CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Robert Clifford Shaw was placed on probation after he pleaded no contest to selling cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), transportation of cocaine (ibid.), possession for sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), possession of oxycodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), possession of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (a)), driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 21552, subd. (b)), and being under the influence of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)).
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) and his motion to dismiss (Pen. Code, § 995). Defendant argues he was subjected to “an unconstitutional detention and search” when the police stopped his vehicle because its rear center brake light was not working. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation.

Dan Lejerskar appeals from an order compelling him to pay $63,000 in attorney fees to the attorney who represented his former wife, Eva Lejerskar, in this marital dissolution proceeding. Dan’s primary argument is that because the court had earlier determined the parties had a “valid and enforceable” settlement agreement which included an arbitration clause, the court lacked jurisdiction to award any further relief, including attorney fees, in the case. He is incorrect.
The existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement only means that the parties to that agreement have the option to seek its enforcement, should either choose to do so. However, an arbitration agreement is not self-executing and in the absence of an order enforcing it — and staying further proceedings in the trial court — the agreement has no effect on the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine issues that fall within its scope.

A jury convicted Alfonso Kee Kee Peterson of attempted human trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code, §§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1), 664, subd. (a) [count 1]; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1) [count 2]), and attempted pimping (§§ 266h, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a) [count 3]). Peterson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the pandering, attempted human trafficking, and attempted pimping convictions. He also argues we must reverse his conviction for attempted pimping because it is a lesser included offense of attempted human trafficking. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

A jury convicted Javier David Esparza of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; all statutory citations are to the Penal Code), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury also found true allegations that Esparza used a firearm in the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that he committed the robbery, received the stolen property, and possessed the firearm for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced Esparza to an aggregate term of 23 years.
Esparza challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his active gang participation conviction and the jury’s conclusion he committed the other offenses for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang. As we explain, these challenges are without merit, and we therefore

Plaintiff Bann-Shiang Liza Yu appeals from a judgment entered by the court in favor of defendant West Bend Mutual Insurance Company despite her demand for a jury trial. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract, bad faith, and equitable contribution, indemnity, and subrogation, all based on assignments of rights by parties and their insurers with whom she had settled an underlying construction defect action.
Plaintiff claims the court violated her right to a jury trial by entering judgment in favor of defendant without using a proper procedural vehicle. She also argues the court erroneously interpreted the underlying settlement agreements and assignments of rights. Finally, she contends the court erroneously dismissed her peremptory challenge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6; all further statutory references are to this code.)
We agree there was no proper procedural vehicle for the court to enter judgment in favor of defendant.

G.G. (mother) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested post-permanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3), denying her request for reinstatement of reunification services under section 388 and setting a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan of adoption for her now nine-year-old son, Jay.R., and eight-year-old daughter, Gen.R. (collectively, the children). Mother contends the juvenile court’s decision was based strictly on the children’s preference for their foster family and must be vacated. We deny the petition.

Defendant Dontrell Blinks was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon; possession of ammunition by a felon; gang participation; and misdemeanor obstruction of a peace officer. The information further alleged: as to counts 1 through 3, he was convicted of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm in 2003 and gang participation in 2012, both of which constitute “strike” offenses and serious felonies; as to counts 1 through 3, he served prison terms for the aforementioned 2003 and 2012 convictions as well as a 2004 conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon; as to count 1, he was armed with a deadly weapon; and, as to counts 1 and 2, he committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged.

Victor Alvarado appeals from his conviction for committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14. He argues a confession the police obtained from him in this case was involuntary and was erroneously admitted into evidence, thereby violating his due process rights. He further argues evidence of a prior, uncharged sex offense was also erroneously admitted into evidence, again leading to a violation of due process. We reject both of these contentions. Alvarado finally argues the trial court erroneously ordered him to submit to an AIDS test. The People concede the issue. We will remand the matter for further proceedings in this regard, at the election of the prosecution. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Richard Angel Garcia was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4), count 1.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled no contest. The trial court withheld pronouncement of judgment and placed defendant on probation for three years. He violated his probation several times before the court terminated probation and sentenced him to the midterm of three years in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Rudy Jesse Moreno pled guilty to carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) in case No. RIF1701054. At the same hearing, he pled guilty to carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) in case No. RIF1701176, pursuant to another plea agreement. In accordance with the agreements, the court sentenced defendant to three years in state prison in case No. RIF1701054 and a consecutive term of one year eight months in case No. RIF1701176.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in case No. RIF1701176, challenging the validity of the plea. He requested a certificate of probable cause, which the court granted. Defendant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal in case No. RIF1701054. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jesus Balderama appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition to withdraw his no contest plea from 1992, filed under Penal Code section 1016.5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the minute order of the plea hearing was sufficient, admissible evidence that defendant was advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. We affirm.

C.S., mother of the minor, Matthew G., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and adopting a permanent plan of adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26 & 395; unspecified statutory references are to this code.) Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the minor was likely to be adopted. She further contends there was a less detrimental permanent plan based on the minor’s close bond with her, and thus the court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. Finding neither claim has merit, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

This case is about what information the Governor and Board of Parole Hearings (collectively, the board) may consider when determining whether a person convicted of a crime punishable with an indeterminate life sentence is suitable or unsuitable for parole.
Plaintiff James Menefield first contends that California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402 (section 2402) conflicts with the text of Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (b) because the regulation allows the board to consider factors other than “the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses” in determining parole suitability. (Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (b)(1).) In addition, he argues that the board’s current practice of denying parole to life prisoners based on minor and administrative misconduct violates the due process rights of inmates.

J.D. (the minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s order revoking his probation and committing him to the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800.) The minor contends: (1) The court erred by finding he had failed to complete a required alcohol and drug assessment, because his failure to do so was not willful. (2) The court erred by finding he had committed an offense under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). His purported confession was uncorroborated, in violation of the corpus delicti rule. But even if that rule does not apply, there was no admissible evidence of the offense because the purported recording of his confession was not properly authenticated.