans and partnership agreement with a third party to market tax cre

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), Y.S. (Mother) appeals from the dispositional order, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the removal of her then five-year-old son I.V. from her custody after the juvenile court sustained a supplemental dependency petition under section 387. We agree with Mother that the removal order is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the disposition order.

Appellant Mahealani Leialohakala Austin and two codefendants used a gun to steal money from several Antelope Valley pharmacies and pizza restaurants during 2011 and 2012. A 31-count information filed July 17, 2014 charged the trio with numerous counts of second degree robbery and kidnapping to commit robbery, as well as other related offenses, including conspiracy to commit robbery and making criminal threats, plus firearm enhancements. All three defendants faced life in prison due to the aggravated kidnapping charges, which the court declined to dismiss pursuant to defendants’ section 995 motions.

Plaintiff and appellant Earl J. Dieckman II contends that the trial court erred by dismissing defendant and respondent Roxanne Lamar-Reed from Dieckman’s personal injury suit with prejudice, after Dieckman had filed a pretrial request to dismiss Lamar-Reed without prejudice. We agree, and, accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice.

Plaintiff and appellant Earl J. Dieckman II contends that the trial court erred by dismissing defendant and respondent Roxanne Lamar-Reed from Dieckman’s personal injury suit with prejudice, after Dieckman had filed a pretrial request to dismiss Lamar-Reed without prejudice. We agree, and, accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice.

The instant appeal presents a single issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that defendant Guillermo Garcia Hernandez (defendant) had willfully violated a condition of formal probation requiring him to “[k]eep probation officer advised of [his] residence and work and home telephone numbers at all times.” Defendant had been deported to Mexico shortly after pleading no contest in 2011 to felony aggravated assault and being placed on three years’ formal probation. Defendant reentered the United States in 2017.
Because the evidence supports that defendant (1) was informed of the term of formal probation requiring him to advise the probation department of his residence address and work and home telephone numbers, and (2) had access in Mexico to means of communicating with the probation department; and that the latter term of probation was not “futile” even when defendant resided in Mexico, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and af

Plaintiff Jeremy Johnson was riding his motorcycle when he was struck by an automobile driven by defendant Tomoe Michino (Mrs. Michino). A jury found in favor of Johnson, who was severely injured, and awarded him $2,434,264.85 in damages. Mrs. Michino and her husband, defendant Mitch Michino (Mr. Michino), contend on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their pre-trial motion to continue the trial and to reopen discovery. They claim that if they “had been allowed even a short continuance to conduct discovery and designate experts, they would have been able to present expert testimony to rebut [Johnson’s] claims, including [Johnson’s] claims related to his speed at the time of the accident, and to otherwise prepare for trial.”
We conclude that because the Michinos’ motion to continue the trial and to reopen discovery did not include a request to extend the time for designating expert witnesses, that issue was not before the trial court.

Appellant Wayne E. Woods appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 36 (the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012), codified in Penal Code section 1170.126. The trial court concluded that he was ineligible for resentencing because in the commission of the subject crime (stalking), he intended to cause great bodily injury, thus making the crime a serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)), and also rendering him ineligible under section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2). He contends that in making this finding, the court wrongly applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the recent decision in People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225 (Frierson), which held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to make such a finding, we agree.