CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant D.D. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order arguing the court failed to determine the maximum term of confinement and to calculate his custody credits. Both parties agree the matter must be remanded. Appellant further argues on remand the court cannot impose an aggregated sentence because appellant was not provided sufficient notice. We remand to the juvenile court to specify the maximum period of confinement, exercising its discretion whether to impose an aggregated term, and to calculate appellant’s custody credits.

Appellant D.D. appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order arguing the court failed to determine the maximum term of confinement and to calculate his custody credits. Both parties agree the matter must be remanded. Appellant further argues on remand the court cannot impose an aggregated sentence because appellant was not provided sufficient notice. We remand to the juvenile court to specify the maximum period of confinement, exercising its discretion whether to impose an aggregated term, and to calculate appellant’s custody credits.

These consolidated appeals pertain to the administration of a group self-insurance plan that secured the workers’ compensation liabilities of group members from 2003 until 2009. In late 2009, the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that this self-insured group (SIG) lacked sufficient assets to cover its liabilities and ordered the group self-insurer, Preferred Auto Dealers Self Insurance Program, Inc. (PADSIP), to take corrective action. In 2011, PADSIP resolved to raise funds by imposing an “assessment” on all former group members. After several former members refused to pay their invoices, PADSIP filed the underlying action for breach of contract. These consolidated appeals pertain to the administration of a group self-insurance plan that secured the workers’ compensation liabilities of group members from 2003 until 2009.

James Davis appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of U.S. Bank. He contends the trial court erred in finding he lacked standing to pursue his claims. We affirm.

James Davis appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of U.S. Bank. He contends the trial court erred in finding he lacked standing to pursue his claims. We affirm.

Defendant Stanley Moore appeals from a final judgment following a court trial, raising one issue: was the evidence sufficient to find him guilty of attempted murder?
We conclude yes, and affirm the judgment.

After plaintiff Park Lane Associates, LP (Park Lane) won summary judgment against defendants Joseph and Michele Alioto (the Aliotos) in this unlawful detainer action under the Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.), judgment for restitution of possession of the Aliotos’ apartment was entered in Park Lane’s favor. The Aliotos moved for a new trial. While their motion was pending, Park Lane obtained a judgment against the Aliotos in a previously-filed unlawful detainer action for failure to pay rent, and a return on a writ of possession was filed with the court confirming the Aliotos had vacated the apartment. After Park Lane filed a request for judicial notice of these facts, the trial court denied the Aliotos’ motion for new trial as moot. The Aliotos now appeal from the judgment, and from the orders granting summary judgment and denying a new trial. We agree with the trial court that the action is moot and dismiss the appeal.

After plaintiff Park Lane Associates, LP (Park Lane) won summary judgment against defendants Joseph and Michele Alioto (the Aliotos) in this unlawful detainer action under the Ellis Act (Gov. Code, § 7060 et seq.), judgment for restitution of possession of the Aliotos’ apartment was entered in Park Lane’s favor. The Aliotos moved for a new trial. While their motion was pending, Park Lane obtained a judgment against the Aliotos in a previously-filed unlawful detainer action for failure to pay rent, and a return on a writ of possession was filed with the court confirming the Aliotos had vacated the apartment. After Park Lane filed a request for judicial notice of these facts, the trial court denied the Aliotos’ motion for new trial as moot. The Aliotos now appeal from the judgment, and from the orders granting summary judgment and denying a new trial. We agree with the trial court that the action is moot and dismiss the appeal.

A jury convicted Justin Ralph Mitchell of two residential burglaries and a host of other theft-related and drug-related charges. In this appeal, Mitchell challenges the jury instructions in several respects. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to give CALCRIM No. 373 (Other Perpetrator) or CALCRIM No. 370 (Motive), and we find harmless error in the trial court’s failure to give an instruction on accomplice testimony and in its inadvertent reading of CALCRIM No. 361. We accordingly affirm.

A jury convicted Justin Ralph Mitchell of two residential burglaries and a host of other theft-related and drug-related charges. In this appeal, Mitchell challenges the jury instructions in several respects. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to give CALCRIM No. 373 (Other Perpetrator) or CALCRIM No. 370 (Motive), and we find harmless error in the trial court’s failure to give an instruction on accomplice testimony and in its inadvertent reading of CALCRIM No. 361. We accordingly affirm.

A jury convicted Justin Ralph Mitchell of two residential burglaries and a host of other theft-related and drug-related charges. In this appeal, Mitchell challenges the jury instructions in several respects. We find no error in the trial court’s decision to give CALCRIM No. 373 (Other Perpetrator) or CALCRIM No. 370 (Motive), and we find harmless error in the trial court’s failure to give an instruction on accomplice testimony and in its inadvertent reading of CALCRIM No. 361. We accordingly affirm.

The Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of K.P. shortly after her birth. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1) (failure to protect).) At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court removed K.P. from the custody of her mother, A.P. (mother), and declared K.P. a dependent child of the court. It also appointed K.P.’s counsel to serve as an educational rights holder, sharing educational rights as to K.P. with mother.
We reverse the court’s educational rights order, concluding that it had no authority to appoint a co-holder of educational rights to share decision-making as to educational and developmental services with mother.

Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (former § 11364.1). He also admitted that he had one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced defendant to 32 months in prison, which was deemed satisfied by credit for time served.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his post-plea Marsden motion. He argues that he was not receiving adequate legal representation, because his counsel failed to file a motion to withdraw the plea based on defendant’s unawareness at the time of the plea that he would have to wear an ankle monitor on parole. Defendant further argues that he had the right to seek withdrawal of his plea where legitimate grounds existed, even if his counsel did not believe it was in defendant’s best interest.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Pedro Alvarez appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of three counts of custodial possession of a weapon (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a) - counts 1, 5, and 6), two counts of assault by a state prisoner (§ 4501 - counts 2 and 4), and one count of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a) - count 3). As to count 5, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 969f, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant committed attempted murder (count 3) with premeditation and deliberation. Defendant admitted that he had suffered four strike priors (§ 1170.12). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 52 years to life in state prison.