CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Jarrod Boxie of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. He was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in (1) not ordering the disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant, (2) denying his motion for a new trial, and (3) staying a gang enhancement. We conclude the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for disclosure of the informant’s identify, or denying a new trial. As to the gang enhancement, the attorney general concedes and we agree it should be stricken.
In supplemental briefing, defendant contends that legislation effective January 1, 2018, ending the statutory prohibition on a trial court’s ability to strike a firearm enhancement applies and requires a remand for a new sentencing hearing. We agree that the new legislation applies retroactively to defendant, however, we conclude a remand for resentencing is not required.

Sandra V., born in 1997, appeals from a juvenile court order terminating non-minor dependent jurisdiction. Since the inception of this appeal, the juvenile court has again assumed jurisdiction over Sandra. The appeal is, therefore, moot, and we are without jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the appeal.

Dallin H. appeals from a five-year restraining order that the trial court entered pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA), Family Code section 6200 et. seq. Dallin contends that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and abused its discretion in deciding to grant the order. He also argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request to continue the hearing. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Gary Crownover of robbery, in violation of Penal Code section 211, and also found true an allegation pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), that Crownover personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. The trial court sentenced Crownover to 12 years in prison, including a 10-year firearm enhancement, pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b).

Carmel C. Harper, in propria persona, appeals from a postjudgment order of the superior court terminating her spousal support from her ex-husband, Andrew Harper. We affirm.

Gombert (Mike) Yepremyan was shot and killed on November 18, 2009. Defendants and appellants Vahagn Jurian, Zareh Manjikian, and Khatun Vardanian were tried for his killing. A jury convicted all defendants of conspiracy to commit assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code , §§ 182, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and convicted Jurian and Manjikian of first degree murder (§ 187). Additionally, the jury made true findings with respect to Jurian and Vardanian that a principal in the offense was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1); and that Manjikian had personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)).
The trial court sentenced Vardanian to probation for five years, Manjikian to prison for 50 years to life, and Jurian to prison for 25 years to life.
For the reasons discussed below, the judgments are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Orzell Long appeals in propria persona from a workplace violence restraining order. Because we conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the lower court’s decision to issue the restraining order, we shall affirm.

Defendant Oscar Gilberto Patino was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 60 years to life after a jury found him guilty of 12 felonies and their accompanying enhancement allegations. All of the charges related to sexual acts committed against minors.
The major issues on this appeal concern testimony provided at trial about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). “It is beyond dispute that CSAAS testimony is inadmissible to prove that a molestation actually occurred. It can be highly prejudicial if not properly handled by the trial court. It is unusual evidence in that it is expert testimony designed to explain the state of mind of a complaining witness. The particular aspects of CSAAS are as consistent with false testimony as with true testimony. For these reasons, the admissibility of such testimony must be handled carefully by the trial court.

Defendants Mohammed Khan and Manuel Trujillo were convicted by a jury of first degree murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter. Khan was also convicted of cultivation of marijuana, and an arming enhancement was found true as to Trujillo. Trujillo and Kahn both appeal, Trujillo making three fundamental arguments in which Khan joins: (1) instructional error; (2) insufficiency of evidence in three particulars; and (3) double jeopardy. Khan makes an additional argument, insufficiency of evidence as to the conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that none of the arguments has merit, and we affirm.

K.F. (hereafter “mother”) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile court’s orders terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing with respect to her son, J.F. Mother claims she should have been granted additional reunification services because the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) failed to provide her with reasonable services and failed to facilitate visitation.
For the reasons stated below, we will deny mother’s writ petition.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Thomas H. Schulte, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Motion to dismiss appeal. Request for Judicial Notice. Order on preliminary injunction affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Order allowing receiver to hire counsel affirmed. Motion and request denied.

Defendant Matthew Tye appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for court approval of his girlfriend to accompany him and to be his adult monitor, while in the presence of minors, as mandated by his probation conditions. Defendant primarily contends the court was required to approve his girlfriend. We disagree.
Defendant also raises a host of other contentions regarding the conduct of the hearing on the petition and the probation conditions at issue. These contentions are (a) moot, (b) meritless, (c) waived, or (d) not subject to review in this appeal. Thus, we will decline to address some of them, reject the others, and affirm the challenged order.

In this appeal, we review the trial court’s decision to grant two anti-SLAPP motions filed by five of the 11 defendants named in Dan W. Baer’s malicious prosecution action. This task is somewhat complicated by the fact this is the seventh appeal to follow complex litigation that has spanned over two decades.
The original complaint, filed in 1996, arises out of business dealings between Baer and an attorney, David H. Tedder, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It began as an action filed by Tedder as general partner of a multitude of Nevada limited partnerships he created for clients as part of “asset protection” services he provided for those clients. Tedder sued on behalf of the limited partnerships to recover on loans they allegedly made to Baer’s two corporations to acquire real estate owned by the corporations. Baer’s corporations and Tedder cross-complained against each other seeking to determine their respective interests in the real estate and other busin

A jury convicted Rodrigo Gabriel Garcia and Ignacio Flores Vasquez of attempted murder. Garcia was the direct perpetrator of an assault with a knife; Vasquez was one of two alleged aiders and abettors. In an earlier opinion, we reversed Garcia’s conviction because the trial court failed to provide the jurors with an imperfect self-defense instruction. (People v. Garcia (May 18, 2017, G052567) [nonpub. opn.].)
In this appeal, Vasquez argues there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of attempted murder, the pattern jury instruction regarding a defendant’s flight from the scene of a crime violates due process, and the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the defense of imperfect self-defense.
We find sufficient evidence to sustain Vasquez’s conviction. We also hold that the flight instruction does not violate due process.